Russian gambit: Yeltsin's crisis leadership from devaluation to Pristina by Cavan, Susan J.
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Theses & Dissertations Boston University Theses & Dissertations
2014
Russian gambit: Yeltsin's crisis
leadership from devaluation to
Pristina
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/15302
Boston University
BOSTON UNIVERSITY 
 
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES 
 
 
 
 
 
Dissertation 
 
 
 
 
 
RUSSIAN GAMBIT: 
 
YELTSIN’S CRISIS LEADERSHIP FROM DEVALUATION TO PRISTINA 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
 
 
 
SUSAN J. CAVAN 
 
A.B., Boston College, 1984 
M.A., Boston University, 1992 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
 
requirements for the degree of 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
2014
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2014 
 SUSAN J. CAVAN 
 All rights reserved
 
Approved by 
 
 
 
 
 
First Reader ___________________________________________________ 
 Walter D. Connor, Ph.D. 
 Professor of Political Science, International Relations, and 
 Sociology 
 
 
Second Reader ___________________________________________________ 
 David Mayers, Ph.D. 
 Professor of Political Science and History 
 
 
Third Reader ___________________________________________________ 
 Michael Corgan Ph.D. 
 Associate Professor of International Relations 
  
 
  iv 
DEDICATION 
 
 
 
 
To my parents, 
 
whose love, faith, and support made all things possible. 
  v 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
 
I was fortunate as a graduate student to benefit from three remarkable mentors.  
The first is Walter D. Connor, my dissertation adviser, wise counselor, and fellow 
Irish music enthusiast.  He and his wonderful wife Eileen have been amazingly 
supportive friends, even turning over their house keys when I needed a refuge.  
Thank you both so much for the friendship, advice, support, and laughter. 
 
Bill Green, formerly a Professor of International Relations at Boson University, 
knew how to push, and then shove, when a graduate student needed a little 
encouragement.  His practical advice and wisdom guided me through my studies 
in the early Post-Soviet years and started me on the path to this dissertation.  His 
friendship and witty intellect are sorely missed. 
 
Professor Uri Ra’anan was assigned as my adviser during my studies for the 
Masters in International Relations, and I have been learning from him ever since.  
As Director at the Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology & Policy at B.U., he 
devised a database project of Soviet and post-Soviet studies and created a 
graduate student research team to train in policy analysis and keep on top of 
political developments across the territory of the former Soviet Union.  Professor 
Ra’anan shared his knowledge and instincts for Kremlinology and Foreign Policy 
  vi 
in the classroom, at research team and informal student meetings, and through 
the Simulex Crisis Decision-Making Exercises.  He also oversaw the dispersal of 
tens of thousands of dollars in graduate student assistance, of which I was a 
grateful beneficiary.  After I suffered an acute illness, Professor Ra’anan 
welcomed me back to the Institute as Deputy Director and encouraged a return 
to my studies.  My gratitude for his generosity is immeasurable. 
 
My colleagues at ISCIP over the years also have had a profound effect upon my 
studies, especially my dear friend, Kate Martin, now a tenured professor and 
living the dream!  Monika Shepherd, Robyn Angley, Fabian Adami, Tammy 
Lynch, and my Boston kids Allison Christenson, Roheet Shah, and Sarah Uziel 
all have been wellsprings of support and encouragement, and provided the 
intellectual stimulation I needed to keep going.  I also have benefitted immensely 
from the U.S. Air Force’s National Defense Fellows and the U.S. Navy’s Federal 
Executive Fellows who were seconded to the Institute, joined ISCIP’s research 
team, and contributed immensely to our work.  I had a lot to learn from our 
military fellows, and I thank each and every one of them for helping to educate 
me…and for their service to our country.  Several former ISCIP fellows were both 
great colleagues and supportive just when I needed it:  Gordon Hahn, Joe Gibbs, 
Miriam Lanskoy, Chandler Rosenberger, Sarah Miller, Mike Thurman, Mark 
Jones, Luba Schwartzman, Myles Smith, Alexey Dynkin, Creelea Henderson, 
  vii 
Sergei Tokmakov, and, of course, my friend Peter Lorenz, with whom I shared 
countless coffees and conversations at the Trident. 
 
I am deeply grateful to the members of my dissertation defense committee: David 
Mayers, Mike Corgan, Judy Swanson, and Christine Rossell.  I greatly appreciate 
your willingness to take on my dissertation and your help to improve it. 
 
I was encouraged in this work by the support of some wonderful friends 
(including, of course, my “oldest, dearest” Annie Shea) and family members, who 
rooted for me to keep going and to finish. 
 
I would be remiss not to toss a bone to Banba, my faithful companion and the 
most fabulous dog ever.  Thank you for not complaining too much that I was 
working when we could have been out for a walk. 
 
Go raibh mile agat! 
  viii 
RUSSIAN GAMBIT: 
YELTSIN’S CRISIS LEADERSHIP FROM DEVALUATION TO PRISTINA 
 
SUSAN J. CAVAN 
 
 
Boston University Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, 2014 
 
Major Professor: Walter D. Connor, Ph.D., Professor of Political Science, 
International Relations, and Sociology 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
This work is an analysis of Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s decision-making 
process in the context of both foreign and domestic policy crises.  The timeframe 
selected encompasses July 1998, as the Russian economy faltered and headed 
to eventual currency devaluation through June 1999, when NATO’s air campaign 
in Kosovo ended through mediation proposed by Yeltsin and negotiated in part 
by his former prime minister, Viktor Chernomyrdin. 
 
The framework of this study is centered on Robert D. Putnam’s “two-level game” 
model, and the focus on Yeltsin as leader and decision maker follows work in 
International Relations theory by Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, Valerie Hudson, 
James D. Fearon, and Margaret Hermann among others. Yeltsin’s personality, as 
well as the particulars of his biography, specifically involving the status of his 
health, contribute to the atmosphere in which Yeltsin made decisions, and 
  ix 
therefore are important elements of the study.   The Russian-U.S. relationship, 
which forms a foundational base to the crises and their resolution during this 
timeframe, also displays a high degree of personalization and figures prominently 
in the work.   
 
In describing the crisis situations in which Yeltsin’s decisions evolved, this study 
also provides insight into Yeltsin’s perceptions (or misperceptions) of the 
environment in which he operated.  This includes his focus on the revanchist 
element in the parliament and his evaluation of the importance of the 
interpersonal relationships he had developed over the years with other state 
leaders.  Yeltsin’s view of the Russian state, as well as his goals for Russia, both 
domestically, in the form of the transition to a market economy, and in foreign 
policy, in the form of greater acceptance and cooperation with western states, 
also constitutes an integral part of this study. 
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1.  Study in Context 
 
 
This work examines the relationship between Russian domestic and foreign 
policy over a defined time period as a case study of the interaction between 
domestic policy and foreign policy and the influence of international institutions.  
At its core, this study is meant to enhance the understanding of foreign policy 
through an analysis of the interplay of domestic and international factors as 
Russian President Boris Yeltsin and his leadership team formulated Russian 
foreign policy during periods of both domestic and international crisis.  The 
ambitions of this study flow from its conceptual wellspring: Foreign Policy 
Analysis (FPA) and the importance it concentrates on individual leaders and the 
decisions they make.  It is hoped that this work provides a strong case for the 
intricacy of the interaction of foreign and domestic elements in state foreign 
policy creation, particularly in the hands of an exceptional political leader. 
   
International Relations theory has been dominated by debate regarding the 
nature of the international system, the level of analysis in approach to the 
explanation of systemic issues, and relatedly, the definition of the actor featured 
in the analysis.   There certainly also has been debate over the importance of 
domestic practices and international behavior, such as underlies the democratic 
peace debate. However, the field of Foreign Policy Analysis, in general, had 
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been seen as the domain of practitioners – those concerned with both the 
context and mechanics of state policy for the practical policy implications.   Early 
research bears the mark of this theoretical versus practical distinction, and there 
has been some effort to cordon off the realms of international politics and foreign 
policy formulation seemingly from cross-theoretical contamination.   However, 
with the collapse of the Soviet Union and disintegration of the bipolar 
international structure, the field of international relations has been more open to 
approaches focusing on cultural, social, and psychological elements, which serve 
to broaden the base of IR theory. 
 
While the end of the Cold War marks a blossoming of less systemic approaches 
to IR theory, there is substantial earlier work that informs the more recent 
scholarship.  Certainly the work of Robert Putnam and his “two-level game” 
concept are foundational to this study.  The intention to examine President 
Yeltsin’s use of and response to domestic and foreign pressures rests on 
Putnam’s framework:  “the two-level approach recognizes that central decision-
makers strive to reconcile domestic and international imperatives 
simultaneously.”1   
 
There is a decidedly psychological aspect in the examination of the decision-
making of state leaders, and the work of Robert Jervis (1976), Margaret 
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Hermann and Joe Hagan (1998), as well as Margaret Hermann, Thomas 
Preston, Baghat Korany, and Timothy M. Shaw (2001), Peter Katzenstein (1998), 
Valerie Hudson and Christopher Vore (1995), Valerie Hudson (2002), Richard C. 
Snyder, H.W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin (2002), James Fearon (1998), and many 
others expand the field through their determination to consider the individual 
decision-maker and his/her perceptions of both the inputs and the “lay of the 
land” in their analyses.   
 
In his consideration of post-Cold War leadership, Jervis notes: The focus of 
individual loyalties, the governmental units that form, and the kinds of nationalism 
that thrive will be influenced by the values and choices of leaders.  The external 
environment and material conditions are certainly important, but I doubt if they 
will entirely determine our fates.”2  
 
This focus on the individual infuses the concept underlying this work and is 
spurred on by calls for further research.    The contrast between Cold War and 
post-Cold War scholarship speaks to the very circumstances of the transitional 
era under consideration in this work.  “If our IR theories contain no human 
beings, they will erroneously paint for us a world of no change, no creativity, no 
persuasion, no accountability.  And yet virtually none of our mainstream IR 
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theories over the decades of the Cold War placed human beings in the 
theoretical mix.”3  
 
The context of decision-making is an area critical to this study that is nudged to 
the forefront by a number of analysts contemplating further research.  Following 
and updating the research of Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, the authors Chollet & 
Goldgeiger point future analysts to broaden their research and focus:   
“[S]cholars…must do more to understand the context of decision: more care 
must be taken to get the fullest sense of the policy-making environment – what 
sort of other choices they are facing, what other pressures they are under, and 
what kind of information they are getting.  A policy-maker’s attention and 
intellectual resources are finite.  How they grapple with time pressures and 
simultaneity will therefore continue to be necessary (and fruitful) areas of 
research.”4   
 
In an argument particularly relevant to this undertaking, the authors argue the 
need to cross the streams of scholarship and policy-making:   “What we want in 
fact is to integrate propositions about decision-making in specific situations with 
larger structural factors in international politics to generalize about behavior. (…)  
[W]e aren’t just trying to explain decision-making processes and choices, we are 
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also trying to be policy relevant in order to help decision-makers do better with 
processes and choices.”5  
 
The importance of policy analysis and an understanding of the process is an end 
in itself, as well as for its possible policy implications, and informs the choice to 
place Russia in 1999 at the center of this work.  Russia is the successor state to 
a former superpower, it was in the midst of a prolonged transition from the Soviet 
system in its politics, economy and civil society; its economy, while undergoing a 
domestic transformation, was simultaneously in the process of integrating into 
the world economy–a process that involved not only foreign advice and advisers, 
but collaboration with a range of international economic institutions, most notably 
the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.   There were, likewise, political 
and military organizations with which Russia forged new relationships, notably 
NATO, the E.U., and the United Nations.  
 
During the period under consideration in this study, Russia also was on the verge 
of it first post-Soviet leadership succession and had neither established nor fully 
accepted a mechanism to accomplish this transition.6  For the duration of the 
period considered in this work, the Russian president was in poor health – a fact 
acknowledged when President Yeltsin was required to undergo a multi-valve 
heart bypass operation in the immediate aftermath of his election to a second 
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term as Russian president.  The first-ever Russian presidential transition loomed 
during this timeframe and seemed to ensure that domestic politics could not fade 
behind the demands of international negotiations, even with the Kosovo crisis 
flaring in Europe.  For the presidential team, the transition was not only unfamiliar 
territory but inhospitable – Yeltsin’s failing health, past unseemly antics, and 
apparent distance from the actual work of daily governance had soured his 
image and given various opposition groups fertile ground within the electorate.   
Threats, corruption charges, scandals, and the possibility of a revanchist 
communist resurgence injected uncertainty into the fate of the post-presidential 
private citizen, Boris Yeltsin, and his “Family” (including advisers and 
associates).  Without any recent democratic precedents as a guide, the transition 
was a potentially existential quandary for the Yeltsin leadership team.   
 
The timeframe selected for this study is meant to take advantage of the 
unprecedented openness of post-Soviet Russia.  For a brief period, the Kremlin 
was a treasure of resources in state decision-making, with presidential ukazy  
(decrees) published and widely discussed, presidential associates gave 
interviews and wrote memoirs detailing the presidential decision-making process, 
and the Russian media experienced a (relatively short) window of access and 
political analysis that provided even greater insight into Russia’s political 
development.   
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There are also a number of excellent memoirs from American officials, who detail 
negotiations and meetings with Russian interlocutors, and, of course with Yeltsin.  
Contemporary interviews with decision-makers throughout the Kosovo 
negotiation process and NATO air campaign provide a remarkably candid 
recording of events and experiences.  Significant documents and 
correspondence regarding Kosovo from the Clinton Administration were 
declassified during the preparation of this thesis and buttress the first hand 
reports of memoirists at crucial moments, including the meetings of American 
national security principals.   
 
Specifically, the time period encompasses July 1998 through June 1999.   The 
events of significance that define the timeframe commence with the date of the 
International Monetary Fund’s promise to provide Russia with emergency bail out 
money in the amount of $17.1 billion in order to shore up the ruble through to the 
agreement reached among the United States, Russia, and NATO on the 
participation of Russian troops in the KFOR deployment in Kosovo.  The focus of 
the study is the interplay of foreign and domestic policies, during a period of 
heightened activity (or high stakes) in both the domestic and foreign arenas.   
 
The study consists of thorough analysis of the domestic and international 
contexts at key moments, specifically the August-September ruble devaluation 
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crisis and impeachment threats against President Yeltsin; the Rambouillet 
negotiations and subsequent decision by NATO to use force against the Serbs; 
the dismissal of the Russian government and threat of impeachment in April-May 
1999; and the decision by Russia to move troops out of Bosnia in order to secure 
Pristina airport under Russian authority.  The work culminates in the 
Chernomyrdin-Ahtisaari mediation that resulted in an end to NATO bombing and 
agreement to station international peacekeepers, including Russian forces, in 
and around Kosovo. 
 
The international crisis at the heart of this study, Kosovo’s struggle for 
independence, Serbian recalcitrance, and the spiraling acts of violence, 
encompassed a combination of deeply resonant issues for the U.S., Russia, 
Europe, and many members of the international community.  The real and 
imagined failures associated with efforts to mediate in Bosnia heightened 
concerns over forced migration and potential genocidal attacks.  Likewise, acts of 
violence in Bosnia, as well as the genocide in Rwanda, already had inspired a 
substantial reconsideration of the limits of state sovereignty – an issue at the 
heart of international actions in Kosovo.  In this specific environment, many state 
leaders involved in the international negotiations were cognizant of a sense of 
historical gravity, which inspired contemporary memoirs, biographies, and 
interviews that provide significant insight into the developing situation.  As 
mentioned above, the declassification of significant Clinton Administration 
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documents regarding Kosovo bolster first person accounts and elucidate further 
details. 
 
In examining Russian foreign policy, my frame of reference will focus on Russia’s 
stated policy in relation to Kosovo, presented through the United Nations Security 
Council, and gauge subsequent changes to the policy against international and 
domestic pressures.  In consideration of domestic policy, there is no baseline 
policy against which to measure decisions, however, during the timeframe under 
consideration Russia had four different prime ministers (one unconfirmed) and 
the context surrounding their appointments, confirmations, rejections, and 
dismissals will serve as the critical domestic moments in this analysis.   
 
This study follows a chronological sequence of events and assesses the 
competing demands of domestic and foreign policy on Russia’s leaders.  A 
sketch of the environment in the first months of the timeframe under 
consideration provides the context for the study: 
 
On July 13, 1998, the International Monetary Fund announced a $17.1 billion 
emergency rescue package for Russia.  Despite an infusion of $4.8 billion, the 
first installment of the bail out, the Russian economy continued to slide toward 
default.  This marks the beginning of the first stage of this proposed study.  On 
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August 17, the Russian Government announced a “controlled devaluation” of the 
ruble and suspended repayment of its international debts.   This economic crisis 
sparked a political showdown as attempts to apportion blame dominated the 
political dialogue.  President Boris Yeltsin dismissed Prime Minister Sergei 
Kiriyenko and his government and sought the return of former Prime Minister 
Viktor Chernomyrdin.  Despite Chernomyrdin’s reputation as a cautious 
moderate, the Russian Duma twice rejected his candidacy.  Constitutionally, a 
third rejection would provoke a broader political crisis as the Duma would be 
dissolved and new elections called.   
 
Alternatively, the Duma could institute impeachment proceedings against the 
president.  In either event, Russia would be struggling through another in a series 
of executive-legislative skirmishes as the economy floundered. 
 
On September 1-2, 1998 U.S. President Clinton (on the verge of his own 
impeachment proceedings) met with President Yeltsin in Moscow for a pre-
arranged summit.  It was a moment to acknowledge the critical situation in 
Russia.  Michael McFaul, currently U.S. Ambassador to Russia, noted at the 
time:  “[T]his is akin to the greatest crisis that Russia's had since becoming an 
independent state. It's a total economic meltdown….   And the real threat now is 
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the political crisis, does this bleed over to cause authoritarian regimes, civil 
war?”7 
 
By September 10, President Yeltsin had turned to another candidate, Foreign 
Minister Yevgeni Primakov.  Before becoming prime minister, Primakov had 
served in the Yeltsin administration as foreign intelligence chief and in the Soviet 
era, he had a long career as a journalist, diplomat, and Middle East specialist.  
His nomination, considered a defeat for the president (who had to abandon his 
first nominee), nonetheless signaled a cooling down in the battle with the 
parliament as this nomination passed smoothly. 
 
While Russia’s inter-branch struggle had been eased, Yeltsin still had to contend 
with a government comprised of a team not entirely of his choosing.  Additionally, 
on September 15, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund decided not 
to release a scheduled tranche of “stabilization” funds to Russia until the 
Primakov government was fully formed and functioning.  Halfway through his 
final presidential term and in poor health, Yeltsin had a catalogue of domestic 
political concerns to command his attention. 
 
Internationally, attention was drawn to the Yugoslav province of Kosovo, where 
Serbian forces clashed with Kosovar Albanians, producing hundreds of 
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thousands of refugees over the course of the summer of 1998.  Despite an 
intensified diplomatic initiative by U.S. Presidential Special Envoy Richard 
Holbrooke, international monitoring was blocked and Kosovo became the focus 
of concentrated diplomatic attention.  The primary locus of activity on Kosovo 
was the “Contact Group,” which had been formed in 1994 to address issues in 
the Bosnia crisis.  Comprised of representatives from the U.N. Security Council 
(UNSC), E.U., U.S., and Russian Federation, the Contact Group provides a 
forum to discuss events in the Balkans, launches diplomatic initiatives, sponsors 
mediation and negotiations, and interacts with the United Nations Security 
Council in drafting UNSC resolutions.   
 
After months of discussion over ongoing events in Kosovo, as well as concerns 
for possible intensification of the crisis (the specter of Bosnia, often manifest as a 
general sense of failure to prevent mass killings and forced population transfers, 
is an oft repeated foundation to key leaders’ attitudes towards Kosovo at this 
time), on September 23, 1998 the UNSC passed Resolution No. 1199, 
demanding that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) cease hostilities in 
Kosovo, particularly “by the security forces affecting the civilian population;” 
enable international monitoring and the provision of humanitarian assistance; and 
set a timetable for political resolution of issues.8 
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Russia’s role in developing the strategy to resolve—or defuse—the crisis in 
Kosovo was key.  As a vocal supporter of the Serbs, the Russian delegation in 
negotiations was seen as an advocate, speaking on behalf of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), but also willing to work closely with western 
powers through the United Nations and even NATO.  After determined opposition 
to any wording that suggested an enforcement element to the resolution should 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia not comply, Russia affirmed Resolution No. 
1199, along with thirteen other members of the Security Council (China 
abstained).   
 
Despite the absence of a mechanism to compel compliance with U.N. Security 
Council Resolution No. 1199, the following day NATO issued ACTWARNs – a 
notification that force may be required and which further allows for planning and 
preparation.  While NATO issued the ACTWARNs on the authority of its North 
Atlantic Council (and specifically not the United Nations), the UNSC Resolution 
provided a clear guideline to specific measures that the FRY would need to 
implement.  NATO’s ACTWARNs provided the standing threat behind the failure 
to implement the required measures. 
 
The connective thread in both the domestic and foreign events under 
consideration is the developing spiral towards crisis.  In the international arena, it 
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is represented by the undertone of an emergent military strategy to compel 
Serbian acceptance of a negotiated agreement on Kosovo.  Within Russia, the 
economic crisis develops a political cast with a continuation of the executive-
legislative skirmish for dominance.  There is also an element of this situation that 
involves the evolution of NATO and its search for relevance in the post-Cold War 
international arena.  Kosovo provides a forum, and perhaps even an impetus for 
the member-states of NATO to address its changing mission and the role of the 
alliance in an post-Soviet security architecture. 
 
The central thesis of this study of the importance of domestic context in foreign 
policy is demonstrated by an analysis of the interaction between domestic events 
and foreign policy, with particular attention to the decision-making of Russia’s 
leaders.  The context of this study is the transitional nature of both Russia’s 
domestic environment as it traversed a path away from Soviet rule and a 
command economy, as well as an international system in flux in the wake of the 
collapse of its longstanding bipolar structure.   
 
It is the contention of this study that Russia’s unsettled status within both its 
domestic and international spaces had many ramifications, most notably for this 
study, the situation provided its leadership with exceptional circumstances and 
latitude in the direction of its foreign policy.   Specifically, the Russian political 
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leadership team was in a favorable position to engage in multi-level policy 
interactions, using domestic policy decisions for international impact (“Second 
Image”) and foreign policy for domestic gain (“Second Image Reversed”).i  This 
case study of Russian policy is intended to illuminate the connections between 
Russia’s domestic and foreign policy choices, in an effort to contribute to an 
understanding of foreign policy formulation.  The exceptional circumstances at 
the core of this work serve to cast light on the decision-making process. 
 
I have carefully selected a timeframe, within which a series of domestic and 
international crises occur to form my case study for this foreign policy analysis.  
The salient element of the international context is the crisis over Kosovo, which 
requires the participation and even leadership of Russia to mediate.  This crisis 
eventually prompted NATO action–the aerial bombardment and threat of ground 
invasion against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).  The negotiated end 
to this conflict also required a crucial contribution from Russia in the form of 
mediator; however, this moment was quite nearly derailed by Russian military 
maneuvers that threatened to bring Russia and NATO into open, armed 
confrontation. 
 
                                                        
i  I employ the imagery of Kenneth Waltz and Peter Gourevich somewhat liberally in this 
study. 
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Kosovo raises issues in the international community, most resonant in a debate 
over sovereignty–the impact of which is still evident in the U.S.—Russian 
relationship today.ii  At the time, however, Russia’s domestic crises seemed 
equally pressing, particularly to the Yeltsin leadership.  The devaluation of the 
ruble in August 1998 brought down the Kiriyenko government and threatened 
Yeltsin’s presidential regime.  Attempts to forge a new government exacerbated 
an ongoing executive-legislative struggle and resulted in the selection of Yevgeni 
Primakov, an official without direct obligations to Yeltsin, as head of government.   
His control of the government was soon after deemed dangerous to the Yeltsin 
team.  Yeltsin’s dubious health already had created a succession stir, but 
Primakov’s government now provided a realistic alternate locus of power and 
threatened control of the succession scenario.  Debate and discontent over 
Russia’s path from Soviet rule suggested a successor might trumpet revanchist 
ambitions to reverse political or market reforms and to hold the Yeltsin leadership 
to account for the excesses of the transition. 
 
This work is formulated as a study of this particular aggregation of circumstances 
for their potential to provide useful insights in several different sectors of foreign 
policy and leadership analysis.  The highly personalized presidential regime of 
Boris Yeltsin suggests an avenue of pursuit along the psychological aspect of                                                         
ii  The debate in the United Nations Security Council, primarily Russia versus the U.S. 
and Europe, over sanctions against Syria demonstrate the lingering effect of differing 
perspectives on the limits of sovereignty in current international policy. 
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leadership and its impact on foreign policy.  The domestic environment in which 
Yeltsin makes his decisions is key, as Robert Jervis notably discusses, “leaders 
are not likely to take great chances in order to improve the status quo, if they 
have recently suffered a reverse or fear that without bold action the status quo 
will deteriorate, they are likely to run high risks.”9  
 
Russia, still traversing its post-Communist transition, provides particular interest, 
as the domestic and international realms are intricately interwoven at this stage.  
In particular, major international economic institutions are critical to Russia’s – 
and Yeltsin’s – success.  Richard Sakwa notes the international community has 
an influence on Russian affairs even now, “One of the key aspects shaping 
Russia today is the interaction of external pressures and domestic elite 
responses.”10  
 
Post-Soviet Russia’s evolving interactions with international organizations – 
economic, military, and political – forms a significant element of the structural 
context of this case study and presents issues relevant to one of the central 
debates of international relations, namely the role of international institutions.  
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of Russia certainly provided 
a remarkable opportunity to address questions of the influence of international 
structures, and there have been several significant studies, including Joseph S. 
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Nye (1990), Peter J. Katzenstein, et al (1998), Robert Keohane (1998), Stanley 
M. Hoffmann (2001), David A. Lake (2001), and John M. Owen (2001-2002).  
Nonetheless, this proposed case study may provide some fresh insight on the 
subject.  Alexander Wendt commented on aspects of the debate that find some 
illumination in this study:  “A key issue in determining policymakers' 
responsibilities, therefore, is how much "slack" a social structure contains.  
Neorealists think there is little slack in the system, and thus states that deviate 
from power politics will get punished or killed by the "logic" of anarchy.  
Institutionalists think such dangers have been greatly reduced by institutions 
such as sovereignty and the democratic peace, and that there is therefore more 
possibility for peaceful change.”11  
 
While the role of Russia’s leadership is the focus of this case study, international 
institutions are certainly still central figures.  Russia’s economic transition, which 
was tightly integrated with its political transition, was coordinated with foreign 
advisers and reliant on outside advice, and perhaps more significantly, Russia’s 
reform plans were founded upon the financial support of several key international 
institutions.  Decisions reached by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on the 
release or delay of loan “tranches” had considerable impact on Russia’s 
domestic political agenda.  It is clear that Russia’s political leaders perceived 
their policy choices to be circumscribed by the benchmarks elucidated by 
representatives from the IMF and World Bank, among other institutions.   
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In addition to the economic organizations that worked to transform Russia’s 
economy and incorporate a new, market-oriented version of Russia into western 
financial regimes, there were political and military groups working with Russia’s 
leadership.  A key element of this work is the relationship between Russia and 
NATO, as both sought to redefine their relationship and their roles following the 
collapse of the Cold War’s bipolar, adversarial structure.  Throughout the 1990’s 
NATO worked to redefine itself as an alliance of liberal democracies aimed at 
promoting common values, good neighborly relations, and, of course, a strong 
defense of those values.  It also established guidelines for accepting new 
members, most controversially for Russia, from the former Soviet bloc.  Russia 
and NATO likewise attempted to establish a new relationship, working through 
the “partnership for peace” and NATO-Russia Council.  The period under 
consideration here marks a particularly difficult period in that relationship.  At its 
core, the fundamental issue hampering the relationship appears to be that 
“despite the efforts that were made to create an institutional network for 
cooperation between NATO and Russia, the Kremlin continued to perceive 
NATO as a conventional military alliance directed against Moscow.”12   
 
This study addresses the role of international institutions in the formulation of 
President Yeltsin’s domestic and international “game plan.”   This international 
structural context will be considered as a meaningful factor in the decision-
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making choices of the Yeltsin leadership team and in their response to western 
initiatives.  I do not address international institutions for their possible systemic 
impact.   This study is not intended as an analysis of the international system qua 
system.   In this, I am chastened by Kenneth Waltz’s admonition that 
“international politics is not foreign policy.”13  
 
This study is fundamentally an examination of foreign policy and its aim is to 
improve our understanding of why certain foreign policy choices are made.   In 
this, I share an aim noted by James Fearon, “our goal should be to improve our 
understanding of and explanation for states’ foreign policies.”14  In choosing 
Russia in transition as the subject of analysis, I approach both the issue of 
transition (occasionally, and optimistically, referred to as “democratization”) as a 
variable, the impact of which is not as determinant as once hoped.  
“Democratization has been widely heralded as a force for peace and prosperity. 
This received wisdom, however, overlooks the belligerent foreign policies that 
frequently accompany democratic transitions that stall prior to the establishment 
of a coherent democracy.”15  
 
The purpose of conducting this particular case study of Russian foreign policy is 
to enhance an understanding of the interplay of domestic and international 
elements in foreign policy formulation.  The structure of this study follows, in 
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addition to Putnam, the approach to foreign policy analysis explicated by Richard 
C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin:  “The search for explanation of why 
states behave as they do leads ultimately, according to our argument, to the 
factors which determine the choices made by decision-makers. … The rules, 
activities, and relationships among the decision-makers constitute the 
organizational or decision-making system”16  
 
It is my intention to demonstrate that the understandings, perceptions, and 
aspirations of a state’s leadership are crucial to the decision-making that leads to 
policy formulation.   International institutions and the ways in which they 
accomplish their work formed integral elements of Russia’s transition during 
much of the 1990s, at least toward a more integrated presence with the West.  
This study takes into consideration the institutional elements of Russia’s external 
environment and how they are perceived by the Russian leadership during 
periods of domestic and international crisis. 
 
In terms of organization, this work is primarily a consideration of Russia’s foreign 
policy choices selected within critical moments in Russia’s transitional 
development.  Most crucially, these choices were made by, or in the name of, 
one individual leader with the advice of his apparatchiki.  Those choices, over the 
period of this study, demonstrated a pattern of relationships between domestic 
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and foreign inputs, constraints, and aspirations – all of which informed the 
behavior of the Russian state in the international system.  At the center of this 
analysis is the leader who chose Russia’s path, balancing foreign and domestic 
pressures, playing the two-game board in his own way.  This study reflects the 
importance of the individual leader, and in so doing follows Bruck, Snyder, and 
Sapin:  “ the point of intersection is not the state, and that is where classic and 
even contemporary IR theory is lacking and needs augmentation, according to 
SBS (Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin).  The point of intersection is the human 
decision-maker.”17  
 
This study examines the reference points that factor in President Yeltsin’s 
decision-making, in a context also informed by Prospect Theory.18  Yeltsin’s 
evaluative heuristic seems to place an inordinate amount of emphasis on 
elements of surprise and risk, rather than a calculation of the probability of 
success, and it is an underlying contention of this thesis that moments of political 
crisis tend to enhance this predisposition in Yeltsin. 
 
Additionally, the frame of reference for this study requires an “explicit revelation” 
(Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, p.32, 2002) of the author’s understanding both of the 
decision-maker at the center of this study, namely Russian Federation President 
Boris Yeltsin, as well as an overview of the events that form the crisis moments 
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under consideration.  This section is foundational to the work in that it 
acknowledges that any author “makes certain assumptions about the social world 
in which he lives and in which he carries on his investigation.” (Snyder, Bruck, 
and Sapin, p.32, 2002)  Chapter Two thus begins with a “Background” section 
both to provide context for events to come and for the atmosphere of presidential 
decision-making in the approaching crisis. 
 
The time period under consideration reveals a transitional Russian state, heavily 
reliant on the financial support of international institutions, while endeavoring to 
maintain its leading role in international organizations as successor state to the 
Soviet Union.  While at the time of this study, Russia’s position in international 
affairs in relation to other states is somewhat more established than it had been 
earlier in the decade, by 1999 there were still large swathes of uncertain mist 
clouding the development of its post-Soviet relationships.  This uncertainty 
allowed for an openness of debate over policy options, and therefore provided 
both greater quantity and stronger quality in the information available to form the 
base of this study. 
 
Likewise, the Russian media in 1999 published far more liberally on political 
debate and Kremlin intrigues than it would under President Putin’s 
administration.  Many elements of the media were controlled by the wealthy and 
  
24 
politically influential “oligarchs” of the late Yeltsin era, and they were not 
disinclined to use the influence of their media outlets in both political and 
economic schemes.  The data forming this study must, therefore, also account 
for bias in reporting.  A section of this work will address “oligarch” ownership of 
media outlets and their perceived allegiances and biases. 
 
The crux of the work consists of a chronological review of events, layered with 
analysis of key moments in the chronology.  The first of these chapters will focus 
on events involving the devaluation of the Russian ruble and the subsequent 
government crisis.  President Yeltsin’s negotiations with the legislative arm of 
government, as well as the bargaining to select an acceptable head of 
government will be the focal point.  Key moments concerning Kosovo, particularly 
the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution No. 1199, and the 
diplomatic discourse concerning the possibility of threat of force against the 
Serbs, are the subject of the second chronological chapter. 
 
The third chronological chapter will take the Rambouillet negotiations as its 
centerpiece and focus analysis on the foreign policy aims of Yeltsin’s Russia.  
This chapter’s chronology will cover the time period from the decision to conduct 
the Rambouillet discussions through to the commencement of the NATO 
bombing campaign in former Yugoslavia.  Domestically, during this period Russia 
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was experiencing a Kremlin power struggle, manifesting as a kompromat 
(compromising material) war among government and Kremlin officials.  Yeltsin 
seemed to be under political attack through proxies and the resultant pressure 
was apparent in the domestic political arena, where the executive-legislative 
battle once again surfaced. 
 
The fourth and fifth chronological chapters will focus on the time period of the 
NATO bombing campaign and end with the final decisions on placement of 
NATO and Russian troops in Kosovo and Serbia as part of the KFOR 
deployment.  Simultaneous to the international negotiations, these chapters will 
chronicle the events in Russia of another government dismissal, presidential 
impeachment proceedings, and the eventual seating of a new government.  It is 
in the analysis of this section of the study that the interplay of domestic and 
foreign policy, as well as Yeltsin’s command of the game, is most apparent. 
 
The sixth and penultimate chapter will provide the connective thread of analysis 
of events within the framework of the thesis.  In this chapter, I review critical 
moments in the chronology to ascertain the strength of potential causal links 
between negotiations, confrontations, and concessions in the domestic arena 
and the success, diminution, or failure of policy at the international level. 
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The final chapter will serve as an evaluation of the thesis in terms of the material 
presented.  This chapter should provide answers to the questions envisioned in 
the exposition of the thesis.  To wit, does this case study of Russian domestic 
and foreign policy during the Kosovo crisis provide sufficient data for analysis of 
the interplay of domestic and foreign policy, following Robert Putnam’s “two-level 
game” framework, and further, what does this analysis contribute to the 
understanding of foreign policy analysis in international relations.   
 
It is my intention that this analysis of Russia’s presidential leadership as it 
confronts both domestic and foreign crises will provide useful insights into the 
interplay of domestic and foreign policy and that it might inspire further 
scholarship on the subject.  President Yeltsin was considered remarkably adept 
at balancing political forces within the Russian system, and it seems likely that 
the data will suggest that this talent carried over to his management and direction 
of Russian foreign policy.  It may prove enlightening to consider the relative 
successes and struggles of other state leaders—within the former Soviet Union 
and beyond—in the post-Soviet transition period.  Several of the newly 
independent, post-Soviet states faced dual track transitions, internally and 
externally, that resembled those taking place in Russia.  While few assumed a 
strongly activist role in the international community, several states of the former 
Soviet Union have figured prominently in international disputes and negotiations.  
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The experiences, choices, and processes of these leaders may prove a 
fascinating counterpoint to those of the Russian leadership. 
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2.  Crisis in Russia 
 
Boris Yeltsin, A Biographical Sketch 
 
Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin was born February 1, 1931 in the Urals Mountains 
village of Butka—the eldest child of Klavdiya Vasiliyevna and Nikolay 
Ignatiyevich Yeltsin.  In 1934, Nikolai Ignatiev and his brother were convicted of 
anti-Soviet agitation and “wrecking;” they were sentenced to three years in the 
Dmitrov labor camp, along the Moscow-Volga canal.19  
 
After his release Nikolay Ignatiyevich moved his family to Berezniki, where he 
took on work as a builder, eventually being promoted to the position of 
construction supervisor.  The Yeltsins occupied a single room in a Stalin-era 
Soviet baraks, which were long, low, drafty structures that consisted of twenty 
rooms off a central corridor.  Yeltsin would later describe his childhood as 
“joyless,”20 and “associated with the countryside, with physical burdens, with 
labor.”21   
 
Boris Nikolayevich was a good student and was perceived as a leader among his 
peers at school.  There are several well-known accounts of Yeltsin leading some 
of his classmates in mischief, often with self-destructive results, such as the 
incident during WW II (the Great Patriotic War), when he snuck into a local 
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armory and purloined a couple of grenades.  His wary friends stood back as 
Yeltsin hammered into one of the grenades to dissemble it.  Yeltsin lost the tips 
of two fingers after the grenade exploded.22   
 
Boris Nikolayevich attended the Kirov Polytechnical Institute (now the Urals 
Polytechnical Institute) in Sverdlovsk, where he specialized in “industrial and civil 
construction.”  He also developed a talent for volleyball and played on the 
masters’ team at the National Championships.23  While at the Institute, he met his 
future wife, Naina Iosifovna Girina.  They married in 1956 and had two 
daughters, Yelena and Tatiana. 
 
Yeltsin began his career in the construction industry learning trades including 
masonry, carpentry, and crane operation as he worked.  In 1961, he joined the 
Communist Party and soon thereafter became Chief Engineer at the Sverdlovsk 
House-Building Combine.  He then moved to positions within the Sverdlovsk 
regional party committee, eventually becoming Secretary of the Committee, and 
a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
(CPSU). 
 
In the mid-1980s, Mikhail Gorbachev decided to move Yeltsin to Moscow, where 
Yeltsin headed up the Department of Construction at the Central Committee of 
the CPSU.  In December 1985, Yeltsin became First Secretary of the Moscow 
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City Party Committee, where he replaced Viktor Grishin and began an 
anticorruption campaign targeting Grishin’s former staff and associates.24  He 
also joined Gorbachev’s Politburo as a candidate member. 
 
Yeltsin spent two years working with and, eventually, struggling against 
Gorbachev, specifically chafing at the pace and implementation of Gobachev’s 
signature reform programs, perestroika and glasnost.  In 1987, Yeltsin spoke at a 
Central Committee Plenum, attacking the work of the Secretariat of the Central 
Committee, under Yegor Ligachev’s supervision, criticizing the “glorification” of 
General Secretary Gorbachev, and requesting his release from the “position, the 
duties, of a candidate member of the Politburo.”25  
 
Following Yeltsin’s remarks and subsequent disciplinary appearance at the 
Central Committee, Gorbachev demoted Yeltsin back to deputy construction 
minister.  Yeltsin would describe this period as a very dark moment:  “Gorbachev 
appeared to be gracious, sparing and pitying me.  But few people know what 
torture it is to sit in the dread silence of an office.  In a complete vacuum, 
subconsciously waiting for something.  For this telephone with the state seal to 
ring.  Or not.”26 
 
As Gorbachev loosened the rules for elections to the USSR Congress of 
People’s Deputies, Yeltsin ran and was elected to an at-large Moscow seat in 
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1989.  When elections were held for a Russian (Russian Soviet Federated 
Socialist Republic-RSFSR) parliament in 1990, Yeltsin again won, and 
subsequently resigned his membership in the Communist Party.  In June 1991, 
Yeltsin, along with his vice presidential candidate Aleksandr Rutskoi, won 
election as President of the RSFSR. 
 
In August 1991, as the State Committee for the State of the Emergency 
(Gosudarstvennyi Komitet po Chrezvechainomu Polozheniyu or GKChP) seized 
power in Moscow, Yeltsin worked the phones behind the scenes, establishing 
contact with other political leaders and key military personnel.  He also famously 
stood atop a tank in front of the Russian White House to condemn the coup: “We 
appeal to citizens of Russia to give a fitting rebuff to the putschists and demand a 
return of the country to normal constitutional development.  Undoubtedly it is 
essential to give the country's president, Gorbachev, an opportunity to address 
the people.”27 
 
With the end of the coup, a dramatic shift occurred in relations between 
Gorbachev at the Soviet center, and Yeltsin in the Russian presidency, along 
with the leaders of the Soviet republics.  By December 1991, the Soviet Union 
had collapsed, as Yeltsin, and the leaders of Ukraine and Belarus met in the 
Belovezhskaya pushcha to dissolve the bonds of the Soviet system and begin 
work on their new interstate relations. 
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Yeltsin attributed his strength during the coup to his love of sport.  “[S]ports gave 
me such a character.  The tougher it was, the more collected I became…When 
you play sports, you don’t even think of losing.”28  Scattered throughout his 
autobiographies, Yeltsin describes adventures and events that he seems to seek 
out, in order to test his strength and endurance.  His love of the Russian banya 
seems a metaphor for the regular tests he imposes on himself:  “My father 
brought me up to endure this tempering, the steamy pleasure of the banya so hot 
that your breath leaves your body, your pores open, and you can’t wait for the 
blessed iciness of the coldwater dip afterward.”29 
 
On December 31, 1999, in a closely guarded surprise announcement, Yeltsin 
resigned the presidency in favor of his chosen successor, Vladimir Putin.  The 
move gave Putin the advantage of incumbency, as well as the “administrative 
resources” of the presidency in advance of the 2000 presidential elections.   
 
Yeltsin retired to a dacha outside of Moscow, consulting on occasion with the 
new president.  From retirement, he worked on a memoir, but had scant 
comment on his successor’s administration.  In 2007, Yeltsin suffered sudden 
heart failure and died at the age of 76. 
 
His friend, Bill Clinton, discussed Yeltsin’s legacy in a New York Times Op-Ed:  
“Boris Yeltsin was intelligent, passionate, emotional, strong-willed and 
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courageous. He wasn’t perfect, and he had to contend with staggering political 
and economic challenges as he led Russia away from centuries of authoritarian 
rule. But lead he did.”30 
 
 
Background  
Russia’s political atmosphere in 1998-1999 carried the weight of a charged and 
contested arrangement of forces.  The implosion of the Soviet Union, the need 
for economic reform and the chosen path of shock therapy, the distribution of 
authority among the branches of government, the severity of personality clashes, 
and, of course, the violent confrontation between president and parliament in 
1993 were still fresh wounds even late in the decade; there was a pervasive 
sense that any of them could be re-opened, re-examined, and a new history 
written by different victors.   
 
Russian President Boris Yeltsin remained the indispensible figure following his 
re-election in 1996.  Unfortunately, health ailments sidelined him and restricted 
his level of engagement with both daily operations and strategic decision-making.  
Nonetheless, Yeltsin’s imprimatur was asserted for government and Kremlin 
initiatives, and the president along with his extensive executive branch, remained 
the driving force of political and economic policy.   
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Parliament 
Despite the definitive measures taken in 1993 to assert executive authority, the 
Russian legislature continued to clamor for a larger role in policy and personnel 
decisions.  State Duma elections in December 1995 provided the Communist 
Party of Russia with a strong showing and approximately 35% of the seats in the 
Duma.  The Liberal Democratic Party, headed by Vladimir Zhirinovsky, held 
11.3% of Duma seats.  Our Home is Russia, a pro-government party closely 
associated with then-Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin won 12.2% and 
economic reformer Grigori Yavlinsky’s party Yabloko garnered 10% of Duma 
seats.  The rest of the parties failed to attain the required 5% of the vote for 
representation of the party in the Duma, but won seats through single mandate 
district voting:  “Independents” won 77 seats (17.1%); the Agrarian Party, 20 
seats for 4.4%; and Russia’s Choice, a party specifically supportive of 
government economic reforms and privatization policies won 9 seats for 2% of 
the Duma.  Thirteen other parties, ranging from the Communists of the USSR (1 
seat) to former USSR Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov’s Power to the People! (9 
seats/2%) to Russian Unity and Accord (1 seat/.2%) divided the rest of the seats 
in fractious amounts. 
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As a result of this array of political forces in the Duma, President Yeltsin could 
claim very little parliamentary support, particularly once he put aside his stolid 
Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin.  It is worth noting that Viktor Chernomyrdin 
initially became prime minister in a compromise with a previous parliament that 
required Yeltsin to sacrifice his economic reform leader, Yegor Gaidar.  While 
Chernomyrdin had been seen as providing a steady hand on the Russian 
government as Yeltsin cycled through illnesses, surgeries, and “colossal fatigue,” 
his potential as a Yeltsin successor in 2000 became a central issue in 1998.   
 
The issue of a successor to President Yeltsin had gained salience as Yeltsin’s 
health declined.  By early 1998, after repeated hospitalizations and “colds,” 
President Yeltsin chided reporters at the Kremlin for making too much of his 
health and suggested they refrain from “dragging out the subject of the 
president’s health.”31  Three days later, the Kremlin released press statements to 
the effect that he had contracted an “acute respiratory disorder” and was said to 
be resting at his country dacha.   
 
On March 23, President Yeltsin announced a government shake up that included 
the dismissal of Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and his replacement with the 
young Minister of Fuel and Energy, Sergi Kiryenko.  Other members of the 
reform team, including First Deputy Minister Boris Nemtsov, retained their 
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positions.   At the time, and in the years since, there has been intense 
speculation over the reasons for Yeltsin’s decision.  It is possible that a change of 
economic course, such as was not being accomplished under the joint First 
Deputy Premierships of Chubais and Nemtsov, was in order.  It is also possible 
that Yeltsin was particularly sensitive to the state of his health and his 
appearance as frail.   
 
Constitutionally, Yeltsin was serving his final term as president, and while he 
records in memoirs that he was looking for a possible successor, it seems any 
candidates had to be circumspect in the expression of their aspirations. 
 
The dismissals came just days before a meeting in Bonn of the Contact Group 
concerning Kosovo.  U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright recalls dining 
with Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeni Primakov the night before the meeting 
and learning that almost everyone in the cabinet, except for Primakov, had been 
fired.  “Primakov explained that he had survived because he had been an ally of 
Yeltsin since they had been in the Politburo together.  Yeltsin was comfortable 
with him because he wasn’t a potential rival.”32 
 
Boris Nemtsov saw Chernomyrdin’s dismissal as a result of several mistakes, 
including Chernomyrdin’s fear of “powerful assistants” (namely Chubais and 
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Nemtsov), who exercised too much control of economic policy, and his overt 
assumption of the mantle of Yeltsin’s successor:  “[Chernomyrdin] met with Al 
Gore and said” “you and me, we’ll define the future of our great nations in the 
21st century.”  Unbelievable!  Unbelievably stupid!  Of course, Yel’tsin was 
shocked by this move.”33  
 
As for the choice of Kiriyenko, Yeltsin suggests in his memoir that he was looking 
for a young and energetic candidate, and considering the possibility of a 
successor.   The president had on several occasions identified government 
ministers, advisers, or possible prime minister appointees as putative 
successors, and political analysts moved the ball further down field, looking for 
political motives in each personnel reshuffle.  It is possible that some careers, 
including those of Viktor Chernomyrdin, and Moscow Mayor Luzhkov, were, in 
the long run, damaged by the speculation. 
 
In any event, the preoccupation with the next possible president reinforced the 
political leitmotif of Yeltsin as a lame–and ailing–duck.  In order to exercise 
presidential authority, Yeltsin needed to strengthen the perception of his ability to 
rule.  Previously in Yeltsin’s administration, that had entailed not only personnel 
changes in the executive, but confrontation with the parliament, as well. 
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According to the Russian constitution, the dismissal of the government and its 
reformation under a new premier is a right of the president, but requires the 
approval of the State Duma.  The president submits his candidate to lead the 
government for approval to the Duma, and if, after three votes on the candidacy, 
the president’s choice is not confirmed in the voting, then either the government 
must be formed under a new putative premier, or the president may exercise his 
right to disband the Duma and call for new elections.  There is one caveat to the 
president’s right to disband the Duma over his choice to lead the government, 
and that is contained in Article 109 of the Constitution:  “The State Duma may not 
be dissolved from the moment it files a charge against the president of the 
Russian Federation….”34  
 
Yeltsin submitted the candidacy of Sergei Kiriyenko and immediately met 
resistance from the Duma.  The first poll yielded only 143 votes for Kiriyenko, out 
of the 226 needed for confirmation.   The Communist Party of the Russian 
Federation (KPRF) under the leadership of Gennadi Zyuganov (who was 
defeated by Yeltsin in the 1996 presidential elections), stood firmly opposed to 
Kiriyenko until the final vote.  Intervening suggestions by President Yeltsin that 
deputies who approved Kiriyenko might receive special benefits, as well as 
reminders that a third rejection would result in new elections that might not see 
the same deputies returned to the legislature seemed to help move Kiriyenko to 
approval.  The third vote, held by secret ballot in order to allow deputies to avoid 
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rigorous party scrutiny, confirmed Kiriyenko with 251 votes.  A significant portion 
of the Duma abstained, but only 25 votes were cast against Yeltsin’s nominee. 
 
A contemporary analysis describes the relationship between Yeltsin and the 
parliament at this time: “The way in which the Duma caved in showed not only 
that deputies did not want to lose their comfortable positions, but that they 
acknowledged the ultimate power which the president holds over them.”35  
 
The leadership of several Duma parties seems to have learned an important 
lesson during the confirmation process:  On June 19, the Duma voted to form an 
impeachment commission to consider charges against Yeltsin.  The Commission 
comprised 15 members:  The Communist Party held the Chair of the commission 
and three additional seats, Nash Dom Rossii  (a party closely associated with 
former Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin) had three members, Yabloko and 
Zhirinovsky’s LDP each had two, and the Agrarian Party, Power to the people!, 
and Russia’s Regions contributed one member each. 36   With impeachment 
charges at the ready, the president’s threat to disband the Duma in any future 
showdown over a change in government leadership would be effectively 
curtailed. 
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The general state of Russia’s economic health, which became a central crisis 
point of 1998, was weakened by international crises in Asian markets, 
speculation over the stability of the Russian ruble, a plunge in oil prices, a woeful 
record on tax collection within Russia, and unfortunate bond and debt financing 
policies by Russian government entities.  The manner, and perhaps youth, of the 
new Russian prime minister and the somewhat technical approach of his team 
seemed not to inspire confidence in the government’s ability to stem the slide in 
the value of the ruble.iii  With focused persistence in propping up the currency, 
President Yeltsin recalled former First Deputy Prime Minister Anatoli Chubais 
and appointed him to serve as Special Deputy to the President of the Russian 
Federation for links with international financial organizations.  Chubais intensified 
negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for an emergency 
allocation to assist Russia in supporting the ruble. 
 
In the course of one year, Russia had transitioned from a recommended 
developing economy for investment to a country on the verge of devaluation of its 
currency. Russia in 1998 ( as now) was heavily dependent on its oil and gas 
production and therefore, it is not insignificant that from 1997 to 1998, the price of 
oil dropped from $23.47 in January 1997 to $12.06 in June 1998.37  In May 1998, 
concerns about the imbalance in the Russian government’s budget, despite the                                                         
iii In his memoir, Midnight Diaries, President Yeltsin recalls Kiriyenko’s attempt to appear 
“condescendingly calm” (p.169) as the economic crisis deepened, but the “major 
bankers and the financial elite … simply didn’t trust him.” 
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appointment of Prime Minister Kiriyenko and his economic reform team, had 
seen an upturn in calls for devaluation of the ruble.  The IMF’s Russia expert, 
John Odling-Smee, lent a calming voice to the debate by claiming that Russia’s 
new government’s “economic policies are wholly coherent, and there is no 
reason for devaluation.”38  By June, difficulties securing the consent of the Duma 
to pass the legislation, which would enable the implementation of new economic 
austerity measures and fiscal reforms, caused the IMF to re-evaluate its planned 
disbursement of funds.   
 
Anatoli Chubais negotiated not just with the IMF representatives, but sought 
political, as well as economic support in Washington, D.C.   The course of debate 
centered on whether Russia had enacted tough enough reforms, or would have 
the capability to do so in the near future.  “It used to be that there were only a few 
reformers” in the Russian government, Chubais explained as he appealed to 
U.S. Treasury officials, “In this Government, they are all reformers.”39  Prime 
Minister Kiriyenko and his team had developed a comprehensive reform program 
and presented economic legislation to the State Duma for enactment.  President 
Yeltsin managed to threaten, albeit ambiguously, the parliament should it fail to 
approve the necessary legislation. 
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By July, the IMF had become convinced of the need for a stabilization Fund for 
the ruble, and approved $11.2 billion in loans (of which $4.8 billion was 
transferred to Russia and promptly “vanished”).40  The Duma agreed to enact 
some of the Kiriyenko government’s reform program, but left most of the 
measures to be adopted by presidential decree.   
 
June-September Domestic Crisis  
Hundreds of coal miners lined the Gorbaty Bridge near the Russian White House 
in the summer of 1998.  They set up camps, demanded payment of their back 
wages, and even called for the resignation of President Yeltsin and his 
government.  Every day, the miners sat along the bridge and pounded their 
helmets against the street.  Their presence seemed to unnerve Russia’s 
leadership and fascinate the media.41  There were miners’ strikes across Russia 
that spring and summer, with miners blocking railway lines that crippled 
transportation and shipping.  The Russian Security Council declared their actions 
illegal, to little effect.  Oleg Syusyev, Deputy Prime Minister for Social Issues 
attempted to negotiate with the various collections of miners, with limited 
success.  The Russian Government could not resolve the miners’ problems, nor 
could it resolve its own. 
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On July 13, Michael Camdessus, Managing Director of the IMF, announced a 
series of loans and credits to provide Russia with $11.2 billion in support from the 
IMF, with half that amount, $5.6 billion, to be provided “ as soon as the agreed 
actions of the Russian government have been taken, by legislation where 
necessary, and upon IMF Executive Board approval.”42  Additional funds were 
made available by the World Bank, and a Japanese loan of $800 million was 
earmarked for the coal miners. 
 
The Russian Government had provided the Duma with twenty legislative drafts 
as part of the reform program negotiated with international lenders.  The Duma 
approved fewer than half of the measures, leaving President Yeltsin to use 
presidential decrees to enact the rest.  Having so done, Yeltsin departed the 
capital for a vacation; the Duma’s Impeachment Commission began investigating 
charges against the president, including high treason for signing the 
Belovezhskaya Pushcha accords in 1991 (these agreements effectively 
dissolved the Soviet Union). 
 
On 20 July, the IMF released $4.2 billion in emergency funds to assist in 
stabilizing the ruble.  The reduced figure was protested by Chubais, who argued 
that it would dampen confidence in Russia.  The IMF countered that not all of its 
lending conditions had been met, and there was still concern about the political 
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end of the process – whether or not the Duma would uphold President Yeltsin’s 
decrees.  This $4.2 billion did little to shore up confidence, or the ruble.  It was 
soon the subject of its own controversy as claims surfaced that the money had 
disappeared into Swiss bank accounts, Yeltsin “Family” coffers, oligarch off-
shore accounts, or other non-governmental outlets.  In any event, within two 
weeks, it apparently had vanished.43  
 
Despite a brief bump up in the Russian stock market, the heralded loans, credits, 
and reform program did little to staunch the tumble in the Russian economy.  
There were many contributing factors to the downward spiral that subsumed the 
Russian ruble in 1998, including the drop in oil prices and Russia’s poor record 
on tax collection. The IMF’s Russian expert, John Odling-Smee considered the 
role of the IMF in the crisis:  “By far the most important determinants of economic 
policies were the Russian leadership and many economic agents who were in a 
position to support or thwart that leadership.  …  The government itself was often 
a coalition of opposing views, and the state was weak.  In this situation, 
economic agents were able to manipulate the law and its implementation to their 
advantage….  Given the turbulence of the struggle for economic and political 
power in the 1990s, it is not surprising that the IMF was not a dominant force in 
determining economic policies. … The biggest consequence of the IMF’s limited 
influence was the failure to raise revenues and reduce fiscal deficits, which led to 
the 1998 crisis.  Had the fiscal consolidation that was agreed upon between the 
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government and the IMF in every year up to 1996…been achieved, it is unlikely 
that the crisis would have occurred.”44 
 
According to Yeltsin’s memoir, early in August, Anatoli Chubais, former Prime 
Minister and reform godfather Yegor Gaidar, Vice Premier Viktor Khristenko, and 
Central Banker Sergei Dubinin “went into the prime minister’s office and didn’t 
come out for two weeks.  They wrote the “final and decisive” anticrisis emergency 
plan.”45 
 
Other accounts suggest that as the devaluation crisis ratcheted up, several of the 
key decision-makers in Russia, the IMF, and the U.S. were on vacation and thus 
communication and coordination amongst them was particularly fraught. In fact, 
when the U.S. Treasury Department sent Undersecretary David Lipton to 
Moscow to “reinforce the message that Russia should not expect any more 
official financing, from the IMF or anyone else, he found that almost everyone of 
influence was gone.”46  He reported back to Washington with the assessment 
that “it was pointless for the IMF to pour more money into Russia, since it would 
flow right back out again with the rest of the capital and international reserves 
that were fleeing an economy in which investors had lost all confidence.”47  
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While the economic situation in Russia appeared to be deteriorating at a 
momentum that fulfilled its own logic, one bit of external pressure would prove 
particularly irksome.  Financier George Soros wrote a letter to the Financial 
Times, published on August 13, in which he exhorted the Russian Government to 
devalue its currency.  “The meltdown in Russian financial markets has reached 
the terminal phase,” began the letter.  While the specific measures 
recommended, including a “modest devaluation of 15 to 25 per cent,” and the 
establishment of a currency board to stabilize the ruble with G-7 provided funds, 
were not extreme, the headline that Soros recommended devaluation did little to 
bolster confidence and seemed to provided a tipping point for Russia’s reform 
Government.48  On the same day, Standard and Poor’s downgraded Russia’s 
credit rating to B minus, and Moody’s Investors Services reduced Russia’s ceiling 
for foreign currency bonds to B2.49   
 
Also on August 13, the Russian Stock Exchange suspended operations after a 
drop of 15% in the first 40 minutes of trading.  Russia’s ORT television termed it 
“Black Friday for Russian financial markets.”50 
 
Up to this point, Yeltsin had been out of the public eye, and his absence did little 
to reinforce confidence in the Russian leadership.  “The president of Russia was 
nowhere to be seen while his country seemed to be hurtling off the edge of a cliff. 
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… Reports circulated that he had stopped taking his medication for high blood 
pressure because someone had told him that alcohol was just as effective.  
Various cabals were rumored to be maneuvering to take power.”51  There was 
speculation at the time that Yeltsin was not kept updated on developments.  
Similar assumptions peppered his presidency and likely were due to concerns 
over his health and habits, although there also seemed to be a strong vein of 
conspiracy theory that shielded Yeltsin himself from blame for the actions of 
shadow advisers.  Somehow, this perception both of being in power, but not 
being in charge seemed alternatively to hinder and to serve Yeltsin well over the 
years. 
 
The Kiriyenko Government attempted to maintain an optimistic façade into the 
middle of August 1998.  In fact, Kiriyenko repeatedly insisted that the basis of the 
crisis was “psychological,” as if to dispel the financial aspects.   To that point, the 
prime minister prevailed upon the president to attempt to inspire confidence in 
the Russian economy.  Yeltsin obliged, appearing in public while on vacation to 
tour a factory and reassure the public:  “There will be no devaluation – that's firm 
and definite."52  
 
Yeltsin also expressed confidence in his prime minister and reform team, 
affirming his intention to keep Kiriyenko in his position as prime minister.  
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Additionally, both the president and prime minister recommended that the Duma 
return from its summer recess to address economic initiatives due from the 
Government. 
 
Despite the president’s efforts to project faith in the economy, the situation 
deteriorated rapidly.  Kiriyenko gathered his team to discuss emergency 
measures.  In addition to Kiriyenko, Central Banker Sergei Dubinin, Yegor 
Gaidar, Finance Minister Mikhail Zadornov, Deputy Finance Minister Vyugin, and, 
upon his return from vacation in Ireland, Anatoli Chubais debated the decision on 
devaluation.  It is clear from later accounts that the IMF Russia team was aware 
that devaluation was in the offing, but that there may have been some 
miscommunication over exactly what was planned and how the IMF leadership 
would respond.iv  At issue was a sense conveyed to the Russian team by IMF 
Russia specialist John Odling-Smee that the IMF was “neutral” on default and 
“would support their decision,” when in fact Camdessus had wanted to 
encourage negotiations with external creditors, as the “Fund could not accept 
unilateral default.”53  
 
                                                        
iv As noted earlier, many of the Russia, American, IMF, and G-& decision-makers were 
on vacation at this critical juncture.  An IMF report notes that the IMF Russia specialist, 
John Odling-Smee received “garbled” instructions from Fund Managing Director Michael 
Camdessus, who was in Bayonne, France.  (Boughton, 2012, p. 336) 
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While the miscommunication had little impact on the decisions the Russian 
Government needed to make, it seemed to augur a period that was less than 
felicitous between Russia and the international lending bodies, as post-mortem 
evaluations and the inevitable finger-pointing began in the wake of the Russian 
economic collapse. 
 
Kiriyenko and the small group of advisers discussed the scenarios for what came 
to be known as “controlled devaluation,” which would include a temporary debt 
freeze (lobbied for by some of the “oligarchs”).  When agreement among the 
advisers was accomplished, Kiriyenko, Chubais, and the Kremlin Chief of Staff 
Valentin Yumashev travelled to Yeltsin’s dacha outside of Moscow to receive his 
“blessing.”54 
 
Yeltsin finally had cut short his vacation and settled in the dacha at Zavidovo.  
According to his memory of events, Kiriyenko and Chubais sketched the 
elements of their plan to address the crisis.  Kiriyenko tried to present Yeltsin with 
a detailed description of the economic indicators and pressures at work, but 
Yeltsin interrupted.  “Go ahead,” Yeltsin recalls saying, “take the emergency 
measures necessary.”  It was evident, even without Kiriyenko’s detailed account, 
Yeltsin wrote, “”that the government, along with him and all of us, had become 
hostages to the situation.”55 
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After receiving approval from the president, Chubais and Gaidar informed the 
IMF of the plan, before releasing the information publicly.    According to Gaidar, 
“The IMF knew what our idea was and they supported it.  All attempts to say 
otherwise now are simply cowardice.”56 
 
On Monday, August 17, the prime minister announced the emergency measures, 
which did not, he insisted, amount to a devaluation of the ruble.  “The measures 
are tough and fairly radical, said Kiriyenko.  “They are unavoidable.”57  It soon 
became clear that whatever the Russian Government chose to call its actions, 
the ruble had been cut free from Central Bank support, and it soon plummeted in 
value.  
 
President Yeltsin, while not present for the announcement, returned to the 
Kremlin for meetings with Kiriyenko.  Initially, the only personnel casualty was 
Presidential Adviser Aleksandr Lifshits, who chose to resign.  Yeltsin reported 
that in his resignation letter, Lifshits “asked my forgiveness for the fact that he 
couldn’t protect the country from economic crisis.”58 
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The political fallout from the crisis would manage to develop into its own political 
crisis, but it seems important to reflect upon the extent of the economic damage 
created: 
The disaster that began on August 17, 1998, spread immediately throughout 
Russia. In just 24 hours, some retailers raised prices by more than 30%.  The 
free-falling ruble forced shopkeepers to raise prices daily, even hourly. …The 
most immediate and dramatic result of the Crash of 1998 was the virtual 
collapse of Russian banking. The government imposed a two-month freeze on 
withdrawals from the country's six largest private banks. With the ruble dropping 
precipitously in value every day, ordinary Russians were forced to watch in 
horror as the money in their bank accounts lost its value. …  The lack of a 
reliable currency reduced much of Russia to a barter economy. Many citizens 
were paid with whatever goods were currently available, regardless of the 
goods' practical value. … Farmers were devastated by the 1998 economic 
collapse. Grain harvests fell 30% below 1997 levels. The sudden impact of the 
ruble devaluation was especially harmful because existing levels of farm 
production were already depressed, having fallen for years. …   The fallout from 
the economic collapse greatly exacerbated many of the problems that plagued 
Russia. In addition to the unemployment, lost wages and pensions, and financial 
hardship, there has been an attendant social crisis.  Those who were sick or 
under a doctor's care were badly hurt by the crash. Russia's health care system, 
in poor shape even before August 1998, suffered a run on medicine that quickly 
reduced supplies in hospitals and pharmacies to Soviet-era levels. …  Russia's 
widespread joblessness, poverty, and drug use have led to an increase in crime, 
homelessness, unemployment, and school dropout rates.59  
 
 
Within days, the Russian State Duma returned from its summer recess to discuss 
the financial emergency, the government’s performance, and the president.  On 
21 August, the Duma passed (245 to 32) a resolution calling on the president “to 
stop fulfilling his presidential powers before the end of his term,” as the country is 
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in “deep crisis and the president is not taking measures to protect the 
constitutional rights of the citizens.”60   
 
Given the tension between executive and legislature at this point, it is not 
surprising that the Duma chose to focus on apportioning blame and attempting to 
find purchase on higher ground than the president held.  Boris Yeltsin had made 
clear, nearly since his assumption of office, that economic reform, and along with 
it protecting his economic reformers, was the cornerstone of his presidency.  The 
failure of his government’s economic policies visibly demonstrated in the collapse 
of the ruble and the widespread collateral damage across Russia was precisely 
the type of opportunity the Duma sought in order to assert itself vis à vis Yeltsin. 
 
Yeltsin’s thinking at the time followed the well-worn strong man imagery of 
Russian lore:  “In this kind of crisis in a country like Russia, nothing will work 
without a powerful political figure who can stabilize the situation.”61 It was clear 
that the current prime minister was not that individual, and so Yeltsin chose to 
discuss the situation with former Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin.  “I looked 
at the large, bulky figure of Viktor Chernomyrdin and thought, “Now here’s a 
heavyweight!”  He had the stature we needed now.”62   
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Chernomyrdin set about attempting to construct a foundation of support from the 
various political and economic players in Moscow, engaging in a series of 
political discussions on the crisis situation and how to move forward.  Yeltsin 
made the decision to dismiss the Kiriyenko government and nominated 
Chernomyrdin to return as prime minister. 
 
The situation would prove extremely fluid, but as August 1998 drew to a close, 
there was a sense that Russia’s political forces would support a broad-based 
coalition government with Chernomyrdin at the helm.   The failure of economic 
reform was laid not necessarily  at Kiriyenko’s feet, but squarely on Yeltsin’s 
shoulders.   As KPRF leader Gennadi Zyuganov remarked on the attempts to 
forge a new government:  "The situation in the country has reached a critical 
stage, in essence. Our task was to protect the new government, by all possible 
means, from the arbitrariness of Mr. Yeltsin who has put the country on the brink 
of collapse."63  
 
General Aleksandr Lebed, former presidential rival, then secretary of Yeltsin’s 
Security Council, who was ousted after his conclusion of a (temporary) peace 
agreement in Chechnya, was more forthright in his aims:  "We are looking at a 
process of the eviction from power of the president, and a shift in the power 
centre of gravity towards the Federation Council and the Duma."64   
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The political sentiment clearly seemed to be running against Yeltsin.  His 
presidency had long been staked to economic reform, and now the reform 
policies apparently had produced economic collapse.  This impression coupled 
with the real concerns over his health, combined to bring into doubt Yeltsin’s own 
political future.   
 
On August 24, Yeltsin announced his decision to dismiss Kiriyenko and replace 
him with Chernomyrdin.  The return of Chernomyrdin, removed by Yeltsin just 
five months earlier, carried with it a rebuke of Yeltsin’s earlier decision (especially 
as the decision was forced by a crisis).  Yeltsin realized that returning 
“Chernomyrdin to the government would mean admitting my own moral defeat, 
my loss.”65  
 
Chernomyrdin had been artfully building support (completely avoiding, in 
particular, Yeltsin’s current nemesis Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov).  However, the 
possibility to score a more solid victory over the president seemed to drive the 
legislature as it considered the creation of a new government.  The Duma 
rejected Chernomyrdin’s candidacy in the first vote on August 31 by a vote of 251 
against to 94 in support, with 105 members not voting.66  Attacked both by the 
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Communist Party and liberal Yabloko, Chernomyrdin with Yeltsin’s support, dug 
in to continue the fight. 
 
In the midst of this political contretemps in Moscow, President Clinton was 
scheduled to arrive for a summit with the Russian president.  Clinton was in the 
thick of his scandal involving Monica Lewinsky and possible perjured testimony 
to the Independent Counsel, a crisis that eventually would lead him through an 
impeachment process of his own.  It certainly was an odd confluence of 
circumstances that produced a U.S.-Russian summit at just such a moment.   
President Clinton, apparently wary of the political consequences at home for a 
trip abroad at such a moment, considered cancelling the summit, a move judged 
by his advisers as one that might prove a coup de grâce for Yeltsin. 67  
In Moscow, rumors of Yeltsin’s health and possible death, resignation, or ouster 
in a coup circulated not only in the press, but among Russia’s elite and even 
western embassy staff.  Strobe Talbott, U.S. Ambassador-at-Large and Special 
Adviser to the Secretary of State on the new independent states of the former 
Soviet Union, conducted pre-Summit meetings, accompanied by a bodyguard for 
the first time.  Given not only the rumors, but the pessimism of his contacts, it 
seemed clear that the Summit might end up as one of Yeltsin’s last official duties.  
Eventually, Talbott received assurances that Yeltsin was alive and not going to 
resign, but pushed for more – a promise from Yeltsin in person.  He was soon 
called to the Kremlin:  “I found Yeltsin looking surprisingly robust. … His 
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message was simple:  if the summit went ahead, the two leaders would be able 
to steady the relationship; if Clinton canceled, everything they had accomplished 
was in jeopardy.”68v  
 
The Summit agenda covered arms control, the economic upheaval, Iran, and 
Kosovo, and did manage to produce two minor arms control agreements on early 
warnings for missile launches and on the disposal of plutonium.  It also provided 
Clinton the opportunity to address Russia’s citizens directly.  In a speech at 
Moscow State University, Clinton noted Russia’s current hardships and warned 
that there were no “painless solutions” to the current crisis.  He did, however, 
remind the audience that Russia was now an integral part of the world: “Now we 
see that when there are problems in Russia or Japan or questions about the 
economy of China, you see all across the world—the stock market in Latin 
America drops; you see the last two days we’ve had big drops in the American 
stock market.  What does that say?  Well, among other things, it says, whether 
we like it or not, we must build the future together, because, whether we like it or 
not, we are going to be affected by what we do.”69   
 
                                                        
v Talbott reported back to the president, vice-president, secretary of state, and others on 
the state of Russia and of Yeltsin: “The country was in crisis but not a panic—the 
situation was dangerous but not hopeless. As for Yeltsin, he was down but not out.  
Having just seen him, I could report he was in relatively good shape, a B+ or even an A- 
as long as we grade on a curve.” (p. 283) 
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Clinton himself reportedly was in a similar state of mind regarding Russian 
relations:  “If we lose Russia…it will be because we neglected the politics of it. … 
You just can’t underestimate the impact on our own economy and national 
security and on the global economy if Russia goes south.”70  
 
The Summit was generally characterized as low-key, with little of the exuberance 
of previous meetings.  Even the state dinner, an event that in an earlier Yeltsin 
administration might have carried on for hours, concluded early, with participants 
leaving by 9:15 pm.71  President Clinton recalled finding Yeltsin particularly vexed 
by Russia’s legislators and perhaps not comprehending the scope of the 
situation: “I’m not sure enough oxygen is getting up to his brain.”72  It seems 
Yeltsin must have rallied for his earlier meeting with Talbott, but faded even over 
the course of low-key discussions. 
 
There was some conversation at the summit of Yeltsin’s strategy in reappointing 
Chernomyrdin.  Yeltsin reportedly wavered over tactics between staunch support 
of Chernomyrdin and crushing of his parliamentary opposition—using repeated 
nominations to disband the Duma, call new elections, and destroy the communist 
party, and in searching for alternate candidates that might smooth the political 
roiling and begin to address the economic debacle. 
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On September 7, the Duma debated the Chernomyrdin candidacy for the second 
time and defeated his nomination by a vote of 273 to 138, with 1 abstention and 
38 not voting.73  While Yabloko leader Grigori Yavlinsky recommended Yeltsin 
search for another candidate, and pointed him towards Foreign Minister Yevgeni 
Primakov, Communist leader Zyuganov taunted Chernomyrdin as he voted: 
"They want us to dance an Argentine tango, but we're not going to dance with 
you."74  
 
With the second defeat in the Duma, it soon became clear that Yeltsin either 
needed to steel himself for a full-blown confrontation with the Duma or consider 
the possibility of another candidate to lead the Government.  Given that Duma 
leaders were threatening to institute impeachment proceedings against him and 
with the economy foundering, Yeltsin seems to have resigned himself to the 
search for an alternate choice.   
 
President Yeltsin described his approach to the conflict after the second failure to 
confirm Chernomyrdin:  “I needed to do three things simultaneously.  First, I need 
to pressure the Duma:  “I have no other candidate. … [T]he prime minister will be 
Chernomyrdin.”  Second, I had to convince Chernomyrdin not to insist on his 
candidacy. … Third, through Yumashev, in a state of absolute secrecy, I had to 
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persuade the only real candidate to accept the nomination:  Yevgeni 
Maksimovich Primakov.”75  
 
Yevgeni Primakov, a middle east expert with a long career in journalism, the 
Foreign Ministry, allegedly the Soviet KGB, and Russia’s Foreign Intelligence 
Service, refused to accept the post of prime minister when initially offered to him.  
On September 12, having just refused the president again, Primakov left the 
president’s office and encountered Valentin Yumashev, Yeltsin’s daughter 
Tatiana Dyachenko, and the Head of Protocol Vladimir Shevchenko (an old 
friend of Primakov’s).  Upon learning of his refusal, Primakov’s friend 
Shevchenko “exploded:”  “How can you think only of yourself?  Don’t you 
understand what we’re facing” August seventeenth destroyed the economy.  
There is no government.  The Duma will be dissolved.  The president may be 
physically unable to perform his duties at any moment.  Don’t you have any 
sense of responsibility?”76  
 
Primakov acceded to the president’s request and stood for prime minister.  Prior 
to the vote, Primakov gave little indication of his economic plan, but signaled the 
type of Government he wished to form by the announcement of two 
appointments: Yuri Maslyukov, who was the sole communist in Kiriyenko’s 
Government, would be appointed deputy prime minister, and Viktor 
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Gerashchenko, described as a “Soviet-style central banker,” would be brought 
back to head the Central Bank again.  Primakov’s nomination was approved by a 
vote of 315 to 63.77   
 
In the midst of negotiations to win Duma approval of his candidate, Yeltsin made 
concessions to the Duma that resembled a power-sharing pact, including a 
provision that would require Yeltsin to consult with the Duma before making any 
ministerial appointments, and to seek approval from the Duma before attempting 
to dismiss ministers.78  This appeared to alter significantly the balance of power 
between president and Duma, and had the Duma eventually confirmed 
Chernomyrdin, President Yeltsin would have found himself with a prime minister 
whose position was a rebuke to the president’s earlier decision to dismiss him, 
and a Duma that had won the right to a voice in all the ministerial appointments 
to the cabinet. 
 
What did, in fact, occur with the confirmation of Yevgeni Primakov as prime 
minister, is that Yeltsin gained some distance from the Duma, who negotiated 
now with a prime minister that clearly was not Yeltsin’s choice, nor was his 
presence a reproof to previous presidential decisions.  Yeltsin, through Primakov, 
was able to resume a familiar pattern of governmental appointments:  Primakov 
selected the ministers and Yeltsin appointed them by decree.  The Duma won 
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the battle over the choice of prime minister, and promptly lost interest in pursuing 
the war.  While Yeltsin assuredly was weakened by the devaluation crisis, the 
real diminishment of his authority was in relation to the prime minister, and not, in 
the end to the Duma.79   
 
Primakov set about building a form of coalition government to work out a 
comprehensive economic rescue plan.  His thoughts on the basis of the crisis 
help to illuminate the sympathy with which he was received by the Duma 
hardliners: 
Perhaps the most serious consequence of August 17 was a crisis of trust. … The 
unilateral moratorium on payments…completely undermined confidence, both at 
home and abroad, in the possibility of stable cooperation with Russia’s financial 
institutions and commercial banks.  The very possibility of Russia’s transition to a 
market system was in doubt.  Official circles in the West clearly supported the 
policy that was implemented in Russia in the 1990s.  The prevailing view seemed 
to be that any departure from the centrally administered system of the Soviet 
period toward a market economy was a blessing….  I can’t exclude the possibility 
that some forces refused to criticize the pseudoliberals because they hoped that 
Russia would remain for many years a supplier of raw materials….  The lack of 
criticism of Russia’s economic policy by the leaders of the Western states was 
motivated by politics. … Perhaps they simply didn’t want to irritate their “friend 
and brother Boris.”  I doubt that this was the main reason.  The West seemed to 
fear that any criticism would strengthen the proponents of a stronger state….  
The West feared them because the increased influence of such forces over 
foreign policy would inevitably lead to a more assertive defence of Russia’s 
national interests.80  
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3.  Kosovo in Crisis 
 
Background 
 
By 1998, the collapse of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia already had 
produced war in the Balkans with hundreds of thousands of casualties and 
displaced persons, prompted the first ever use of air strikes by the NATO 
alliance, witnessed a succession of European and American peace initiatives, 
most of which had met with limited success, and, sadly, introduced the phrase 
“ethnic cleansing” to public parlance. 
 
The essence of the disputes in Kosovovi followed two tracks:  political autonomy 
and ethnic relations.  According to the 1974 Constitution of Yugoslavia, Kosovo 
(at that time the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo or SAP Kosovo) was 
an autonomous province with its own parliament, judiciary, police, and even 
banking system (earlier constitutions granted more limited autonomy).  While 
Kosovo was not granted republic status, it did have a representative in the 
rotating collective presidency that ruled after the death of Marshal Tito.  Unlike 
republics under the 1974 constitution, autonomous provinces were not allowed to 
secede from Yugoslavia.  This provision may have reflected a concern that SAP                                                         
vi I follow the widespread western standard usage of Kosovo, rather than Kosova 
throughout this work.  I also primarily use Kosovo as shorthand for the region referred to 
as Kosovo and Methitija or the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo. 
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Kosovo, which had a significant Albanian population, might attempt to secede 
and join Albania to its southwest.81  
 
 
 
CIA Map of the Former Yugoslavia 
 
 
In 1981, after Tito’s death, tensions between Kosovo’s Albanian and Serbian 
populations became evident in public demonstrations and riots.  By March 1989, 
the Serbian government under Slobodan Milosevic revised the constitution to 
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diminish Kosovo’s autonomy and restricted the rights of the province’s Albanian 
citizens.   
 
Kosovar Albanian resistance to the constitutional changes resulted in two paths 
of protest: a nonviolent approach by the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) 
headed, notably, by Ibrahim Rugova channeled their efforts into developing 
parallel structures of authority and social protection; an activist and protest 
movement, which resulted in the arrests of dozens of Albanian activists also 
developed.  The leadership of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was formed, in 
part, from activists imprisoned in the 1980s protests.82   
 
Throughout the 1990s, as the former political arrangements of Yugoslavia 
dissolved, the constituent republics declared independence, and wars broke out 
in Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina.  In Kosovo, unofficial 
elections conducted primarily by the Albanian population, produced a “shadow” 
government led by Ibrahim Rugova.  However, as Serbian “ethnic cleansing” 
gained momentum, U.S. President George Bush on 24 December 1992 sent a 
warning to Serbian President Milosevic:  "In the event of conflict in Kosovo 
caused by Serbian action, the U.S. will be prepared to employ military force 
against Serbians in Kosovo and in Serbia proper."83  This “Christmas Warning” 
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from the Bush administration would be referenced throughout the Clinton 
presidency in dealings with Milosevic. 
 
The Dayton Accords, signed in November 1995, ended the war in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, addressed several of the issues resulting from the political 
disintegration of Yugoslavia, but were silent on the issue of Kosovo.  The 
international Contact Group,vii formed to address concerns, build consensus 
among allies, and formulate actions in regard to the Balkan wars soon found 
itself addressing the escalation of tensions in Kosovo. 
 
The U.K. put Kosovo on the Contact Group’s agenda in September 1997.84  It 
was the first time the Contact Group had taken up the subject, and, after 
substantial negotiations over the text,85 the members released a statement 
outlining concerns and goalposts:  “We call on the authorities in Belgrade and the 
leadership of the Kosovar Albanian community to join in a peaceful dialogue. We 
urge the two sides to create the conditions necessary for refugees from Kosovo 
to return home. … We warn against any resort to violence to press political 
demands and urge all sides to exercise maximum restraint.  Regarding the 
dispute over Kosovo's status, the position of the Contact Group countries is clear: 
                                                        
vii The Contact Group comprises representatives from US, UK, France, Germany, Italy 
and Russia. 
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we do not support independence and we do not support maintenance of the 
status quo. We support an enhanced status for Kosovo within the FRY.”86   
 
Tensions between the Serb and Kosovar Albanians, particularly the KLA, did not 
ease.  In March 1998, an already precarious situation in Kosovo was 
exacerbated by an action of Serbian special security forces in Donji 
Prekaze/Prekazi i Poshtem, during which a leader of the Kosovo Liberation Army 
(KLA) and 50 others (including 20 members of his family) were killed.  Within 
Kosovo, this event seemed to galvanize sympathy in the Albanian population and 
produced a swing of support from non-violent methods of achieving autonomy to 
active sympathy for the more radical KLA approach.87  
 
The details of the Prekaz operation (termed the “Jashari Family Massacre”) and 
the protests in its aftermath spurred international efforts, as well. The Contact 
Group, meeting four days after events, declared “In the light of the deplorable 
violence in Kosovo, we feel compelled to take steps to demonstrate to the 
authorities in Belgrade that they cannot defy international standards without 
facing severe consequences.”88  
 
The Statement elucidated several punitive measures to take immediate effect 
including an arms embargo, denial of visas for senior Serbian representatives, 
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and an end to export credits.  Additionally, it provided a ten day window of 
opportunity for Milosevic to “cease action by the security forces affecting the 
civilian population; Allow access to Kosovo for the ICRC…; commit himself 
publicly to begin a process of dialogue…with the leadership of the Kosovar 
Albanian community; and cooperate in a constructive manner with the Contact 
Group….”89 
 
The Russian delegation had objected to the punitive measures, and so the 
Statement stipulated that the “Russian Federation cannot support” the immediate 
implementation of the denial of visas or end to export credits, but that the issues 
could be taken up again if Serbia did not make progress in complying with 
Contact Group demands. 
 
According to then Russian Federation Foreign Minister Yevgeni Primakov, the 
next Contact Group discussion on March 25 in Bonn was “stormy,” with U.S. 
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright insisting on punitive measures against 
Belgrade.  Primakov responded, “Sign whatever you want, but Russia will 
publicly declare that we’re against it and that we’re leaving the Contact group.”90  
 
The host, German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel met separately with Primakov 
and worked out wording acceptable to the Group.   The 25 March Statement 
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discussed compliance and non-compliance by Belgrade, but was, perhaps, most 
notable for its call for a United Nations Security Council resolution regarding an 
arms embargo.   
 
U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright found the meeting frustrating but 
revealing:  “The Contact Group meeting…agreed on essentially nothing and 
convinced me that this group was not the right body to counter Milosevic.  
Obviously, Russia would be difficult, and France and Germany were almost 
always reluctant to confront Moscow.  The Italians did a lot of business with the 
Serbs and disliked sanctions.  It was all too easy for Milosevic to immobilize 
these countries with reassuring gestures.  And empty words.”91  
 
On 31 March, The United Nations Security Council (U.N.S.C.) passed resolution 
No. 1160, calling for an arms embargo and for the recommendations of the 
Contact Group, including the determination of an enhanced status for Kosovo, to 
be implemented.  The resolution passed with fourteen in favor, none opposing, 
and only China abstaining.92  
 
Richard Holbrooke, who had helped broker the Dayton Accords, was brought in 
to facilitate discussions between Milosevic and the Kosovar Albanians and to set 
up the process to bring international monitors into Kosovo.  Holbrook noted in an 
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interview, “My advice and position on Kosovo, from the beginning of my 
involvement in the spring of 1998 on, was basically that the Serbs and the 
Albanians would never be able to settle their problems unless there was an 
outside international security presence on the ground.”93  
 
Negotiations between Slobodan Milosevic and the Kosovar Albanians, under the 
leadership of Ibrahim Rugova took place in May 1989 in Belgrade, and it was 
agreed that talks should continue at a “working level.”  In late May, while Rugova 
was meeting with President Clinton in Washington, D.C., Serbian security forces 
launched an attack on Kosovar Albanian villages near the border with Albania, 
shelling the villages and causing residents to flee.94  
 
According to Holbrooke, one of the members of the Albanian delegation to the 
White House reached out to him: “I don’t think that our side can continue these 
talks with the Serbs in light of this.”95  The attacks effectively ended any progress 
made in the start up of negotiations and set off an escalation of violence 
throughout the summer of 1998.  It also marked the beginning of serious 
consideration of a military option by some members of the Contact Group. 
 
In June 1998, NATO’s North Atlantic Council (NAC) meeting of member defense 
ministers, considered what actions NATO could take with regard to Kosovo.  
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Over the course of the summer, as the fighting and refugee situation in Kosovo 
intensified, NATO had military assessments drawn and reconsidered to present a 
range of possible options.  General Klaus Naumann was NATO’s Military 
Committee Chairman in June 1998 and recalled: “[The NAC defense ministers] 
tasked us to develop operational concepts and as a matter of fact they really 
ruined our summer of 1998 since we were developing one operational concept 
following the other one, I think all in all we had some eight or nine different 
options on the table, so we had a full quiver of arrows ready for the use of the 
Council, but the Council was very reluctant to task us to develop these 
operational concepts further into an operations plan.”96    
 
In addition to the concept development, on 15 June NATO carried out a series of 
air exercises over Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.  
Exercise Determined Falcon involved more than 80 aircraft from fourteen NATO 
states and operated within fifteen miles of the border with Kosovo.97    
 
News that NATO was weighing its military options seems to have focused 
Milosevic’s mind.  Meeting with Boris Yeltsin in Moscow on June 16, Milosevic 
agreed to a nine-point plan that met some, but clearly not all, of the Contact 
Group’s and UNSC’s demands.  Milosevic agreed to return to talks with the 
Kosovar Albanians, but not KLA representatives.  It also was agreed that 
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observers and humanitarian groups would be allowed to operate in Kosovo, but 
international mediation was rejected.  Milosevic would not agree to a withdrawal 
of forces from Kosovo, claiming: "There are no grounds for the Yugoslav army 
not to be on the territory of Yugoslavia." … "Therefore, any withdrawal of units of 
the Yugoslav army from any part of Yugoslavia is out of the question."98  
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International Crisis 
 
On July 8, 1998, as part of a follow up to the meeting between Milosevic and 
Yeltsin in June, U.S. Charge D’Affaires in Belgrade, Richard Miles, and his 
Russian counterpart established the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission 
(KDOM) to observe and report on “security conditions and activities in Kosovo,” 
as well as the disposition of displaced persons, and the access granted to NGOs 
and foreign governments.99  KDOM reported to a “coordination group consisting 
of the ambassadors of the Contact Group countries in Belgrade, as well as the 
Ambassadors of Austria (representing the EU presidency) and Poland 
(representing the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE).”100  
 
Despite the presence of observers in Kosovo, tensions and skirmishes increased 
in July and August.  Skirmishes occurred along the border with Albania, where it 
was believed weapons were being funneled to the KLA.  July 17-21, the KLA and 
Serbian security forces clashed over control of Orahovec/Rahovec, where 
thousands fled from the fighting.  By August 10, Ibrahim Rugova cited a dramatic 
upsurge in the Serbian offensive in the Drenica region that left tens of thousands 
displaced and scores wounded.  Rugova appealed for international protection:  
“We welcome intervention so as to halt the Serbian military machine in 
Kosova.”101  
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CIA Map of Kosovo 
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An August session of the U.N. Security Council emphasized member concerns 
over the escalating tensions in Kosovo:  "The Security Council remains gravely 
concerned about the recent intense fighting in Kosovo which has had a 
devastating impact on the civilian population and has greatly increased the 
numbers of refugees and displaced persons. … "The Security Council call for an 
immediate ceasefire. [sic] The Council emphasizes that the authorities of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Kosovo Albanians must achieve a 
political solution to the issue of Kosovo and that all violence and acts of terrorism 
from whatever quarter are unacceptable, and reiterates the importance of the 
implementation of its resolution 1160 (1998).” 102  
 
During his Moscow summit with Yeltsin in September, Clinton attempted to 
address the situation in Kosovo but met with little success, concluding that 
Yeltsin was too preoccupied with domestic concerns.  Within weeks, however, 
the Security Council again discussed Kosovo and compliance with its resolution 
No. 1160.  The debate among the UNSC permanent members centered on 
asserting more forcefully the UNSC’s condemnation for the continued violence, 
and opening the door to possible punitive measures.  
 
UNSC Resolution No. 1199, in addition to expressing concerns over the 
humanitarian disaster unfolding in Kosovo with “numerous civilian casualties” and 
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more than 200,000 displaced persons, affirmed that the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (FRY) “constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region,” and, 
acting under Article VII of the Charter of the United Nationsviii demanded that the 
authorities in the FRY and the Kosovo Albanian leadership commit to a ceasefire, 
work to improve humanitarian conditions, and negotiate a political solution to the 
crisis.103  
 
The Resolution was adopted by a vote of 14 in favor and one abstention (China).  
Negotiations to reach that level of consensus, specifically with Russia, had been 
hard fought, but may have benefited from the chaotic domestic conflict in 
Moscow.  While the resolution was not an explicit authorization for the use of 
force to compel compliance, its finding of FRY as a “threat to peace and security” 
was sufficient for NATO to issue a warning of its own. 
 
At a 23-24 September meeting of the North Atlantic Council, the allies’ defense 
ministers debated measures to reinforce the Security Council resolution.   NATO 
Secretary General Javier Solana emphasized the need to assure Milosevic of the 
seriousness of NATO’s purpose, as it seemed the Serbian authorities had 
decided that they could keep up the violence against the Kosovar Albanians as 
long as they kept their actions small-scale.  Solana told the defense ministers 
                                                        
viii Please see appendix for the text of Article VII of the Charter of the United Nations. 
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that a Serb diplomat had been heard to joke:  “a village a day keeps NATO 
away.”104   
 
The NAC ministers agreed to take NATO forces to an increased level of 
preparedness by issuing an ACTWARNix for a potential air campaign in Kosovo.  
The announcement of the decision by the NATO Secretary General explicitly 
reiterated the demands placed on Milosevic by the UNSC resolution and signaled 
NATO’s readiness to use force “if it becomes necessary to do so.”105  
 
There had been debate among the NATO allies over what level of coordination 
might be necessary with the U.N. Security Council.  U.K. Foreign Secretary 
Robin Cooke told Madeleine Albright the “his lawyers” had informed him that 
NATO needed an explicit authorization for the use of force from the U.N. Security 
Council.  Albright told him to “get himself new lawyers.”106  For NATO to require 
United Nations Security Council authorization to act would be tantamount to 
giving Russia and China veto power over the alliance.  If a vote on authorization 
were taken at the Security Council, but not passed: “NATO would lose Russian 
support in its efforts and any future NATO military intervention would be 
delegitimized.”107  
                                                        
ix NATO’s ACTWARN, is an acronym for “activation warning,” which is a phase of 
preparedness for a NATO mission that entails notifying NATO member states that there 
is a mission for which force will be required. 
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The atmosphere in Europe in late 1998 was hardly convivial for a unified political 
and military policy from NATO members.  Germany and Italy were both on the 
verge of political transitions:  Romano Prodi lost a vote of confidence in Italy in 
October and was replaced by Massimo D’Alema and a center-left coalition; the 
long-serving German Chancellor Helmut Kohl was defeated in federal elections 
and replaced by Gerhard Schroeder’s Red-Green coalition on October 27, 1998.   
In the United States, the Clinton administration was mired in presidential 
impeachment hearings and moving toward an eventual Senate trial. 
 
On September 30, the Principals Committeex met at the White House.  “[National 
Security Adviser] Sandy Berger…put a copy of The New York Times on the table 
with large front-page color photograph of the corpse of an elderly Albanian 
villager whose throat had been slit.”108  The Times article recounts the executions 
and mutilations of women, children, and the elderly by Serbian police and the 
Yugoslav Army: “From the way some of the bodies lay on a rocky path, it was 
evident that the women and children had tried to escape and had run straight into 
the police.”109                                                           x The Principals Committee is a gathering of the top foreign policy advisers to the president.  In the Clinton Administration, the Committee comprised the Secretaries of State and Defense, the National Security Adviser, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the C.I.A., and the U.N. Ambassador.  Meetings were held in the soundproof, secure Situation Room. (Ann Blackman, Seasons of her Life: A Biography 
of Madeleine Korbel Albright. New York: NY: Scribner. 1998: p.233)  
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On the recommendation of the Principals Committee, President Clinton sent 
Richard Holbrooke back to Belgrade to emphasize the allies resolve in 
compelling Serbia to comply with NATO and UNSC demands.  Nonetheless, 
Milosevic remained “unconvinced that NATO would move beyond its repeated 
warning.”110  
 
While Russian President Yeltsin had been too preoccupied to discuss Kosovo in 
early September, he did return to the subject later in the month.  When his new 
Foreign Minister, Igor Ivanov, paid a visit to Washington, Yeltsin phoned him at 3 
a.m. and “and personally instructed him to tell Clinton that Russia would “not 
countenance” airstrikes in FRY.111   
 
On October 3, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Anan reported to the Security Council 
on Milosevic’s compliance with resolutions 1160 and 1199:  “During the reporting 
period, fighting in Kosovo continued unabated.  Government security forces 
conducted offensives in the various parts of Kosovo….  In the week following the 
adoption, on 23 September 1998, of resolution 1199 (1998), the forces in fact 
intensified their operations…[that] resulted in the displacement of some 20,000 
additional people. … In the last few weeks, the international community has 
witnessed appalling atrocities in Kosovo, reminiscent of the recent past 
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elsewhere in the Balkans.  These have been borne out by reporting by the 
Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission and other reliable sources.  I reiterate my 
utter condemnation of such wanton killing and destruction.  It is clear beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the great majority of such acts have been committed by 
security forces in Kosovo acting under the authority of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia.”112   
 
On October 5, Yeltsin and Clinton spoke directly.  Yeltsin “was nearly unhinged 
on the subject of Kosovo.  He ranted for twelve minutes, pausing neither for 
interpretation into English nor for Clinton’s reply. …  Milosevic had seen the light 
and would now comply with U.N. resolutions.  Therefore, Yeltsin concluded 
emphatically, the use of force would be inadmissible and forbidden.  He repeated 
several times a Russian word, nyelzya….” 113  
 
Despite Yeltsin’s assurances, after meeting with Milosevic, Richard Holbrooke, 
together with Secretary Albright determined that NATO needed to make its 
intentions crystal clear.  They met first with the NATO allies in Brussels.  The 
NATO allies, even those with uncertain political futures, agreed with the decision 
to send a more emphatic signal to Belgrade and on October 2, NATO’s North 
Atlantic Council decided to step up its preparedness to the level of Activation 
Request—ACTREQ—for both a limited air assault option and a phased air 
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campaign.114  However, some of the allies still considered it necessary to secure 
a United Nations mandate for action. 
 
Secretary of State Albright went directly from Brussels to a meeting of the 
Contact Group held at London’s Heathrow Airport, in the VIP lounge.115  There 
was again a discussion of the need for a U.N. Security Council resolution on the 
use of force in Kosovo.  Igor Ivanov made it clear that Russia would veto such a 
resolution, thus removing the Security Council as an avenue for increased 
pressure on Serbia.   However, Ivanov noted that if the NATO allies chose not to 
raise the issue at the Security Council “we’ll just make a lot of noise….  The 
Russian can’t do anything.  NATO is the power.”116   
 
Richard Holbrooke continued his negotiations with Milosevic in Belgrade and 
managed to focus the Serbian leader’s attention by claiming that NATO had 
decided to advance its mission preparedness further with Activation Orders—
ACTORD—which was the final step in the activation process and meant that 
NATO would “pull the trigger on the airstrikes unless it were later suspended.”117  
 
Returning to Brussels, Holbrooke briefed a North Atlantic Council meeting on 12 
October.  He had worked out an agreement, including a system of verification 
with Milosevic, but advised the ambassadors that if NATO went forward with the 
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ACTORD, he would be better able to make his agreement with Milosevic stick.118  
The North Atlantic Council issued the ACTORD on October 13, in effect 
approving a limited air strike and phased air campaign to begin in approximately 
four days.  Holbrooke returned to Belgrade, “A few hours later, Holbrooke 
announced that he and Milosevic had a deal.”119  
 
The October 1998 agreement Richard Holbrooke managed to negotiate with 
Slobodan Milosevic required Serbia to withdraw forces, allow in international 
observers in a “verification mission,” allow elections to be conducted and grant 
substantial autonomy for Kosovo.  Milosevic entered into negotiations on a 
separate agreement covering troop withdrawals and aerial surveillance for 
verification with Secretary-General Solana, as well as Generals Clark and 
Naumann from NATO, which decided to suspend its ACTORD until October 27, 
to provide time for the conclusion of the negotiations and for Milosevic to comply, 
without dropping the threat entirely.  The negotiations continued for days, while 
Milosevic and his generals argued the necessity of leaving extra police and Army 
forces in Kosovo.  It quickly became clear that the NATO threat had brought 
Milosevic to this point, but that reaching agreement on exactly what was to be 
withdrawn from Kosovo would be tedious.  On his second visit to Belgrade, 
General Clark delivered a direct threat to Milosevic:  “Mr. President, you are 
going to have to withdraw all your excess forces.  Let’s stop fencing about this.  If 
you don’t withdraw, Washington is going to tell me to bomb you, and I’m going to 
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bomb you good.”120  On the third trip, October 24-25, they finally reached 
agreement with Milosevic and his generals. 
 
An agreement between Serbia and the OSCE created the Kosovo Verification 
Mission, which comprised approximately 2,000 unarmed observers who patrolled 
Kosovo in bright orange trucks to monitor the agreed ceasefire.  The Mission was 
established by a decision of the Permanent Council of the OSCE on October 25, 
and deployed in November 1998 under the direction of American Ambassador 
William Walker.  The NATO portion of the verification mission—Operation Eagle 
Eye—coordinated with the ground observers through the Kosovo Verification 
Coordination Centre (KVCC) in Kumanovo, Macedonia (FYROM).  The KVCC 
began operations in November 1998 and was commanded by Brigadier General 
David Montgomery, U.K. Army.121  The NATO and OSCE verification missions 
were endorsed by Security Council Resolution No. 1203.   
 
There seemed to be little optimism for the long-term success of the October 
agreements with Milosevic, nonetheless, it did provide a break for some of 
Kosovo’s displaced persons to return to their homes for the winter.  Holbrooke’s 
view was measured:  “we predicted that if we didn’t have a security force to 
enforce this, it would fall apart by the spring.  In reality, the falling apart began 
before spring even arrived, because both sides provoked each other.  
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Nonetheless, a tremendous number of lives were saved by this October 
agreement.”122  
 
General Clark warned, “we had done no more than buy a pause in which 
diplomacy had to work.  If it didn’t, we would be facing conflict again within a few 
months.”123 Secretary Albright saw the agreement as little more than a “Band-
Aid,” she noted, however, “It reinforced the truth that Kosovo’s fate was of 
international concern, and it established a set of formal obligations Milosevic had 
accepted, and against which he could be held accountable.  Perhaps most 
important, the NATO authorization of force was suspended, not withdrawn.124  
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4.  Intermezzo 
 
“On or about 15 January 1999, in the early morning hours, the village of Racak 
(Stimlje/Shtime municipality) was attacked by forces of the FRY and Serbia.  
After shelling by the VJ units, the Serb police entered the village later in the 
morning and began conducting house-to-house searches.  Villagers, who 
attempted to flee from the Serb police, were shot throughout the village.  A group 
of approximately 25 men attempted to hide in a building, but were discovered by 
the Serb police.  They were beaten and then removed to a nearby hill, where the 
policemen shot and killed them.  Altogether, the forces of the FRY and Serbia 
killed approximately 45 Kosovo Albanians in and around Racak.”xi 
 
 
The Kosovo Verification Mission under Ambassador William Walker had 
deployed to Kosovo in November 1998.  Upon hearing reports of a “military 
clash” around Racak, Ambassador Walker, his deputy, an interpreter, and some 
guards drove to Racak while “a whole bunch of journalists…formed a tail behind 
my little caravan.”125  “The first K.V.M. teams to arrive in Racak on Jan. 16 in the 
early morning found the following: Twenty-three adult males of various ages. 
Many shot at extremely close range, most shot in the front, back and top of the 
head. Villagers reported that these victims were last seen alive when the police 
were arresting them. . . .”126   
                                                         
xi This description of events in Racak forms part of the basis for the charges against 
Slobodan Milosevic in the International Criminal Tribunal.  Milosevic died in detention in 
2006. (The prosecutor of the Tribunal Against Slobodan Milosevic, et al, Amended 
Indictment, IT-99-37-I, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 22 May 
1999, pp11-12, via www.icty.org.) 
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Upon returning to his office, Ambassador Walker held a press conference for the 
journalists that had followed his team back.  He termed what he had just seen “ a 
crime against humanity,” and suggested that those responsible were in the 
security services.  Walker then recommended that the “international criminal 
tribunal in the Hague should be invited to come in here with its investigators to do 
a real criminal investigation.”127   
 
On 15 January in Washington, D.C., the Principals Committee met at the White 
House Situation Room to discuss the shortcomings of the October Agreement 
and the ongoing fighting in Kosovo.  News of the Racak massacre had not yet 
reached the Committee members as they debated the possibilities of a more 
emphatic threat of force to forestall further violence.  There seemed to be 
agreement on the underlying assumption that Kosovo was experiencing a pause 
in what would become an extremely volatile situation in the spring, but there was 
no agreement on the path to a more robust process that might prevent 
escalation.  Secretary of State Albright made the case strenuously for a more 
assertive approach; National Security Adviser Sandy Berger (among others) 
outlined the difficulties of relying on a military solution to the Kosovo problem.  
The debate over the use of force, if an international consensus truly could be 
  
92 
reached,xii bifurcated along familiar lines:  concerns over air power alone not 
being sufficient to achieve the intended goals; and the hesitance over the 
insertion of ground troops on any mission without overwhelming force.  The 
Principals Committee eventually agreed, albeit with some notable reservations, 
on a policy referred to as “October Plus,”128 implying that further efforts would be 
made to reach resolution, but not advocating military action.  The recently 
released Summary of Conclusions from the 15 January meeting suggests a 
Committee as much concerned with KLA activity, as with Serbian military and 
police actions.  The following conclusion is illustrative:  The USG should adapt its 
public line to condemn more forcefully acts of violence by the KLA, and its role in 
provoking violence, while still acknowledging that Milosevic bears primary 
responsibility for the crisis in Kosovo.129 
 
Former Director for European Affairs at the National Security Council Ivo Daalder 
described the basic premises of the new policy: “October Plus strengthens it a 
little bit, re-invigorates the shuttle that we're doing between the Albanians and 
Milosevic to get a political agreement. It sends some bodyguards to some of the 
OSCE monitors down there, and a variety of other means to set this up.”130   
 
                                                        
xii Apparently, NATO’s activation warnings, requirements, and orders, while stipulating 
concrete military commitments, were viewed as little more than political tools in this 
negotiation process. 
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When news of the Racak massacre, along with Ambassador Walker’s 
observations and reactions, reached D.C. on the morning of January 16, 
Madeleine Albright phoned Sandy Berger: “Spring has come to Kosovo early this 
year,” she chided.  The national security principals soon were discussing the 
ramifications of Racak and a more assertive approach to Belgrade.  After several 
days of meetings, a loose consensus was constructed around an approach that 
called for new negotiations under the threat of NATO air strikes and the 
“possible” U.S. involvement in a NATO-led peacekeeping force, which would only 
deploy if Belgrade consented.131  The summaries for these Principals Committee 
meetings reflect a far more robust approach to Kosovo, with calls for updated 
targeting information, a NATO ultimatum to Milosevic, and protection for the 
Kosovo Verification Mission, including an extraction force to pull them out if 
violence should escalate.”132  
 
Focusing on the Contact Group as the appropriate forum for advancing action 
regarding Kosovo, Albright found it necessary to explore the Russian position 
more thoroughly, in the hopes that they would not obstruct Contact Group 
decisions; a trip to Moscow was set for January 25-27, 1999. 
 
Unfortunately, President Yeltsin had suffered a difficult winter.  Questions about 
his health had resurfaced as the Primakov Government developed policies to 
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ease the devaluation crisis.  Seen on state visits to Central Asia in the fall, Yeltsin 
seemed stiff and unsteady.  Hospitalized in November with bronchitis, he was 
diagnosed in January with a bleeding ulcer and was again confined to the 
hospital on January 17.133  His occasional visits to the Kremlin inevitably led to 
the promotion or firing of an adviser or official, but the moves seemed less the 
actions of the indispensible leader than the stale tactics of an aging boss. 
 
By mid-January, Prime Minister Primakov had embarked on a path that could 
bring economic stabilizationxiii and had established a pattern of rule that 
appeared broad-based and consultative to some, but which was beginning to 
appear leftist and revanchist to Yeltsin’s more liberal advisers and officials.  The 
more liberal wing included his closest set – often referred to as “The Family,” 
because the group included Yeltsin’s daughter and adviser, Tatiana Dyachenko.  
The Family members generally followed a western-oriented reformist policy path, 
but their politics were secondary to loyalty to Yeltsin and protection of his 
authority and reputation.xiv 
 
                                                        
xiii This was still a critical moment as the prime minister was negotiating with the IMF and 
forecasting that his banking and financial plans would develop as needed for 1999.  
(See, for example, BBC News, 312 December 98, The Economy, Red-letter year for 
Russia.) 
xiv “Family” members allegedly included Anatoli Chubais, Valentin Yumashev, Aleksandr 
Voloshin, and oligarch Boris Berezovsky.  
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In the wake of the August-September crisis, Prime Minister Primakov had put 
together a government that resembled a coalition for its inclusion of parties 
represented in the State Duma, but which Primakov preferred to characterize as 
a team of professionals.  One notable aspect of Primakov’s team certainly was 
the lack of enthusiasm for the economic reform path of Gaidar, Chubais, and 
Kiriyenko.  Whether as a reaction to events, or as part of a general policy 
preference, Primakov’s team began to reassert state controls over segments of 
the economy and to recreate a strong central authority in economic activity.   
 
In his memoirs, Primakov notes that the advice proffered from the west—
variably, the U.S., allies, the IMF—leaned heavily towards decentralization in the 
economy (perhaps natural in the transition from a centrally-planned command 
economy).  Primakov, however, seems to equate the separation of state authority 
in the economy with a weakening of the state.  He suggests that less state 
involvement in the economy is a means the west employed to weaken the 
standing of the Russian state in general.  “The West seemed to fear that any 
criticism [of Russia’s economic policy] would strengthen the proponents of a 
stronger state role in the economy, even those who were firmly on the side of 
market reforms and privatization but wanted them to be implemented in a way 
that took the needs of production into consideration.  The West feared them 
because the increased influence of such forces over foreign policy would 
inevitably lead to a more assertive defense of Russia’s national interests.”134  
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Primakov was not alone on the Russian political stage with the view that the 
West had used economic reform policies to weaken Russia, with or without the 
collusion of Yeltsin and his reform team.   He was, however, prime minister at a 
time when Yeltsin was weakened by the failure of his team’s economic policies 
and his own poor health.  Additionally, Primakov had many sympathizers and 
supporters in the parliament.  Instead of the anticipated buffer that Primakov 
might provide by absorbing parliamentary anger at executive policies, Primakov 
was becoming a secondary power source.  Yeltsin noticed these developments:  
“I gradually began to sense the danger of this situation.  Yes, Primakov was able 
to attract that portion of the elite which quietly dreamed of a political revanche 
and a return of the old ways.”135  
 
The problems between president and prime minister were becoming evident at 
the end of 1998, when Primakov had difficulty even securing a meeting with 
Yeltsin.  When he did finally get in to see Yeltsin in the hospital, Yeltsin 
upbraided him for not coming more often.  Primakov ascribed his communication 
problems with Yeltsin to his inner circle—the Family—and notably Yeltsin’s 
daughter, who “was more the Family’s manager than its ideological or strategic 
leader.”   To Primakov, the Family was “afraid of my meetings with the president, 
at which he would get true information, which differed in many ways from what he 
was getting from his inner circle.”136 
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One of Primakov’s most controversial policy initiatives involved the focus on 
“economic crimes.”  It was clear at the time that corruption pervaded most levels 
of the state bureaucracy and that there was significant outflow of capital from 
Russia to foreign bank accounts.  However, given Primakov’s closer relationship 
with leftist forces in the legislature than with the reformers of earlier Russian 
governments, his emphasis on fighting economic crimes appeared as an attack 
on the reform programs that had been the hallmark of Yeltsin’s presidency.   
 
Against this backdrop, Primakov attempted to revive a ceasefire with the Duma 
similar to one that had been considered in September: a temporary ban on the 
use of presidential authority to dissolve the Duma in exchange for an end to 
presidential impeachment for a set period of time (until the next elections) and 
new legislation to provide security guarantees for Russian presidents in 
retirement.   
 
On January 22, Primakov wrote to the leaders of the Federal Assembly and State 
Duma to propose an “agreement on rules of conduct for the president, the 
Federal Council, and the government” in order to “secure the coordinated efforts 
of the federal institutions of state power.”  While Primakov claimed his intention 
was “ensuring the country’s political stability,” it certainly appeared as though he 
was opening the door to a reconsideration of the executive-legislative balance 
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and a resumption of the domestic struggle that had ended in violence fewer than 
six years earlier.137   
 
Yeltsin expressed surprise at Primakov’s maneuver, but recognized the threat to 
the current constitutional arrangement:  “Why Primakov decided to revive it was a 
complete mystery to me.  …  In the fall, the Duma’s impeachment procedure and 
my illness indicated the need to put some brakes on the political process. 
…[N]ow, in late January, the same pact would seem like a total capitulation by 
the president.”138   
 
Yeltsin summoned Primakov to his hospital room:  “[H]ow can you draft a 
document that significantly reduces presidential powers  and talk about it with the 
Duma and the Federation Council without even informing me or discussing it with 
me?”  Primakov, embarrassed, replied that he had the president’s interests, as 
well as the interests of society and the state in mind, but that he would “withdraw 
the document.”139   
 
Yeltsin, recognizing “how easily the foundations of the constitution could be 
undermined,” must have determined that Primakov was becoming not only too 
independent, but too ambitious as well.  While he managed to forestall the 
debate on curbing presidential powers for the time being, it seemed certain that 
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the parliamentary opposition had found a sympathetic ear in his executive 
branch. 
 
With Yeltsin’s health considerations at the forefront, the prime minister had been 
taking on many foreign policy obligations as well as his domestic concerns.  
Upon assuming the post of prime minister, Primakov had promised Madeleine 
Albright that she could count on “continuity in Russian foreign policy.”140   
 
Primakov was replaced as Foreign Minister by his deputy, Igor Ivanov.  On 
January 25, Ivanov and Madeleine Albright began discussions on Kosovo meant 
to both inform Russia of the new U.S. approach post-Racak and to suss out 
Russia’s position on a more activist approach to Belgrade.  After talks that kept 
derailing over the means of getting to a political settlement in Kosovo, Albright 
and Ivanov took a break and attended a performance of La Traviata at the 
Bolshoi Theater together.  In a side room during intermission, Albright pressed 
her point:  “The Europeans are worried about your reaction if NATO tries to act 
without going to the Security Council. ... “Igor, this is serious.  I need to be able to 
tell the Europeans that NATO can threaten force in order to get a political 
settlement and that you will find a way to live with it.”141   
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“Russia will never agree to air strikes against the Serbs,” Ivanov responded.  
“That would be totally unacceptable.  NATO has no right to attack a sovereign 
state. … We do, however, share your desire for a political settlement, and 
perhaps the threat of force is needed to achieve that.”142  With apparent 
agreement on the threat of force from NATO, if not the actual use of force, 
Albright was able to convene the Contact Group and set up peace negotiations 
backed up by threat of NATO air strikes, to be held in Rambouillet, France in 
February. 
 
Russia was not the only member of the Contact Group to have reservations 
about the use of force by NATO should negotiations fail.  There were two primary 
avenues of dissent: several member states of the Contact Group seemed, like 
Russia, to agree that a threat of force might be required to get Belgrade to 
negotiate but were opposed to any actual use of force; others were advocates of 
a U.N. Security Council mandate for NATO’s use of force.xv  As Marc Weller 
noted, the Rambouillet negotiations intensified the divisions among the putative 
allies:  “Throughout the talks, significant rifts in the Contact group were visible, 
relating to the political settlement, to the implementation and to the threat or use 
                                                        
xv In the case of Russia, France, and Italy, allowing NATO to have authority in the 
situation was tantamount to acceding to US leadership.  For Russia in particular, the 
goal seemed to be to keep the locus of talks in a group where it might block action to 
which it objected. (Weller, Daalder) 
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of force as a tool of achieving settlement.  The divisions became more 
pronounced towards the conclusion of the conference.”143  
 
On January 29, the members of the Contact Group announced that they would 
convene peace negotiations at the Rambouillet Castle outside Paris. The talks 
were hosted by France and Britain, with negotiators from the E.U. (Wolfgang 
Petritsch), Russia (Boris Mayorsky), and the U.S. (Christopher Hill).  The Serbian 
and Kosovar delegations were given a list of non-negotiable principles, such as 
Kosovo’s right to autonomy and the fact that the agreement was meant to be 
“interim,” and then were to be given an agreement (and a series of “annexes” on 
military issues, security, etc) to consider.  As originally conceived, each 
delegation could request changes, but only those agreed by both delegations 
would be incorporated into the agreement.  Crucial to the arrangements was a 
deadline by which the parties would either sign the agreement or face 
consequences – this ultimatum clearly was intended for Serbia as a threat they 
had heard before:  sign or NATO air strikes would commence.144 
 
The Kosovar delegation comprised representatives from Rugova’s Democratic 
League of Kosovo (LDK), members of the United Democratic Movement (an 
umbrella organization of smaller political parties) headed by Rexhep Qosja, 
several Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) members, academics, and independents.  
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The delegation was headed by KLA representative Hashim Thaçi.  The high-level 
composition of the delegation signified that the Kosovars accepted the 
importance of the negotiations, but also reflected the fracturing of Kosovar 
society in recent months and the increasing political power of the KLA. 
 
The Serbian delegation, on the other hand, had no high-ranking officials, but was 
a study in the diversity of the population in Kosovo with representatives of the 
Muslim, Turkish, and pro-Serbian Albanian and gypsy communities.  It was clear, 
at least over the first week of negotiations, that the Serbian delegation intended 
to participate as little as possible.  By the second week of talks, finally Serbian 
President Milutinovic joined the delegation and presented some substantive 
analysis of the agreement, along with demands for amendments. 
 
Several issues seemed to undermine Rambouillet from the outset, perhaps 
primary among them was the insistence on the interim nature of the agreement.  
This underlying principle removed the most fundamental of the Kosovoar 
Albanian demands from the table before the talks even started and may have 
contributed to the sense expressed by delegation leader Thaçi that “the 
Rambouillet conference in the beginning did not leave an impression that it is that 
serious.”145  
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The inability to discuss final status was exacerbated by the lack of a security 
annex, as its text was still being debated.  The Kosovar Albanian delegation saw 
themselves being asked to abandon their goal of independence and depend on 
the international community for protection, but the international community was 
having trouble getting agreement among themselves on what shape that 
protection might take.  Indeed, the Rambouillet Conference at times seemed to 
focus as much on relationships among members of the sponsoring Contact 
Group, as on the parties to the talks.146  
 
 The attitude of the Serbian delegation, which did not seem to be giving serious 
attention to the negotiations, immediately called into question the point of the 
conference.  In order to make clear to Milosevic that Rambouillet represented a 
serious and final opportunity for mediation, American Ambassador Christopher 
Hill shuttled to Belgrade for discussions.  This seemed to breach the protocol of 
isolation at the Castle and appeared to the Kosovars to represent preferential 
treatment for Milosevic.  The appearance of special status deepened the 
continuing complications and divisions within the delegation, raised questions 
about the negotiation sponsors, and intensified the need for communication 
between the delegation members and KLA leaders at home in order to forge 
consensus.147   
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After postponing the initial Rambouillet deadline, Madeleine Albright arrived to 
participate personally in the last days of negotiations, with little success.  In the 
end, the Serbian delegation refused to sign, and the Albanian delegation 
requested a postponement so the members could return for consultations in 
Kosovo.  The talks were postponed until March 15, when the parties would 
reconvene in Paris.   
 
The Russian delegation at Rambouillet, led by Boris Mayorski, approached the 
negotiations with a particular set of priorities, which included a staunch defense 
of Serbia/FRY and the preclusion of an agreement that would involve a NATO-
led force.   By the end of the conference, Russia’s negotiator came to be viewed 
“almost in the way of a representative of a particular party to the talks.”148  In 
Moscow during the Rambouillet talks, Strobe Talbott would urge the “Russians to 
see that by appearing, yet again, to serve as the Serbs’ defense attorneys, they 
were only encouraging intransigence and thus increasing the likelihood of 
war.”149   
 
Tensions in Moscow were escalating over domestic issues, as well as 
international disagreements.  The growing divide between president and prime 
minister, in an odd stasis as Yeltsin cycled in and out of hospital, was becoming 
more evident by February.  When King Hussein of Jordan passed away, the 
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official delegation to his funeral was to be headed by Primakov.  Apparently, 
Yeltsin had second thoughts and decided to lead the delegation himself.  Boris 
Nemtsov explained the president’s thinking:  “Yel'tsin is at the funeral [for King 
Hussein of Jordan]. He went because he wants to show the world that he's 
powerful, he's in good shape. I have my own view: Maybe it's just a joke. I think 
that when he was in the hospital, he read the newspaper and noticed that he had 
no power, that nobody paid any attention to him. Life was going in one direction 
and Yel'tsin was staying in another hospital. Well, I think that he was so angry 
about that he wanted to prove to the nation that he's a Russian tsar.”150  
 
Unfortunately, Yeltsin’s trip to Jordan did little to persuade anyone of his 
robustness, instead, Russian media zeroed in on both his frailty and the evidence 
of a split in the executive branch:  “Boris Yeltsin sacrificed his health so as not to 
let Primakov feel like he is the president,” the liberal Sevodnya newspaper said.  
… “It is possible Yeltsin’s trip to Amman was the strongest political move the 
physically and mentally tired Yeltsin could have made,” says Nezavisimaya 
gazeta.”151  
 
While Yeltsin convalesced, Primakov had continued pushing initiatives both in 
the struggle against economic crimes and on the so-called power sharing 
agreement.  The targets of the economic crime investigations were primarily 
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individuals with close ties to the Yeltsin “Family,” particularly Boris Berezovsky, 
who used his media outlets to fire back at the prime minister and investigators.xvi  
As security officials raided corporate headquarters (notably Berezovsky’s 
Sibneft), Yeltsin’s former government officials, reform-minded advisers, and inner 
circle wondered if the attacks were more political than economic—an issue that 
raised political hackles with the ill but savvy president.   
 
On February 1, the Procurator-General, Yuri Skuratov, submitted a letter to the 
Duma complaining that a company called Fimaco was used by the Russian 
Central Bank to park hard currency reserves in foreign bank accounts, then 
submitted his resignation for “health reasons,” and admitted himself to the 
hospital.  “There are several rumors about the resignation of the prosecutor, Yuri 
Skuratov,” Boris Nemtsov explained at the time, “One of the quite realistic 
explanations is that this is the result of Berezovsky's influence.  What is the 
source of Berezovsky's power? There is only one source -- he has two, but the 
most influential is the First Channel (ORT). He always uses ORT for his political 
purposes, for blackmail. … I don't think he is weak now, because he has another 
source of power, his relationship with some people in the Kremlin, like Yel'tsin's 
daughter [Tatiana Dyachenko]. That's why I don't think that Berezovsky will 
decline.”152                                                          
xvi In his memoir, Primakov claims to have had no hand in the investigations, but does 
express very strong opinions about Berezovsky and the manner in which he “earned” his 
fortune. 
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In the late 1990’s, there were four significant media holding companies, which 
exercised notable political power based on their control of media outlets (most 
influential were all-Russian television stations).  “These four were the state 
holding company (VGTRK), the mass media controlled by Boris Berezovsky, 
Vladimir Gusinsky’s Media-Most Group, and also the media group controlled by 
Yuri Luzhkov and by companies close to the Moscow City government.”153  While 
Berezovsky and Gusinsky, in particular, had been instrumental in their support of 
Yeltsin’s re-election campaign in 1996, their media outlets did not hew a strictly 
pro-presidential line by 1998-99.   
 
Anna Arutunyan provides a rough sketch of the twisting loyalties of Berezovsky’s 
ORT Television and Gusinsky’s NTV in the late 1990s”  “NTV and ORT joined 
forces to uphold Yeltsin in the 1996 presidential campaign; NTV and ORT 
likewise joined forces in 1997 in an attempt to discredit the Yeltsin administration 
over the Svyazinvest deal; NTV and ORT were once again pitted against each 
other in 1999-2000 during the parliamentary and presidential elections, with ORT 
staking on Yeltsin and Putin, and NTV staking on the Primakov-Luzhkov 
opposition.”154   
 
It was believed that Berezovsky might have had knowledge of a particularly 
salacious video of Skuratov and used the information to blackmail the Procurator-
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General.  Russia had seen a fair share of kompromat (compromising material) 
used in political skirmishes in recent years, but a new round of kompromat wars 
seemed particularly ill-timed given the president’s compromised health, the state 
of the economy, and the prime minister perceived as eyeing a return to state 
command administration.  According to Yeltsin, it was his then Chief of 
Administration, Nikolai Bordyuzha who first saw the Skuratov video and 
demanded the procurator’s resignation.  In any event, Skuratov disappeared for a 
few weeks, only to resurface as the central figure in yet another power clash 
between the executive and legislature. 
 
In an effort to lower the tone of political discourse, Primakov pursued a version of 
the previously floated political accord, this time with the president’s blessings.  
Chairing a meeting of the Security Council, Primakov announced the new plan, 
which would provide guarantees for the president and parliament; Yeltsin was not 
present to sign the accord.  On February 25 however, Yeltsin and Primakov 
taped a short appearance for the television cameras to speak reassuringly of 
their respect for each other’s positions and the intentions that each of them 
should serve until the year 2000 in office.  Yeltsin recounts the event as a means 
to keep Primakov from worrying too much about news coverage, and he recalls 
wanting to tell him:  “Yevgeny Maksimovich, come to your senses!  It’s another 
era!  There’s another country out there!”  But I didn’t want to offend or insult him.  
Maybe that was my mistake.”155  
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Yeltsin was hospitalized at Central Clinic Hospital in late February once again for 
complications from the bleeding ulcer.  The status of the Procurator-General, 
while in the same hospital, was unclear, as the Federation Council had yet to 
decide whether or not to accept his resignation.  By early March, Yeltsin’s Chief 
of Staff Nikolai Bordyuzha was admitted to Central Clinic as well, and before long 
the Chief of the Kremlin Business Administration (and a central figure in one of 
the “economic crimes” investigations) Pavel Borodin joined his colleagues and 
the President at Central Clinic.156  The withdrawal of so many Kremlin officials 
into hospital suggests that these were uncertain times, enough to try men’s 
souls…and perhaps to exacerbate heart conditions. 
 
As the deadline to reconvene the parties to the Rambouillet negotiations 
approached, Contact Group members worked through three priorities.  The first 
clearly was to maintain Group consensus, which was increasingly difficult as the 
possibility for NATO action loomed closer.  Secondly, the channel with Milosevic 
had to be maintained, as the pressure was turned up to convince him that NATO 
bombing was becoming a more likely eventuality, but simultaneously, the 
Kosovar Albanians had to be persuaded to sign or the threat of NATO air strikes 
would become moot.  Third, NATO’s NAC had to be informed and consensus 
sustained, as NATO prepared for the threatened air campaign.    
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U.S. National Security Council agenda notes from the period between 
Rambouillet and the Paris talks reflect the many irons in this particular fire, as 
well as the numerous paths of approach devised to achieve the desired result: 
3/8/99 -DC 
USNATO should work with key allies on March 9 to lock in agreement on 
strategy for dealing with Serb intransigence for presentation to the NAC on 
March 10 (Action: USNATO) 
State should develop a strategy for addressing the implications of a “no” from the 
Kosovar Albanian side (Action: State) 
We should recommend that Secretary Solana make a statement concerning 
Kosovo at the beginning of his March 12 visit to the United States. (Action: 
State/USNATO)  (…) 
 
3/13/99 - PC 
Any changes to the military chapter of the interim settlement should be cleared in 
advance by DoD. (Action: State, DoD) 
The USG should request the North Atlantic Council to task the NATO Military 
Authorities to plan for air operations beyond the initial package of strikes already 
planned in NATO. The planning should include options to respond to: (1) FRY 
offensive operations in Kosovo and (2) FRY attacks on NATO forces. (Action: 
State) 
The VJ should be warned through military channels of the 'consequences to the 
VJ of NATO air strikes, so as to undermine VJ support for launching a military 
offensive in Kosovo. (Action: DoD)  
Assuming that the talks in Paris will not produce an agreed, interim settlement, 
the Principals should reconvene to consider the following two paths: 
First, using a Kosovar Albanian "yes" 'and Serb "no" to pose a credible threat of 
NATO airstrikes with the aim of securing Belgrade's acceptance of the interim 
settlement, while ensuring that NATO is ready to execute air strikes to reduce 
Belgrade's capability to conduct offensive operations in Kosovo 
Second, disengaging from the talks without a concluding threat of air strikes, 
while keeping NATO ready to respond to further FRY offensive operations or 
atrocities. (Action: NSC)157 
  
111 
 While the refusal of the Kosovar Albanians to sign the Rambouillet Accords 
might have been the most embarrassing of outcomes at this point, clearly it was 
the military intentions of Serbia that would prove most difficult.  As March 15 
approached, Serbia massed armed forces on the border with Kosovo.  Soon, 
reports began to emerge of shelling in the area around Pristina and along the 
road to Skopje.158   
 
In the interim between the Rambouillet and Paris talks, the negotiators (Hill, 
Petritsch, and Mayorski) shuttled to and from Belgrade in efforts to persuade 
Milosevic to sign the agreement.  On March 10, Richard Holbrooke joined the 
attempt once again, adding his voice to a call for Milosevic to show “maximum 
restraint” regarding Kosovo in the lead up to the Paris talks.159   
 
The Kosovar delegation, Serb delegation, and Contact group negotiators 
reconvened on March 15 at the Kléber Avenue Conference Center in Paris.  After 
several days of talks, the Serb delegation refused to consider the presence of 
foreign troops on Kosovo’s soil and declined to sign the agreement; The Kosovar 
delegation signed.   In a retrospective analysis of the negotiations, one of the 
central paradoxes of the Kosovo mediation strategy was considered:  “The NATO 
threat of force had certainly played a role in getting Milosevic to discuss the issue 
at all. At the same time, it made the KLA less and less interested in negotiations 
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and compromises. The stronger the threat was, the less inclined was KLA to 
yield. That was the real dilemma of enforced negotiations.”160  
 
By March 20, the Kosovo Verification Mission withdrew from the province as 
violence escalated and refugees fled their homes.  At NATO, preparations for the 
air campaign ratcheted up.  Later, the U.S. National Security Council would 
assess its role in the negotiation process, and its focus on preparations for the 
military option.  The analysis found that preparations for an anticipated outcome 
may have contributed to the likelihood of its realization:  “The NSC’s preference 
for a military option became something of a self-fulfilling prophecy.  Each time 
Milosevic’s behavior - such as his refusal to personally attend the Rambouillet 
talks - signaled intransigence, he reinforced the NSC’s conviction in military 
force.  In response, the NSC would devote increasing amounts of time, funding, 
and political capital to its preparations for a military option.  When Milosevic 
refused to compromise as Rambouillet approached its initial end date, the U.S. 
Government ramped up preparations to commence airstrikes, including notifying 
embassy personnel to prepare for evacuation.  Despite deciding to extend the 
talks for several weeks, the NSC continued practically unabated airstrike 
preparations (finalizing target lists, reinforcing NATO’s resolve, maintaining KLA 
cooperation, briefing Congress, etc.), rather than increase investment in 
diplomatic outreach to Milosevic that they assessed was unlikely to succeed.”161  
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In Moscow, the Federation Council prepared to consider the resignation of 
Procurator-General Skuratov.  President Yeltsin already had accepted the 
resignation, but it is, constitutionally, the prerogative of the Federation Council to 
review the decision.  On March 17, Skuratov, clearly no longer indisposed at 
Central Clinic Hospital, appeared before the Council and asked to rescind his 
resignation, claiming he had been blackmailed into resigning: "A big contribution 
to the resignation process came from well-known oligarchs, who have their own 
interest in criminal cases linked with corruption in top power posts.”162  
 
Skuratov mentioned companies connected to Boris Berezovsky; he also alluded 
to an investigation into a Swiss Company, Mabetexxvii, involved in renovation 
projects at the Kremlin, a case that appeared to involve close Yeltsin associates.    
 
The evening after the Federation Council’s decision, Russian state-owned 
television ran a short clip of a man, "looking very much like Prosecutor General 
Yuri Skuratov" with two prostitutes.  President Yeltsin and Prime Minister 
Primakov met with Skuratov the next morning to discuss his resignation.  
Eventually, Yeltsin issued a decree dismissing him from his post as a criminal 
investigation into the video and the prosecutor’s behavior would be conducted.   
                                                        
xvii In an interesting, perhaps ironic development, the Founder, President, and Owner of 
Mabetex Corporation was Behgjet Pacolli, a Kosovar Albanian who, in 2011, became the 
President of the Republic of Kosovo. 
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Somehow, while in hospital, Skuratov had managed to gather the support of 
Moscow Mayor Luzhkov, Communist leaders Viktor Ilyukhin, and Gennadi 
Zyuganov, and many other Yeltsin antagonists, who saw the prosecutor’s 
corruption investigations as either a confirmation of suspected Kremlin practices, 
or simply a means to box in an already weakened president.   The situation 
forced Yeltsin to continue to coexist with Primakov, despite clear misgivings, and 
set off another confrontation between executive and legislative branches:  “The 
scandal around Skuratov has considerably weakened the position of President 
Boris Yeltsin just at the moment when the president seemed to be about to 
launch a counteroffensive against Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov, who was 
increasingly irritating him.  …  Now, however, it is virtually impossible for Yeltsin 
to do that, both politically and psychologically, given that his immediate 
entourage and even some of his family members are implicated in a scandal 
involving even more serious corruption charges.   Primakov's secret evening with 
the leaders of the leftist opposition showed that real power is rapidly flowing 
away from Yeltsin's hands. Yeltsin is in a desperate situation, and not for the first 
time in his political career.”163  
 
Following the Paris Talks, NATO’s preparations for the air campaign, within the 
constraints of the political leaders, were completed.  Before bombing 
commenced, Richard Holbrooke arrived in Belgrade for talks with Milosevic to 
persuade him to agree to the Rambouillet Accord: 
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Secretary Albright and the president asked me to go back for one last meeting 
after the signing in Paris. I went back with our team, Chris Hill, the general and 
some other people. We presented the ultimatum to Milosevic that if he didn't sign 
the agreement, the bombing would start. And he said, "No." We stayed in 
Belgrade overnight. In the morning, I went back completely alone to see him, 
because I was very conscious of the fact that, in August of 1914 in that part of 
the world, a huge war had started through an avoidable misunderstanding. … So 
I went back alone, and I sat there alone with Milosevic. I said to him, "You 
understand that if I leave here without an agreement today, bombing will start 
almost immediately." And he said, "Yes, I understand that." I said, "You 
understand it'll be swift, severe and sustained." And I used those three words 
very carefully, after consultations with the Pentagon. And he said, "You're a great 
country, a powerful country. You can do anything you want. We can't stop 
you."164  
 
On March 23, Russian Prime Minister Yevgeni Primakov was on his way to the 
U.S. to meet with Vice President Gore in an attempt to revive what had once 
been known as the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission.  As it became clear that 
Holbrooke might not succeed in a last minute conversion of Milosevic, Vice 
President Al Gore telephoned Primakov while his plane refueled in Ireland and 
suggested that Primakov delay his trip until there was final word from Holbrooke.  
Primakov refused.   When the Holbrooke talks yielded nothing further, Gore 
phoned Primakov again, this time as Primakov’s plane neared Canada, to 
explain that the talks had failed and that NATO would not delay its airstrikes any 
longer. 165   
 
According to Primakov’s version of events, he initially was informed by Leon 
Fuerth, National Security Adviser to Al Gore, that events were developing rapidly 
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in Kosovo and that it was wished that “Primakov understands the seriousness of 
the situation so that the possible actions of the American side are not a surprise 
for him.”  Primakov replied that if a military strike were imminent, he would wish 
to be informed so he could cancel the visit.  On March 23, stopping at Shannon 
on his way to Washington, Primakov was informed by the Russian Ambassador 
in DC that there was “a 98 percent chance that negotiations between Holbrooke 
and Milosevic will collapse….”  Primakov then spoke with Gore, learned that 
there might not be an update for a few hours, decided to proceed with his flight, 
and asked Gore to inform him immediately if a decision was made to strike 
Yugoslavia.  Gore promised to update him, restated the administration’s wish not 
to damage U.S.-Russian relations, and suggested Primakov get himself “some 
Irish whiskey in Shannon.”  “I prefer Russian vodka to Irish whiskey,” Primakov 
replied.166  
 
Gore did phone Primakov and informed him of the failure of talks.  Primakov had 
his plane turn around to return to Shannon, telling Gore, “I cannot begin my visit 
and cannot land on the territory of the United States.”167   
 
On March 24, NATO’s Operation Allied Force began.  The Russian military 
responded by putting its senior commanders on alert “[Russian: perevedeny na 
usilennyy rezhim neseniya sluzhba].”  The Ministry of Defense established round 
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the clock monitoring of the Balkan situation, and Leonid Ivashov, who would later 
figure prominently in negotiations over Russian-NATO cooperation, declared:  “It 
is up to the president [Boris Yeltsin] to take a decision. But it is clear that the 
cooperation with and the grade of subordination to the NATO butchers will 
change. No doubt about that.”168 
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5.  Conflict 
 
“The military mission is to attack Yugoslav military and security forces and 
associated facilities with sufficient effect to degrade its capacity to continue 
repression of the civilian population and to deter its further military actions 
against his own people.”169  
 
 
On the first night of bombing, NATO and the U.S. “flew 400 missions, including 
120 strike missions against 40 targets.”  It quickly became apparent that Serbia’s 
air defenses would present a serious impediment, and NATO pilots were 
temporarily instructed to fly above 15,000 feet until the air defenses were 
deemed no longer to be a threat.170   
 
The initial stages of NATO’s air campaign were phased—starting with targets in 
Kosovo, then Yugoslav-specific targets, gradually pulling into the center of 
Belgrade.  For the first few nights of bombing, NATO’s military leadership had 
greater autonomy in choosing targets, with the understanding that there would 
need to be renewed consultations.  From the outset, there were difficulties in 
choosing targets.  As Lt. General Michael C. Short, then NATO’s Joint Air Force 
Component Commander noted, “There were targets that individual nations would 
not let us hit, or wouldn't let us hit with airplanes launched from their soil. There 
were targets that individual nations would not hit themselves, but it was okay for 
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somebody else to hit. Apparently, and clearly, it was relayed to me that every 
nation had a vote. An individual nation could say: you can't hit that target. A 
nation hosting U.S. airplanes could say that U.S. airplanes taking off from their 
soil cannot strike this target.”171  
 
 
NATO Photos Targeting data, 1 April 1999 
 
As Operation Allied Force commenced, there seemed to be a widespread belief, 
almost certainly on the part of Milosevic, as well as many of the NATO allies, that 
the bombing would last but a few days.  The months of holding NATO air strikes 
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as a threat to propel negotiations left an impression of them as an element of 
mediation—a turning up of the volume—rather than a mission with a logic all its 
own.  On of the NATO military officials who had negotiated with Milosevic 
assumed that the Serbian leader actually believed that he needed, politically, to 
be hit militarily by NATO before he could accede to any negotiated demands.172   
 
It was explained to Lt. General Short, explicitly, that American and other 
domestic audiences would not support more than a few days of a bombing 
campaign.  “Mike,” he was told,  “you're only going to be allowed to bomb two, 
maybe three nights. That's all Washington can stand, and that's all some 
members of the alliance can stand. That's why you've only got 90 targets. This 
will be over in three nights."173  
 
Yugoslav forces moved quickly in the early days of the bombing campaign 
apparently to force the flight of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo.  Seen as part of a 
plan, Operation Horseshoe, to empty Kosovar villages of ethnic Albanians and 
thereby deny KLA fighters their bases of support, the actions of the Serbian 
forces followed a familiar pattern of ethnic cleansing that involved the flight, 
disappearance, rape, and murder of villagers and the looting and burning of 
homes.  An OSCE report based, in part, on the reports of KVM observers (who 
were evacuated before the bombing began) and other OSCE human rights 
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workers who conducted refugee and survivor interviews, noted that “Summary 
and arbitrary killing became a generalized phenomenon throughout Kosovo with 
the beginning of the NATO air campaign….”  Additionally, “It has been estimated 
that over 90 per cent of the Kosovo Albanian population—over 1.45 million 
peoplexviii—were displaced by the conflict….”174   
 
While there is still debate over the genesis of the plan referred to as Operation 
Horseshoe,xix including just how long Milosevic might have intended to move 
forward with the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, as well as whether or not NATO 
bombing actually exacerbated the situation, it is clear that the images of burning 
villages and fleeing refugees produced by Milosevic’s and his forces’ actions, 
provided the political support for the NATO allies to continue, and even intensify 
the campaign. 
 
 
                                                        
xviii This figure (1.45 million) was a sticking point with Primakov, who threw it at Gore in a 
conversation later in the month:  “You said that more than a million people escaped from 
Kosovo, but Kosovo’s entire population is about a million.” (Primakov, p. 275) 
xix According to the U.K. House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 
report identifying Operation Horseshoe, made public by the German Foreign Minister 
Joschka Fischer, may have been a “vague report” that German intelligence picked up 
from Bulgarian intelligence then misquoted and inflated into a plan to expel the Kosovo 
Albanian population.  “Kosovo: The Military Campaign,” Fourth Report, via 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmfaff/28/2811.htm#n225 .  
Regardless of the origins of Operation Horseshoe, the report was used to deflect 
criticism that NATO’s bombing campaign set off Milosevic’s ethnic cleansing campaign. 
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NATO Photos: Major Incidents in Kosovo as of 29 March 1999 
 
 
The start of the NATO campaign was not well received in Moscow.  Russian 
President Yeltsin had cabled Clinton on the day Primakov’s flight U-turned over 
the Atlantic to express his disappointment and the danger represented by 
continued American support for NATO bombing in Yugoslavia.  Clinton called 
Yeltsin the following day to confirm that NATO would be moving forward with its 
air campaign and to “divert” Yeltsin’s anger with the image of Milosevic as a 
“pygmy” and a “communist dictator” who had come between the U.S. and 
Russian “giants.”175  
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Yeltsin would not be diverted and attempted to explain to Clinton how a NATO 
bombing campaign in the former Yugoslavia would destroy all that he had done 
“to turn my people toward the West.”176  Yeltsin knew that the reports and the 
images of NATO bombs falling across Serbia would inflame the followers of his 
most ardent opposition and give angry momentum to an already aggressive 
parliament.  The passion of the protests against NATO’s actions made it difficult 
for Yeltsin to tack away from his left-centrist prime minister, and even more 
difficult to do so by highlighting the western tilt of his administration, as well as 
his personal closeness with western leaders.  He hung up on Clinton, saying, 
“I’ve obviously failed to convince the president of the United States.  Good-
Bye.”177 
 
Upon his return to Moscow from the flight that U-turned across the Atlantic, 
Primakov contacted Milosevic and suggested leading a delegation with 
“representatives of power ministries” to work out a political solution, but asked 
Milosevic to guarantee an affirmative response:  “I must know your opinion in 
advance, because if this trip produces no results, it will have serious negative 
consequences.  NATO will then declare:  “The Russians have failed.  Political 
measures are exhausted.””178  
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Milosevic informed Primakov that the parliament had rejected a deal, and the trip 
was not made.  Primakov commenced working from the premise that NATO 
bombing must be stopped before a political settlement could be reached.  He 
informed British Prime Minister Tony Blair that if the bombing would be stopped, 
then “we could create a contact group and discuss what to do next.”179  It is 
unlikely that Primakov forgot a contact group had been discussing what to do for 
months, but more likely that he used the repeated calls for a halt to the bombing 
to be followed by more talks as a devise to achieve his primary aim of stopping 
the NATO air campaign. 
 
 Primakov also relates a conversation with French President Jacques Chirac, 
who suggested that if Moscow could finagle a “small gesture” from Milosevic, 
perhaps the bombing could be stopped. Primakov suggested he try to get 
Milosevic to agree to the gathering of a “contact group” to discuss a political 
solution.  After consulting with Yeltsin, Primakov began preparations for a trip to 
Belgrade with the Foreign Minister, Foreign Intelligence Director, Defense 
Minister, and Defense Intelligence (GRU) Director.   
 
Primakov was informed by Massimo D’Alema (Italy’s Government Chairman) that 
the NATO allies would not be satisfied, nor would bombing stop, with Milosevic’s 
promise just to enter into new negotiations.  After a six-hour meeting in Belgrade, 
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Primakov and the Russian delegation emerged with an agreement from Milosevic 
to enter into more negotiations, to allow the return of refugees, and to begin troop 
withdrawals, predicated on NATO stopping the bombing campaign.  After the 
Russian delegation’s flight departed Belgrade, Primakov noted indignantly, 
NATO bombed the airport.180   NATO reports on daily targeting suggest that 
Primakov’s claims may have been correct.181 
 
The Russian delegation stopped in Germany to consult with Gerhard Schroeder, 
but Primakov had guessed at the allies’ response.  The time for signals and small 
moves from Milosevic had ended.  At the time of Primakov’s mission to Belgrade, 
Yugoslav forces already were rampaging:  there were reports of summary 
executions, round-ups and massive expulsions—tens of thousands of refugees 
fleeing their homes.182   
 
For Yeltsin, it was clear that the domestic circumstances in Russia were 
intertwined with the air campaign over Kosovo.  “Once the bombs started falling, 
the internal political stability in our country would depend on the situation in the 
Balkans.  Already the Communists and the nationalists were trying to play the 
Balkans card in order to destroy the balance of political forces in our society.”183  
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Taking stock of the immediate context of his position, Yeltsin was not in the best 
of health, with hospitalizations for chronic bronchitis, pneumonia, and bleeding 
ulcers over the last two years.  A scandal had erupted involving his Prosecutor –
Skuratov — who had resigned, retracted his resignation, than refused his 
dismissal by the president.  The legislature was fighting the president’s attempts 
to rid himself of the prosecutor by rejecting his resignation and refusing to 
acknowledge the president’s decree dismissing him from his duties.  Additionally, 
the Duma’s Impeachment Committee had settled on five counts in its bill of 
impeachment and set April 15 for the impeachment hearings.    
 
The economic crisis of 1998 had left Yeltsin with a prime minister whom he did 
not trust, whose political inclinations skewed to the opposite end of the political 
spectrum from the president’s, and who just happened to align with Yeltsin’s 
more vocal opponents.  The prime minister also had, on more than one occasion, 
made statements to the press that reflected a less than flattering image of the 
president.  Finally, Yeltsin knew that a presidential transition was fast 
approaching and Russia had not yet developed a tradition of peaceful and open 
leadership change.  In the absence of a transparent, non-arbitrary mechanism for 
succession,184 there were many potentially dangerous scenarios for Yeltsin and 
his family, and there were, of course, no security guarantees–of any kind–for the 
outgoing president and his family. 
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The NATO air strikes had done nothing to sway public opinion Yeltsin’s way, if 
anything they aroused the base of his opposition.  Starting the first night of the 
bombings, crowds had been gathering to protest and to throw rocks and bottles 
at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.  The protestors were described as “Serbs, 
Russian nationalists, and skinheads.” However, for several days, members of the 
LDPR and other nationalist political parties joined the protests.   Yeltsin noted, 
“politicians of all stripes tried to win points with the Kosovo conflict.  …  Mayor 
Luzhkov openly supported the demonstrators in front of the U.S. embassy.”185   
 
On one occasion, an SUV pulled up and two men in combat fatigues attempted 
to fire rocket-propelled grenades at the Embassy—neither launcher fired.  A 
particularly unusual event occurred on April 2, when “a man rode a horse up to 
the front of Spaso House (the U.S. Ambassador's residence) and shot a clay-
tipped arrow into the front lawn of the house. A note written in Russian was 
attached to the arrow. The note read "If America does not stop the war in Serbia, 
the war will come to America." The letter was signed "Alexander Nevsky. The 
horseman was detained by the militia and determined to be mentally unstable.”186  
 
The NATO bombing campaign encountered a series of difficulties in the early 
weeks.  Perhaps the most serious involved the problems destroying the Serb air 
defense systems.   With NATO air strikes anticipated, the Serbian forces did not 
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power up the radar systems on their surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), so they did 
not emit a signature.  It was unclear to NATO forces however, whether the intent 
was to hide the placement of their SAMs or to lure NATO planes into lower range 
flights, making them less difficult targets.187  
 
Of course, constant discussion over the duration of the bombing campaign was a 
political and diplomatic debate that had predictable military consequences.  As 
General Clark requested Apache helicopters, more aircraft, missiles, and targets, 
a senior Pentagon official informed him: “I don’t know where this is going, to tell 
you the truth, Wes.  They’re looking for a way out back here.”188  
 
Secretary of State Albright, whose name would be inextricably linked with the 
Kosovo campaign, was repeatedly asked in interviews about the duration of the 
air strikes and then castigated when they seemed to continue longer than 
expected.  “”I had often argued that force was the only language Milosevic 
understood,” she explained, “but I had not tried to convince anyone he was a fast 
learner.”189   
 
The Vatican launched an initiative for an Easter ceasefire, which was broached 
to Strobe Talbott via Yegor Gaidar. When the idea was rebuffed, Gaidar echoed 
Yeltsin when he told Talbott, “if you only knew what a disaster this war is for 
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those of us in Russia who want for our country what you want.”190  Yeltsin 
attempted to build agreement for a Group of Eight (G-8) meeting to discuss 
conditions for a ceasefire; other attempts to negotiate “pauses” in the bombing 
were rebuffed as well, in order not to give Milosevic time to regroup nor to give 
the allies’ unsteady resolve room for pause.  The NATO bombings held a 
heightened symbolism for Russia in light of its war with Chechnya, which had 
been (and would be again) marked by accusations of terrorism and massacres.  
Chechnya was not the only potential “hot spot” across Russia and the former 
Soviet Union.  As Igor Ivanov had asked Madeleine Albright some months earlier, 
“Madeleine, don’t you understand we have many Kosovos in Russia?”191  
 
It was clear that the West’s concern about Serb actions in Kosovo provoked both 
skepticism and wariness on the part of Russia’s elites.  As Michael McFaul 
noted, “Russia, it must be remembered, has its own problems with ethnic groups 
that want to leave the Russian Federation including, first and foremost, 
Chechnya. Consequently, Russia has been reluctant to set a precedent of 
foreign troops intervening in the sovereign territory of another nation.”192 
 
Equally unnerving, the manner of NATO’s campaign over Kosovo highlighted 
inadequacies in the Russian military’s performance in Chechnya.  An anonymous 
editorial in The Moscow Times makes the point:  “The Russian role in Chechnya 
over the past five years has been squalid and petty - and this alone provides 
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ample reason to look with some cynicism at the official indignation here over 
NATO's war in Yugoslavia. NATO, for all its faults, at least tries to miss the 
civilians; Russia could not be bothered, and its carpet bombing of the civilian 
neighborhoods of Grozny must rank with the great war crimes of the war crime-
ridden 20th century.”193 
 
The same Moscow Times editorial questioned the motives of western leaders for 
ignoring Chechnya, while focusing on Kosovo:  “Is Chechnya really any different 
from Kosovo? In both cases, the federal government waged what quickly 
became an ethnicity-based war against separatists. In one case, the West cared; 
in the other it didn't. … As tens of thousands died, among them thousands of 
children, Bill Clinton turned his back. He said Chechnya was Russia's "internal 
affair," and the IMF coughed up billions just in time to cover the cost of the war.  
But if Clinton believes he is right in Kosovo, he must therefore believe he was 
wrong in Chechnya.”194 
 
Russian apprehension over the Kosovo precedent being used by the West to 
justify interference in questions of Russians sovereignty has been largely 
unrealized.  Nonetheless, the specter retains powerful resonance in Russia and 
has been summoned to forestall western initiatives and justify Russian 
“preemptive” behavior. 
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On April 7, NATO ministers released a list of five questions that Milosevic would 
have to answer affirmatively for bombing to stop.  These questions, reformulated 
at the NATO Summit in D.C., would form the basis of negotiations and set a 
baseline for any third party (namely Russian) mediations: 
“Is President Milosevic prepared for a verifiable cessation of all combat activities 
and killings?  
Is he prepared to withdraw military police and paramilitary forces from Kosovo?  
Is he prepared to agree to the deployment of an international security force?  
Is he prepared to permit the return of all refugees and unimpeded access for 
humanitarian aid?  
And finally, is he prepared to put in place a political framework for Kosovo on the 
basis of the Rambouillet Accords?”195  
 
Secretary Albright termed her approach toward Russia in regard to Kosovo as 
the “double magnet.”  Maintaining strong contact with Russian authorities, she 
hoped to move their position closer to the U.S. position, and then move Belgrade 
closer to Russia’s position.  However, she was not blind to the enormous stress 
the NATO bombing placed on Russia’s leadership, “the Russians were frustrated 
by the weak hand they had to play.  Their military options were few, their 
dependence on the West was growing, their domestic politics were toxic, and 
their putative client in Belgrade was a ruthless dictator.  Every day of NATO 
bombing was a bad day for Yeltsin, whom hard-liners blamed for cozying up to 
America and getting nothing in return.”196  
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What Albright did not mention was that there were at least two distinct paths for 
addressing the anger and nationalist passion at home.  For Primakov, the West 
had made a crucial mistake in Kosovo, but the alliance was not strong enough to 
hold together through a long bombing campaign.  Primakov’s approach involved 
suggesting to the allies that the U.S. did not want Russian peacemaking efforts to 
succeed for fear of diminishing its own role and was instead insistent on 
“escalating” demands on Milosevic that might require a NATO ground operation 
because “the United States was not content with the role of first fiddle but wanted 
to conduct the whole NATO orchestra.”197   
 
As part of his pitch, Primakov noted that attempting to sideline Russia in the 
process of resolving the Kosovo issue would “strengthen anti-western sentiments 
and an isolationist tilt in Russia itself.”198  For Primakov, public protests in 
Moscow outside the U.S. embassy and passionate anger in the legislature aimed 
at all things western were useful as evidence to support the case he made for a 
change of policy and approach to Belgrade in conversations with western allies.  
As one analyst noted of Primakov’s approach: “Russia is using NATO's airstrikes 
against Yugoslavia as ammunition to undermine NATO credibility in Europe as 
well as US influence in the Middle East and perhaps even Southeast Asia. As 
long as the airstrikes continue, Moscow can portray the US-led coalition as the 
aggressor and Russia as the peacemaker….”199   
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Primakov and U.S. Vice President Al Gore discussed the developments in 
Kosovo and attempted to reschedule their Commission meeting.  In his memoir, 
Primakov recounts a telephone conversation with Gore, in which the vice 
president was very focused on two concerns:  1) the movement of a “Russian 
intelligence vessel to the Adriatic,” which suggested to Gore that Russia intended 
to share intelligence with Belgrade, and 2) “despite the U.N. embargo on 
deliveries of military equipment to Yugoslavia, the Russian Defense Ministry and 
other government institutions are preparing to provide military gear to 
Yugoslavia….”200   
 
Primakov, clearly angered, responded to Gore in a tit-for-tat accounting:  “You’re 
saying that we should not increase our support of Yugoslavia, but at the same 
time you don’t say that the United States and NATO should not build up their 
military operations.”201  The conversation was neither particularly amiable nor 
successful.    
 
Primakov noted in his memoir that when it came to developing policy regarding 
Yugoslavia, “I by no means acted alone.  We coordinated the approaches that 
we developed with representatives of what we call the “power structures.”  Every 
day at 9:30 A.M., including Sunday, the foreign minister, the defense minister, 
the FIS director, the chairman of the General Staff, and the head of the GRU 
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gathered at my office at the White House. … Every day we sent specific 
suggestions to the president.”202  Interestingly, the one power ministry not 
represented at these meetings was the Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti  
(FSB), headed at the time by Vladimir Putin.   
 
The line up at Primakov’s daily power meetings mirrored the delegation he 
assembled for the mission to Belgrade, which is precisely the point from which 
the NATO allies’ initial concerns about Russia providing military support derived.  
Additionally, it is highly unlikely that President Yeltsin appreciated getting daily 
“suggestions” from his key power ministers filtered through his prime minister.  
Even when ill, Yeltsin preferred to be hands on where the security structures 
were concerned.  Any plans Yeltsin might have harbored about getting out ahead 
of his communist and nationalist opposition politically over the NATO bombing 
campaign would have faltered when confronted with the strong ties Primakov 
was forging with the power ministries. 
 
In his letters and phone calls to President Clinton, President Yeltsin made it clear 
that the attack on Belgrade was disastrous, precisely because it stirred up the 
anger, the pan-Slavic patriotism and bravado that threatened the course he had 
set for Russia.  Initially, it appeared as though Yeltsin would join his voice to the 
protest and perhaps even lead the charge against NATO’s bombing campaign.  
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In early April, Yeltsin warned the west not to “push” Russia into action, lest war 
be the result.203  Duma Speaker Gennadi Seleznyov claimed that Yeltsin had 
informed him that Russia’s nuclear weapons would be retargeted at NATO 
countries.xx   The threat of retargeting Russia’s nuclear weapons, which had 
been de-targeted by agreement between Yeltsin and Clinton in 1994, was 
significant enough for Yeltsin’s team to make clear to the Clinton administration 
that there had been no retargeting of their strategic arsenal.  In President 
Clinton’s recently declassified “Message to President Yeltsin regarding the 
situation in Kosovo,” Clinton thanks Yeltsin for having his team convey that there 
had been no retargeting of the strategic arsenal.204 
 
By mid-April, Yeltsin was juggling an even more complicated domestic situation:  
the debacle over the prosecutor, who tossed corruption allegations at the Kremlin 
gates, continued with the legislature refusing to acknowledge his dismissal; 
kidnappings and bombings focused on Chechnya resumed; and the date for 
impeachment hearings, while postponed to May for technical reasons, 
represented a significant threat to his political authority.  While the prime minister 
and foreign minister primarily had been attending to the situation in Kosovo, it 
seemed clear that Yeltsin’s faith in his prime minister was at a low ebb, perhaps 
because the speculation surrounding the corruption scandals generated by the 
prosecutor all seemed to have Primakov at the center.                                                          
xx The Kremlin later denied that Yeltsin had mentioned retargeting the nuclear weapons. 
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In any event, at a public meeting on April 9 with the heads of the republics in the 
Kremlin, President Yeltsin avowed his faith in the prime minister for the record:  
“Don’t believe the rumors that I want to dismiss Primakov, dissolve the 
government and so on. It’s all fantasies and rumors.”  Good enough to assuage 
the prime minister’s doubts, until Yeltsin continued, “ I think at this time, at this 
stage, Primakov is useful, and then we shall see.  But the government should be 
strengthened and that’s a different matter.  This question is on the agenda.”205   
 
Primakov answered by broadcasting a statement outlining his positions:  against 
impeachment, against a state of emergency, against petty intrigues, and “I am 
not clinging and holding on to the prime minister’s chair…today I am useful and 
we shall see about tomorrow.”206  The next day, Yeltsin returned to the matter, 
chiding the press for instigating clashes between the president and prime 
minister, but cautioning Primakov not to take offense to criticism.  Nonetheless, 
Primakov was concerned, he “sensed hesitation in Yeltsin’s words and in his 
tone.”207  Clearly Yeltsin was regaining something of his authority vis à vis 
Primakov if his prime minister strained over the tone of his remarks.   
 
The Russian news media clearly had scented a personnel shake-up in the 
executive and were handed another medical anecdote to make the point.   The 
day before Yeltsin’s remarks at the Kremlin, Yeltsin and Primakov were both at 
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the hospital.  “The 68-year old Yeltsin was briefly in a Kremlin hospital on 
Thursday, while the 69-year old Primakov did not show up for work because he 
was laid up at home with acute back pain. ... Some journalists who saw Primakov 
at a government meeting…said he did indeed seem to be in pain.  But other 
media, citing [Primakov’s] canceled trip to Kiev, speculated that Primakov was 
just afraid to leave town for fear that Yeltsin would move against him in his 
absence.”208  
 
Yeltsin’s initial approach at the onset of the NATO bombing was an attempt to 
convince Clinton and the NATO leaders—his friends—that “each missile strike 
against Yugoslavia was an indirect strike against Russia.”209   By mid-April, 
Yeltsin’s analysis of the situation, intertwined with the complicated domestic 
context, had changed.  He began to reach out to legislative leaders like 
Yabloko’s Grigori Yavlinsky and even to his most bitter rival, Moscow Mayor 
Luzhkov.  Again, media analysts saw the writing on the wall for Primakov, 
describing these meetings as Kremlin chats that look suspiciously like a job hunt 
for Primakov's replacement.”210  
 
In his memoirs, Yeltsin would describe the decision to dismiss Primakov in May 
as a much-needed “sharp, unexpected, aggressive move” that would catch his 
opponents off balance, but, in fact, as many had guessed, Yeltsin had made the 
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decision to fire Primakov in mid-April.211   Primakov, who also seemed to assume 
that this move was coming, quickly realized who might be replacing him after a 
classic maneuver at the Kremlin:  Television crews were covering a meeting, 
chaired by Yeltsin, on the Celebration of the Third Millennium.  Mid-speech, 
Yeltsin noted, “We’ve taken the wrong seats.”  Specifically, he indicated that 
Sergei Stepashin, Interior Minister and recently appointed Vice Premier of the 
Government, had taken the wrong seat.  Yeltsin beckoned Stepashin to sit at his 
right hand, and Primakov knew who would be replacing him, if not when.212   
 
There was another factor at work in the domestic dimension of Yeltsin’s 
calculations, an apparent shift in public opinion on the NATO bombing in 
Yugoslavia.  Gennadi Zyuganov and Yuri Luzhkov watched their popularity poll 
numbers shrink, “by 5.1 percent and 4.7 percent, respectively….  The results 
presumably indicate disillusionment on the part of left-wing voters with the 
“excessively warlike and confrontational” statements by Zyuganov and Luzhkov 
concerning Yugoslavia.”  Luzhkov began to climb down from his calls for Russia 
to provide immediate military support to Yugoslavia and suggested it would be 
needed only if NATO commenced ground operations.213   
 
By April 14, Yeltsin clearly had settled on a new approach to Kosovo himself as 
he named former Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin as his Special Envoy to the 
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Balkans (effectively removing that portfolio from Primakov).   Strobe Talbott 
noted that the “move caught us completely by surprise, but once [Yeltsin] made 
it, it seemed entirely explicable.”214   
 
The celebration of the 50th anniversary of the NATO alliance got under way on 
April 22 as a summit meeting in Washington, D.C.  The allies were closely 
watched for possible cracks bubbling up in the alliance, and Yeltsin’s 
appointment of Chernomyrdin might well have been intended to take advantage 
should any appear.  However, the NATO Summit also brought together the 
states in the Partnership for Peace program, which counted several CIS states 
among its members.  Perhaps with an eye to informal conversations in D.C., 
Viktor Chernomyrdin toured some of the CIS states, including, notably, Georgia, 
where he visited with then-President Eduard Shevardnadze.   
 
After his meeting with Shevardnadze, Chernomyrdin announced that Russia 
could get behind “Shevardnadze’s five clauses,” and take them to Belgrade as a 
focal point of negotiations.  Shevardnadze’s clauses essentially proposed: “A 
cease-fire in Kosovo, withdrawal of all armed formations from the province, 
deployment of an international contingent, unconditional return of refugees, and 
negotiations over definition of the status of Kosovo within the framework of 
Yugoslavia.”215  The clauses, of course, are remarkably similar to NATO’s “Five 
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Questions;” the main difference apparent in the final point, where Kosovo’s status 
within Yugoslavia is emphasized in the clauses. 
 
The meeting with Shevardnadze was important from the Allies perspective as 
well.  It seemed as though Yeltsin might have sent Chernomyrdin to 
Shevardnadze with a message meant for the west:  ‘Chernomyrdin told 
[Shevardnadze] that Yeltsin detested Milosevic and blamed him more than the 
U.S. for the crisis. …  Chernomyrdin also confirmed Yeltsin’s dissatisfaction with 
Primakov, in particular for his decision to turn his plane around over the 
Atlantic….  Shevardnadze’s advice was that we do everything we could to help 
Chernomyrdin succeed in his assignment.”216  
 
As the NATO Summit began on April 23, 1999, it was clear that the Allies had 
one major goal to achieve and that was the expression of Alliance unity and 
determination:  “We will prevail.”217  While the summit was a celebration of a 
successful alliance and its historical traditions (the Summit was held in the Mellon 
Auditorium in Washington, D.C., where the signatures formally creating the 
Alliance had been ceremonially affixed fifty years earlier), it also was a moment 
for the members to bolster each other’s resolve and to plan for the strategic 
future of the Alliance through its latest Strategic Concept, which emphasized the 
Alliance’s post-Cold War tasks and broadened the scope of its actions.  The new 
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Concept “recognized the importance of political, economic, social and 
environmental factors in addition to the defense dimension.” It identified the “new 
risks that had emerged since the end of the Cold War, which included terrorism, 
ethnic conflict, human rights abuses, political instability, economic fragility, and 
the spread of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and their means of 
delivery.”218  
 
Kosovo and the air campaign were the primary focus of discussion at the 
Summit, with particular emphasis on reinforcing Alliance solidarity throughout the 
campaign, debating possible broadening of the military campaign to include 
ground troops (an issue strongly resisted by the Clinton administration), and 
agreeing to definitive conditions for Milosevic to meet in order for the air 
campaign to end.  The Alliance’s statement on Kosovo added a few more 
nuanced shades to the earlier terms, but notably demanded that Milosevic agree 
to an international military presence, which reflected the ongoing debate within 
NATO over plans for ground forces: 
Ensure a verifiable stop to all military action and the immediate ending of 
violence and repression in Kosovo;  
Withdraw from Kosovo his military, police and para-military forces;  
Agree to the stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence;  
Agree to the unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons, 
and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid organisations; and Provide 
credible assurance of his willingness to work for the establishment of a political 
framework agreement based on the Rambouillet accords.219 
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While there were still unresolved issues regarding the Alliance’s campaign, the 
Summit meeting managed to display Alliance unity and disappoint those hoping 
for significant fissures to open up among the members in order to exploit any 
divides.  As Sandy Berger noted, “I think it was very important that the nineteen 
leaders of the Alliance sat around a table and said to each other as leaders, “We 
will prevail.  We will succeed.  We cannot fail.”  I think Alliance solidarity was 
almost unbreakable after that.”220   
 
Viktor Chernomyrdin was in Belgrade meeting with Milosevic just before the 
Summit began in D.C.   According to Chernomyrdin, Milosevic had agreed to an 
“international presence led by the U.N. in which Russia would take part.”  
Milosevic’s statement on the meeting condemned the NATO bombings and made 
no reference to an “international presence.”  On the same day in Moscow, 
Russia’s Defense Minister announced that Russia’s nuclear forces were on the 
“highest level” of alert over NATO’s bombing campaign, and Col. General 
Manilov of the General Staff suggested Russia would begin “supplying weapons 
to Yugoslavia if NATO sends in ground troops.”221  
  
On the last day of the NATO summit, Yeltsin contacted Clinton with a proposal to 
revive the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission and announce its resumption with a 
pause in the bombing campaign.  The Allies had just finished building new 
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resolve on the completion of the mission and the possible prerequisites for a 
bombing pause, and Clinton found Yeltsin’s proposal impossible and ill-timed.  
There ensued another highly emotional outburst from Yeltsin, in which he alluded 
to Russia’s nuclear weapons, and shouted “Don’t push Russia into this War!”  
This time, however, the two leaders managed to finish the conversation without 
either hanging up on the other.222    
 
Russia appeared to be angling to pull the spotlight away from the NATO summit, 
create some distance among Alliance members, or at least to reassert its role in 
mediating the dispute with Serbia.  Yeltsin’s dynamic re-emergence and 
determination to “matter” in the Kosovo campaign energized the efforts to 
negotiate with Milosevic, just as the Allies coalesced support around the air 
campaign and the preconditions for ending it.   
 
Chernomyrdin was quite likely the one individual in Yeltsin’s circle who could 
nudge Primakov out of the Balkan negotiations (even with the power ministries 
“in” them) without upsetting the Duma’s leftist and centrist factions.  Yeltsin 
trusted him now, in part because he no longer appeared as either a rival or a 
successor—the political climate had changed significantly in a year.  Yeltsin also 
had a plan in place to reassert control over the constitution of the government.  
While he may have overreached on Kosovo and on exploiting cracks in the 
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NATO alliance, in this attempt he did set the stage for Russia to have a major 
role in the mediation effort and managed to become, once again, a partner of the 
West, particularly with the U.S.  Yeltsin saw a path to a speedy resolution not 
only of the Yugoslav/Kosovo question, but to some of his domestic concerns as 
well.  The result of the Clinton-Yeltsin communication would be a slower, more 
cautious approach than Yeltsin preferred, but eventually it would approach the 
achievement of most of his goals, foreign and domestic, in due time. 
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6.  Resolution 
 
Russia has a particular responsibility in the United Nations and an important role 
to play in the search for a solution to the conflict in Kosovo.223 
 
 
The NATO Summit in Washington, D.C. allowed the allies to present a united 
front and resolve over Kosovo.  There were concerns among the allies, notably 
about the air campaign and its continuation well beyond the brief duration 
anticipated to persuade Milosevic to withdraw forces from Kosovo and return to 
the bargaining table.  There was, moreover, a rather serious disconnect among 
the allies over the next stage in the campaign, specifically whether it would be 
necessary to deploy ground forces into a “non-permissive” environment.  U.K. 
Prime Minister Tony Blair had presented a forceful case to President Clinton, but 
the issue was believed to be corrosive, especially given the American political 
environment, for a president who had just survived an impeachment attempt.  For 
the sake of keeping up the pressure—on both Milosevic and the Russians—
President Clinton and Prime Minister Blair “talked up” the possibility of ground 
forces but pinned their hopes on the air campaign being decisive. 
 
The incomplete meeting of the minds at the Summit was not sufficient to disrupt 
either the bombing campaign or the ceremonial aspect of the anniversary 
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summit, and the failure of the alliance to fragment over Kosovo seemed to have 
robbed Russia of an opportunity to pry open an escape route for Milosevic.  
Yeltsin’s interventions with Clinton on the final day of the Summit did manage, 
however, to spark interest in opening a pathway for negotiations.   
 
A negotiated resolution of the Kosovo campaign would require that Milosevic 
fulfill the requirements set out in the NATO Kosovo Statement, particularly the 
key considerations, which specified the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from 
Kosovo, the deployment of an international force to supervise the return of 
refugees, and political autonomy (based on Rambouillet) for Kosovo.224  As it 
became clear that Russia would serve as intermediary, the American delegation, 
beginning with Vice President Gore, then Madeleine Albright and Strobe Talbott, 
became the primary interlocutors, rather than the full Contact Group. 
 
With Viktor Chernomyrdin’s trip to Belgrade, Russia put itself front and center as 
mediator in the conflict, with Yeltsin applying his own version of Albright’s “double 
magnet.”  Yeltsin sent Chernomyrdin to Washington with an understanding of 
Belgrade’s position, and perhaps how much “give” it might withstand, in order to 
encourage the U.S. and NATO to flex towards Russia’s take on the situation.    
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Yeltsin chose Chernomyrdin for his “enormous weight and authority in 
Yugoslavia, in the West, and in the eyes of the American political elite.”225 He 
also praised Chernomyrdin’s “qualities of an old political fighter—patience, 
flexibility, and a firm will for intelligent compromise.”226  The goal Yeltsin claims to 
have set for Chernomyrdin, “the rapid halt of military action,” may not have been 
suited to Chernomyrdin’s particular skill set, but it does provide context for 
Chernomyrdin’s sense of urgency in some accounts of early meetings to 
establish the mediation.   
 
On May 3, Chernomyrdin departed Moscow for Washington, D.C. with something 
resembling optimism: "If there hadn't been anything concrete, there wouldn't be 
such a trip."227  Chernomyrdin and Gore had managed to establish a rapport 
within the framework of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, but clearly had 
struck out along different career paths in its aftermath.  Chernomyrdin seems to 
have gauged that Gore needed to focus on his run at the presidency and found 
getting pulled into the Kosovo talks too great a political risk.  Strobe Talbott 
recounts Chernomyrdin worrying “about the potential negative consequences for 
Al Gore if our collaboration is fruitless or worse….”228 
 
The Russian press characterized the visit within the context of an intra-Kremlin 
struggle becoming more and more overt:  “Even if Victor Chernomyrdin does not 
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reconcile Americans with Serbs, he at least will manage to get the better of 
Yevgeny Primakov. … Washington vividly showed the difference between guests 
who turn their planes around near the US coastline and those who approach at 
the Andrews Aviation Base on a mission of goodwill.”229 
 
Indeed, some accounts managed to delight in the reversal Chernomyrdin’s 
appointment signaled for Primakov:   
Things have really gotten mixed up in our Russian home: The administrator -
manager Viktor Chernomyrdin has plunged himself into foreign affairs problems, 
while "the chief Russian diplomat," Yevgeny Primakov, has become immersed in 
issues of administration and management. … Primakov's pique is 
understandable: Chernomyrdin brought a different set of rules and arguments to 
the game after it was shown that the game played by Primakov's rules was going 
nowhere. Indeed, the harsh statements by Primakov and Foreign Minister Igor 
Ivanov toward NATO bordered on hysterical: The threats to put ships from the 
Black Sea Fleet into the Adriatic and Primakov's agreement to kiss up to 
Slobodan Milosevic and Belarussian President Alexander Lukashenko 
concerning a possible Russia-Belarus-Yugoslavia union only succeeded in 
removing Moscow from the group of possible intermediaries in the process of 
settling the Yugoslav crisis. President Boris Yeltsin's appointment of 
Chernomyrdin as the special presidential representative to Yugoslavia greatly 
increased Moscow's chances for playing the peacekeeping role.230  
 
 
During the course of meetings with Gore, Chernomyrdin made the case for a 
third party negotiator to join with him in shuttling to Belgrade.  Given the strongly 
negative response to the NATO air campaign in Moscow, it would not be 
appropriate for Chernomyrdin to be seen “accepting Milosevic’s sword.”  A third 
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party also would build in distance from the eventual negotiated settlement for 
Yeltsin, while simultaneously allowing him to take credit (should it be successful) 
for halting the NATO bombing.  Chernomyrdin suggested Kofi Annan, but calling 
upon the U.N. Secretary General presented the same issue as having NATO 
operate under a U.N. Security Council Resolution:  it gave authority—real or 
perceived—over NATO action to a body that was subject to non-NATO member 
vetoes.   
 
Madeleine Albright apparently had concerns beyond the organizational issues 
between NATO and the U.N., worrying that the U.N. Secretary General Annan 
“favored peace at any cost.”231  Albright suggested the president of Finland (his 
name apparently had been brainstormed by Talbott and Berger the night before), 
Martti Ahtisaari.  Ahtisaari previously had been involved in independence efforts 
for Namibia and had headed the U.N.’s Bosnia Task Force, which gave him 
experience in dealing with Milosevic.  Additionally, Finland is not a member of 
NATO, which provides Ahtisaari with some distance from the military campaign, 
and Finland was slated to take up the E.U. presidency later in the year, giving the 
mission a broader European basis.  Chernomyrdin clearly was pleased to hear 
the suggestion:  “He loudly slapped his hand upon the table and exclaimed 
“Vot!—That’s it.”  For the first time during their meetings, Chernomyrdin’s beefy 
face was animated by the hope of a breakthrough.”232 
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Ahtisaari, on the other hand, while initially enthusiastic, needed a bit more 
encouragement as the actual process was described to him.  Chernomyrdin 
assumed Ahtisaari would travel to Belgrade with him for discussions, perhaps 
hoping to soften NATO’s position by wearing down the envoy.  Ahtisaari balked, 
concerned to be seen as “Sancho Panza to Chernomyrdin’s Don Quixote.”233  
Ahtisaari considered the opportunities for “mischief making” and suggested it 
would be better for another Chernomyrdin mission to work on Milosevic, followed 
by a meeting to set a clear agenda before he travel to Belgrade.    Berger had 
nicknamed the Chernomyrdin-Ahtisaari duo the “Hammer and Anvil,” for their 
respective roles in this diplomacy:  Ahtisaari would hold to a strong base of 
demands, and Chernomyrdin would pummel Milosevic “into acceptance.”234 
 
It apparently was President Ahtisaari’s suggestion that some time be built into the 
initial phase of negotiations in order to bring Milosevic closer to NATO’s 
demands.  Chernomyrdin, mindful of Yeltsin’s exhortation to get the bombing 
stopped post haste, was uncomfortable with the delay, but agreed.  It is clear 
from some sources that what was presented as a two-headed negotiation team 
was rather a three-person commission with the United States (in the form of 
Strobe Talbott) participating fully in the meetings.235   At Chernomyrdin’s request, 
Talbott arranged to travel to Moscow, in advance of a meeting in Helsinki with 
Ahtisaari. 
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On May 6, Kosovo was discussed at a G-8 meeting in Bonn, where the ministers 
agreed a statement described as “the lowest common denominator between 
Russia and the West.”236  It called for the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from 
Kosovo (but not “all” as in the NATO demands), and the presence of an 
international force (but not necessarily “military,” and therefore not necessarily 
NATO).  Chernomyrdin and Milosevic subsequently would attempt to use the G-8 
formulation of demands throughout the negotiation process, in order to skirt 
some of the more stringent NATO requirements. 
 
Yeltsin credited the apparent change in demands to his envoy, but his 
disappointment at Chernomyrdin not accomplishing the full mission seeped 
through his statement: "of course, he didn't manage to solve everything –
stopping the bombing and so forth, but we did not count on that. We counted on 
him bringing the positions of the Americans, NATO and [Yugoslav President 
Slobodan] Milosevic closer together."237 
 
On May 7, NATO bombed a target selected for it by the CIA—the only target the 
CIA would provide during Operation Allied Force238 – and bombed the Chinese 
embassy in Belgrade.  The explosions killed three embassy employees and 
wounded twenty more.  The Chinese reaction was immediate and virulent, calling 
the bombing a "barbaric attack and a gross violation of Chinese sovereignty.”239 
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NATO Photos situating the Embassy of the PRC and Target -- Hotel Yugoslavia 
 
 
NATO’s Secretary General Javier Solana acknowledged the error, "We've 
recognized that this is a mistake, and this is a mistake we regret."240  President 
Clinton “called Jiang Zemin with profuse apologies…Zemin was frosty…The 
attack was an unprovoked act of war under international law, which treated 
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embassies as national territory.  Accordingly, Clinton ordered a full investigation 
and offered compensation for the loss of life.”241  
 
The Chinese, who had abstained during U.N. Security Council Resolution votes 
on Kosovo, viewed the NATO air campaign with alarm and concern over 
analogies between Kosovo and Tibet, just as the Russians were alarmed over 
the possible precedent Kosovo set for its relationship with Chechnya.  Chinese 
officials called a special session of the Security Council and condemned NATO’s 
actions.  The Russian delegation joined in, "NATO is going beyond all borders," 
said Russia's U.N. ambassador Sergei Lavrov. "We are really disturbed over this 
barbaric action. We are outraged over this barbaric action. And we call and 
demand an immediate investigation."242  
 
President Yeltsin spoke with the Chinese President and decided to send his 
Balkan envoy to Beijing “to synchronize watches in a broad sense with the 
Chinese leadership which does in many ways share our position with regard to 
what is happening in Kosovo….”243  It seems likely that Chernomyrdin’s trip was 
intended to brief Zemin on the momentum of negotiations and the probability of a 
role for the United Nations.  Despite some speculation that Chernomyrdin had 
discussed Chinese participation in a U.N. sponsored peacekeeping force for 
Kosovo, it is unlikely that Chernomyrdin would have been the appropriate conduit 
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for such discussions.244  In fact, there were reports of military to military contacts 
between Russia and China in subsequent weeks.245 
 
Strobe Talbott arrived in Moscow for preliminary talks in preparation for three 
way negotiations over Kosovo.  During a meeting with Yuri Mamedov, Russia’s 
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (for the Americas), Talbott was informed that 
Yeltsin’s anger over the Chinese embassy bombing had him to the point of 
“pulling the plug on Chernomyrdin’s mission” as mediator in the Kosovo 
conflict.246  It is likely that Yeltsin’s contact with Jiang Zemin, as well as his visit 
from French President Chirac, had him working through the possibilities of halting 
NATO’s bombing through international pressure rather than mediation. 
 
If the NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy caused ripples in the progress of 
Russian mediation over Kosovo, its potential domestic impact in Russia was 
likewise significant.  Yeltsin had been probing for cracks in the NATO and 
western allies over the air campaign, and while there were some to be found, 
Russia had not yet been able to drive a wedge between allies in order to stop the 
bombing.  China, while obviously concerned over precedent, had been relatively 
impassive on the issue of Kosovo at the Security Council.  With the embassy 
bombing, China suddenly became a potential ally in efforts to stop NATO.  For 
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Russia to shift toward China in pursuit of alliance would cause a dramatic tilt and 
upset nearly a decade of hard-fought relationships. 
 
Domestically however, such a shift would have played very strongly to the 
nationalist opposition and potentially removed the threat of presidential 
impeachment.  Yeltsin’s administration had staked itself on economic reforms 
that tied it to western markets and financial institutions, but the possibility of 
tacking left on foreign policy and undercutting both his prime minister and 
parliamentary opposition by an end run must have appealed to Yeltsin’s 
penchant for the dramatic. 
 
In Midnight Diaries, Yeltsin contemplates the political atmosphere in April-May 
1999 and explains that he decided that what was needed was a “sharp, 
unexpected, aggressive move [because it] always throws your opponent off 
balance and disarms him, especially if it is unpredictable and seems absolutely 
illogical.”247  Whatever shifts developed over the Chinese embassy bombing, 
Yeltsin already had begun to spring his political surprise and had laid the 
groundwork for his next move.  In addition to backing away publicly from his 
prime minister and advancing Sergei Stepashin, Yeltsin had established a small, 
unofficial Kremlin council for “political planning,” which would have been focused 
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on countering impeachment efforts.  Its members were reportedxxi to include 
Yeltsin’s daughter Tatyana Dyachenko, Alexander Voloshin (Head of the Kremlin 
Apparat), Oleg Syusev (Deputy Head of the Kremlin Apparat), Vladimir Putin 
(currently Secretary of the Security Council and Director of the FSB), and Sergei 
Stepashin (then First Deputy Prime Minister and Head of the MVD).248 
 
The Russian Duma’s hearings on the five counts of impeachment were 
scheduled for May 13-15.  “The president was accused of committing treason by 
signing the 1991 Belavezha accords, which terminated the USSR; ordering tanks 
to shell the Supreme Soviet in October 1993; abusing his powers by sending 
troops to Chechnya in late 1994; bringing about the collapse of the Russian 
armed forces (through underfunding); and facilitating genocide (in the form of a 
sharp decline in Russian living standards and life expectancy).”249 
 
Duma deputies would be voting separately on each count of impeachment, and it 
was thought that the Chechen war charge was most likely to pass.  Communist 
Party leader Gennadi Zyuganov counted on the support of even the reformist 
parties, "I cannot conceive how Yavlinsky will refuse to vote in favor of 
accusation of unleashing the Chechen War, and how he will return to his 
                                                        
xxi The report on this new political planning council was published prior to Victory Day 
(May 9), and thus pre-dates Yeltsin’s dismissal of Primakov. 
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electorate and justify the genocide or destruction of almost entire economic and 
defense complexes.”250 
 
There were a multitude of reports and analyses on the renewed executive-
legislative confrontation, some of which seemed to have read the tea leaves on 
Yeltsin’s coming announcement, but few quite so presciently as ultra-nationalist 
Vladimir Zhirinovsky:  “Zhirinovskiy said today that Prime Minister Yevgeniy 
Primakov's government might be dismissed this month and that the current 
interior minister, Sergei Stepashin, might become the next prime minister. … 
Zhirinovskiy also predicted that the current impeachment proceedings launched 
by the left-wing parliamentary majority against the president would fail. …  
Zhirinovskiy denied the speculation by Communist leader Gennadiy Zyuganov 
that some of the LDPR lower house deputies would back the move to 
impeach....”251 
 
On May 12, Yeltsin dismissed Primakov.  In his memoirs, Yeltsin explained the 
timing of events: “If the vote in the Duma took place and the procedure for my 
removal from office began, it would be far more difficult for me, in that hamstrung 
position, to remove Primakov.  The Duma members knew this as well as I did.”252  
Yeltsin had left himself just enough time to retain the threat of disbanding the 
Duma. 
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According to Primakov, Yeltsin asked him to put forward his resignation.  His 
response to the request to resign was negative, “No, I won’t do that.  I don’t want 
to make it any easier for anyone.  You have the constitutional authority to sign an 
appropriate decree.  But I’d like to tell you, Boris Nikolayevich, that you’re making 
a big mistake.”  After repeated refusals to resign, Yeltsin’s Chief of Staff 
Alexander Voloshin brought in a decree authorizing Primakov’s dismissal.253 
 
Primakov claims that Yeltsin grew “upset by what was going on,” winced and 
grabbed at the left side of his chest.  Doctors rushed in and gave him medication, 
after which Yeltsin, feeling better, hugged Primakov and suggested, “Let’s stay 
friends.”254  Yeltsin characterized Primakov’s dismissal as the “most dignified and 
courageous” of all he had overseen.255 
 
In his televised announcement, Yeltsin noted, "We are just treading water," he 
said. "The economy is not working. What we need is a clever breakthrough, not 
just prudence."256  Under Primakov, the economy had steadied, but there were 
scant indications of growth.  Given the circumstances of the previous year 
however, Primakov could be credited with preventing more widespread collapse.  
His government also had re-negotiated with the IMF for the resumption of 
financial assistance.  However, his pursuit of “economic criminals” associated 
  
163 
with reform and privatization had done little to inspire private investment or 
prevent capital flight. 
 
The new prime minister, as had been surmised, was Sergei Stepashin.  In the 
announcement, Yeltsin explained his selection of Stepashin: “Sergei Vadimovich 
Stepashin demonstrates great energy and capability. He has serious experience 
of leading federal departments. I am sure that he is capable of giving an 
additional impetus and the necessary dynamism to the work of the 
government.”257  Stepashin’s career was spent with the Interior Ministry before a 
foray into politics in 1990.  In 1994, Yeltsin named Stepashin to head the Federal 
Counterintelligence Service (later the FSB), a post he resigned in the wake of the 
Budyonnovsk hospital hostage taking.  He returned as Justice Minister in 1997, 
and was appointed Interior Minister in 1998.   
 
The response to Yeltsin’s move may best have been described by Vitali 
Tretyakov, “the dismissal of Yevgeny Primakov from the post of head of 
government, and the appointment of Sergei Stepashin to that office had the 
effect of an exploding bomb in Moscow. However, absolutely nothing unexpected 
has happened.”258   
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The Duma met in emergency session, passing a resolution that claimed the 
president had "thrown the country again into a government crisis and caused 
events to evolve unpredictably."259  There were early indications that some 
deputies recognized the futility of another confrontation with the president.xxii  
Grigori Yavlinski, interviewed the night of the announcement likened Yeltsin’s 
maneuver to “tipping over the chess board before the game, not even during, but 
before the game…all the pieces will fall down and no-one will understand what is 
taking place there.”260  The game was over before it had begun. 
 
The Duma decided, nonetheless, to proceed with the impeachment hearings and 
vote.  Hearings were held May 13 and 14, with the vote scheduled for the 
Saturday, the 15th.  The likelihood of a successful impeachment vote in the 
Duma dwindled, as even some of Yeltsin’s oldest nemeses failed to appear to 
testify to events.261  The vote on Chechnya did come closest to passing, but in 
the end, none of the charges raised against Yeltsin garnered the necessary 300 
votes.  The vote on Stepashin’s nomination came within a week, and he was 
confirmed by a vote of 301 in favor to 55 opposed on the first ballot. 
 
                                                        
xxii One of the Communist Party deputies, Vladimir Semago, suggested that Stepashin’s 
nomination would pass and that the Duma now was unlikely to play “political games” 
with the Kremlin. (Korchagina, May 13, 1999) 
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Yeltsin’s dismissal of the Primakov government created some confusion in the 
Kosovo mediations, primarily in the Russian Foreign Ministry, where Primakov 
had mentored and trained deputies in the years before his appointment as prime 
minister.  Strobe Talbott, meeting with Foreign Minister Ivanov after the 
dismissals found him “despondent” and unsure about his position in the new 
government.  Yeltsin, who was behaving “like Zeus hurling thunderbolts,” had 
demanded explanations for his failure to leverage a split among the allies and 
stop the NATO bombing.262  
 
Ahtisaari, Chernomyrdin, and Talbott began their meetings, with Chernomyrdin 
shuttling to Belgrade to confer with Milosevic.  Mediations focused on the 
composition of the international force in Kosovo, and Chernomyrdin had won 
Milosevic’s agreement that NATO could participate.  Conferring in Moscow, 
Talbott and Ahtisaari persuaded Chernomyrdin that Milosevic needed to accept 
“NATO at the core” of the international force.  After a long night outside Moscow 
at Stalin’s Nearby Dacha, Chernomyrdin agreed to return to Belgrade with the 
stipulation on NATO.  The following day, the Foreign Ministry, evidently finally 
secure with its standing in the new government, re-entered the process. 
 
As Talbott explained to Ivanov the status of the negotiations, Ivanov informed 
him that, Chernomyrdin’s agreement notwithstanding, the principle of NATO at 
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the core was “unacceptable to the Russian government.”263  Ivanov then 
proceeded to call Chernomyrdin and walk back the issue of NATO involvement, 
insisting that having NATO per se supervising the Kosovo force operation was 
not satisfactory.  After a bit of diplomatic wrangling over who spoke for the 
Russian government, Ivanov suggested Talbott return to see Chernomyrdin.  If 
Chernomyrdin confirmed the agreement of the night before, then that could be 
taken as an authoritative statement on the subject (albeit over the Foreign 
Ministry’s protests).264 
 
Before Talbott could leave Ivanov’s office, Ivanov received a call from the new 
prime minister that he took standing at attention.  Stepashin evidently informed 
Ivanov that he would be staying on as foreign minister.  The combination of 
events left Talbott thinking he had gotten “a serendipitous glimpse into the 
workings of a barely functional government that was scrambling to organize itself 
before my eyes.”265 
 
The meeting with Chernomyrdin revealed a key issue for Russia:  NATO at the 
core of any international force in Kosovo presented a hurdle for Russian 
participation in the force (deemed necessary to convince Milosevic to accept the 
idea) over the issue of command of the operation.  The Russian military (involved 
in negotiations by Primakov, if not before), as well as certain parliamentary 
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constituents, resisted any possible suggestion of NATO command over Russian 
troops.  This central issue would re-appear in many guises before the 
negotiations were finished and the force deployed.   
 
The point had been made that Yeltsin’s own position would be imperiled if the 
Russian military was not respected on this point, and so Chernomyrdin was 
forced to retract the commitment made the night before.  Talbott recounts that 
subsequent meetings often included Foreign Ministry personnel clearly tasked 
with keeping Chernomyrdin within their guidelines.266   
 
Yeltsin had pried Kosovo loose from the Foreign Ministry and handed it to his 
Personal Envoy Chernomyrdin as part of a campaign both to discredit his prime 
minister and to justify his stance towards the western allies.  Primakov had been 
removed and the threat of impeachment temporarily withdrawn, but 
Chernomyrdin (and the Foreign Ministry both) had failed to deliver a rapid end to 
the NATO bombardment.  Yeltsin’s military (and foreign intelligence) 
commanders were left dissatisfied with the status quo of NATO’s air campaign 
and perhaps un-reconciled with Primakov’s departure.   
 
As negotiations continued in the end of May, momentum began to develop for a 
final push to settlement.  The array of factors present to launch the 
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Chernomyrdin-Ahtisaari mediation seemed to intensify with time.  The hope of a 
settlement gave further hope that the hard decisions on the deployment of NATO 
ground troops, pushed aside at the NATO Summit, could be left unmade.   
 
In mid-May, a backroom scuffle over the deployment of Apache helicopters 
between the Pentagon and NATO Commander General Wesley Clark broke out 
into the open.  Clark had requested the Apaches in March, but concerns over 
their use slowed approval and deployment.  Eventually, the helicopters were sent 
to Albania, as part of a U.S. Army ground force.  In May, Clark requested access 
to the Apaches for live-fire exercises with the intention of their use in Kosovo.  A 
NATO official noted at the time, “The Serbs are using helicopters against civilians 
in Kosovo. Why can't we use helicopters against the Serbs?"267 
 
The debate over the Apache helicopters naturally refocused discussion on 
putative ground forces.  Despite the rhetoric, it had been fairly clear for months 
that the U.S. was, at the very least, unwilling to commit to the deployment of 
ground troops.  The question that every participant in the conflict sought to 
answer was, if push came to shove, would there be troops on the ground?  The 
British had discussed and argued the point with their American counterparts for 
weeks, as one, unnamed, British minister opined, “We've tried to give some 
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leadership but in the end we depend on the Americans,' one said. 'They have no 
stomach for it and have bigger fish - Russia and China - to fry.'”268 
 
Serb officials initially had counted on a combined approach of inflicting casualties 
on NATO by downing aircraft and publicizing civilian casualties collateral to the 
NATO bombings as a means of short-circuiting the NATO attack.  However, they 
underestimated NATO’s resolve, and, perhaps, “the Western European public’s 
abhorrence of ethnic cleansing.”269  While the issue of a ground invasion did not 
seem to factor highly in Yugoslav calculations,xxiii eventually, it would become the 
most relevant factor, as it was the issue that swayed Milosevic’s only serious 
international supporter. 
 
On May 18, despite background disagreements over the use of Apache 
helicopters or the political wisdom of contemplating such an actual move, 
President Clinton, speaking about the possibility of ground troops in Kosovo, 
said, "we will not...take any option off the table."270  While it did nothing to change 
the political calculus of the situation, Clinton’s announcement seems to have cast 
just enough shade to prevent any certainty from solidifying around what the U.S. 
might do in Kosovo.  Eventually, it would become evident that the Russian side 
                                                        
xxiii   There is some dispute over the role played by the threat of an allied ground 
invasion.  Stephen Hosmer presents its influence as a matter of “inference” from Serb 
sources.  (See Hosmer, 2001, p. 112, footnote, 10) 
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had grown increasingly wary that NATO ground troops deploying to Kosovo were 
a realistic possibility and one that needed to be forestalled. 
 
As May drew to a close, the Ahtisaari, Chernomyrdin, Talbott negotiating team 
began to get a sense that it “was time to go for broke.”271  As the group began 
focused negotiations, the indictment of Slobodan Milosevic by the International 
War Crimes Tribunal was announced.  Chernomyrdin reported to Talbott that 
Yeltsin was deeply concerned about the indictment and its ramifications for any 
attempts at Russian mediation of a peace accord.272 
 
After a mediation meeting in Moscow, and a trip by Chernomyrdin to Belgrade, 
the negotiating team met on June 1, in Bonn, for a very long night of 
negotiations.  The sticking point had become the “total” withdrawal of Serb forces 
from Kosovo.  The Russian side, which in the latter stages came to include a 
significant military perspective, had devised a scenario for the division of Kosovo 
into geographical sectors with Russia in command of its own sector and the 
United Nations in overall political control.273 
 
The possibility of Serb forces using the Russian sector as a physical loophole in 
the agreement, in addition to the logistical difficulties of U.N. versus NATO 
control made the Russian proposal unacceptable to the NATO allies.    After 
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hours of negotiations, in which the tensions in the Russian team among 
Chernomyrdin, Ivanov for the Foreign Ministry, and General Leonid Ivashov from 
the Military sector became more evident, Talbott recommended putting aside the 
issue of the deployment of the international force and command as one to be 
worked out between the Russians and NATO (and therefore not a concern for 
Milosevic).274   
 
Eventually, agreement was reached on the withdrawal of  “all” Serbian forces, 
and, with the stipulation that if Milosevic met the demands in the agreement 
NATO bombing would stop, it was agreed that Chernomyrdin and Ahtisaari would 
present the conditions to Milosevic.  As the team rose to shake hands, “General 
Ivashov made a formal statement disassociating himself from the document 
since the minister of defense had not cleared it.”275   
 
The confusion and discord among the various Russian interests represented at 
the negotiating table were a reflection of the difficulties in Moscow.  Yeltsin had 
orchestrated a remarkable maneuver to undercut Primakov, who still enjoyed 
strong support among the defense and security sectors, as well as other 
constituencies, and had stopped his parliamentary opposition from an 
impeachment effort to end his presidency, but reasserting control and running 
both government and policy remained a challenge. 
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President Milosevic accepted the plan presented to him by Ahtisaari and 
Chernomyrdin, and on June 4 the contours of the Kosovo peace plan were 
announced, with a commitment that Yugoslav forces would begin withdrawing 
from Kosovo within 48 hours.276  Arrangements began for military coordination 
between Yugoslav forces and NATO, as well as for a United Nations resolution 
on the international force for Kosovo. 
 
Viktor Chernomyrdin returned to Moscow to the condemnation of opposition 
forces in the Duma, who accused him of treason.  It seems that while Yeltsin had 
personally empowered Chernomyrdin with plenipotentiary powers, this 
authorization “was contained in a top secret decree,” so Chernomyrdin was 
unable to defend himself from his detractors and there were few Russian officials 
willing to stand on his behalf.277 
 
Both Russia and China took their opportunities in the United Nations debate over 
the resolution for the Kosovo force to condemn NATO and its bombing 
campaign, but the resolution passed on June 10, 1999 with 14 votes in favor and 
China abstaining.  After negotiations and efforts at verification of withdrawal of 
troops, NATO and FRY signed a Military-Technical Agreement that allowed for 
the suspension of air operations, also on June 10, 1999.  
 
  
173 
There remained the issue of Russian involvement in the international force for 
Kosovo and the command of those forces.  The Dayton Accords provided a 
precedent for Russian participation with NATO command filtered through 
American military leaders to Russia’s forces.  Strobe Talbott and his team arrived 
for discussions on the issue in Moscow, June 10.  One of the American military 
advisers on the team, Air Force Lt. General Robert “Doc” Foglesong noted a 
change had come over General Ivashov:  “That fella Ivashov seems to have a 
whole new lease on life.  When Chernomyrdin was there to tell him to shut up 
and salute, he was permanently pissed off.  Now he’s kind of cocky.  I don’t like 
the smell of it.”278 
 
Indeed, there had been some speculation that the Russian military had found 
some way to work a side deal with Milosevic that would help both save face.279  
As Talbott’s team met with foreign and defense ministry deputies, and other 
government officials, the message seemed to become clear that Russia had 
made enough concessions, and thus it was time for the U.S. to make 
concessions over Russia’s role in Kosovo.  Talbott sought assurances that 
Russian forces wouldn’t move into Kosovo without agreement and coordination 
with NATO, but received little of substance, even from the prime minister. 
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As Talbott met with the Secretary of the Security Council, Vladimir Putin, the 
discussions between American and Russian military officials broke down over a 
threat from Ivashov that Russian forces would enter Kosovo from the North if 
NATO troops entered from the South without agreement on Russian 
participation.  Putin dismissed Ivashov’s remarks as an “emotional outburst,” 
assured Talbott there would be “one hundred percent cooperation and 
coordination” between Russian and American forces, and promised a more 
authoritative statement on the subject from the Kremlin.280 
 
The American delegation left Moscow, more hopeful than confident, perhaps, 
that the Kremlin would assert itself over Ivashov and the military hardliners.  That 
evening, Russian troops stationed in Bosnia headed for Pristina in Kosovo to 
deploy ahead of NATO forces.  Travelling through Serbia, they were greeted as 
heroes by Serb troops.  Sandy Berger and Madeleine Albright called Strobe 
Talbott and recommended he “pull a Primakov” – turn his plane around and 
return to Moscow.281 
 
The discussions that followed between American and Russian State Department, 
Foreign Ministry, military, and security personnel suggested either that some 
elements of the Russian Government had acted without the knowledge of the 
Kremlin, or that the Kremlin had acted without informing the relevant ministries.  
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There were reports that President Yeltsin had insisted on a Russian sector in 
Kosovo and ordered the march.  Indeed, Yeltsin took credit for the decision in his 
memoir, “I had to decide whether to let the Russian military land its paratroopers 
at the Pristina Airport in Kosovo. … I decided that Russia must make a crowning 
gesture, even if it had no military significance.  …  This last gesture was a sign of 
our moral victory in the face of the enormous NATO military, all of Europe, and 
the whole world.  I gave the order:  GO.”282 
 
Pavel Felgenhauer, a journalist with strong connections to the military and 
General Staff explained: “[Chief of the General Staff Anatoli] Kvashnin had 
already successfully bypassed [Defense Minister Igor] Sergeyev and after getting 
a nod from Yel’tsin, marched a column of Russian paratroopers through Serbia 
into Kosovo’s capital Pristina to overtake advancing Western peacekeepers.”283  
The President and the General Staff had undercut the negotiators meeting with 
their American counterparts, perhaps having received reports that NATO was 
planning to deploy without Russian agreement. 
 
There was certainly a chilling moment when this Russian maneuver could have 
had catastrophic consequences.  A confrontation over Pristina airport, which the 
Russian military planned to use for resupply and to funnel troops through to its 
“sector,” was short-circuited on two fronts: within NATO’s chain of command, as 
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British General Sir Michael Jackson refused the order from General Clark to 
confront the Russian forces and occupy the airport, choosing instead to de-
escalate the situation; and by the neighboring countries of Hungary, Romania, 
and Bulgaria who refused Russia access to their airspace for Russian resupply, 
thus frustrating the Russian military’s plans.284   
 
After more than a week of negotiations, and with a new political deadline—the G-
8 Summit in Cologne at which Yeltsin hoped to make a triumphant appearance—
the agreement on Russian participation in KFOR was achieved on June 18, 
1999.  In the midst of the negotiations, with the KFOR General Michael Jackson 
and the Russian General Zavzarin at odds over the airport in Pristina (a 
flashpoint situation with potentially serious consequences if the discussions 
failed), President Clinton had finally reached President Yeltsin to request his help 
in calming the atmosphere in Pristina.  After repeatedly spelling the name of the 
Russian general for Yeltsin, there was a pause and Yeltsin announced, “Never 
mind those generals, Bill!  Only you and I can solve this problem!”  Yeltsin then 
suggested that the two meet right away…on a submarine if necessary.285 
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7.  Conclusions 
 
Doubling Down: 
1) When you double down, you place a matching bet next to your original bet and 
receive one and only one additional card, which completes your hand. This 
option makes it possible for you to double your bet under favorable conditions.xxiv  
2) to engage in risky behavior, especially when one is already in a dangerous 
situation.xxv 
 
Russia 
 
The G-8 states’ leaders gathered in Cologne, Germany on June 18 without 
President Yeltsin.  Yeltsin had decided to send his new prime minister, Sergei 
Stepashin, for the first days of the summit.  While concerns about Yeltsin’s health 
and ability to travel dominated speculation over the absence of the Russian 
president, there were more prosaic explanations, including the need for 
Stepashin to discuss economic measures, reschedule debt payments, and to 
seek assistance from other G-8 leaders in convincing the IMF to resume its 
financial assistance to Russia with a $4.5 billion loan.286  It is also notable that in 
discussing economic issues for the first two days of the summit, the participants 
met as the G-7, excluding Russia from decisions on its debt forgiveness and 
financial assistance.287                                                         
xxiv Hoyle’s Blackjack Rules of the Game. 
xxv Urban Dictionary, via 
http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=Double%20Down. 
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Yeltsin arrived for the final day of the summit, when political issues including 
Kosovo and the peacekeeping force, as well as the reconstruction of Yugoslavia 
were on the agenda.  Yeltsin’s arrival was a bit shaky; he reportedly appeared 
“unsteady” as he exited his plane:  “He walked cautiously down the aircraft steps 
at Cologne airport on Sunday, one hand on the rail and the other clutching his 
wife Naina’s hand, appearing to falter slightly on the last step.288  Nonetheless, 
Yeltsin made it clear to reporters that he was looking to “mend ties” after “our 
fight” over Kosovo.289   
 
Yeltsin and President Clinton met for over an hour on the sidelines of the summit 
along with Madeleine Albright, Sandy Berger, and Strobe Talbott, as well as Igor 
Ivanov and other advisers on the Russian side.  After a frank discussion of 
differing perspectives on NATO’s air campaign and the deployment of 
peacekeeping forces in Kosovo, both sides managed to broaden the discussion 
to encompass future conversations on strategic arms reductions, changes to the 
Anti-Ballistic Missile agreement, and Yeltsin extended an invitation for Clinton to 
visit Moscow again.  Berger reported that the Russian President, while walking 
stiffly, “looked robust” in the meeting, even pounding his fist on the table for 
emphasis.290 
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Another perspective on the meeting was provided by Talbott, who found Yeltsin 
looking like “a battered statue that might topple over,” and who had skin “the 
color of plaster.”  Talbot described Yeltsin’s attempts to open the meeting that 
turned into a horrid coughing fit, which brought Yeltsin to tears and turned him 
from plaster pale to “florid to ashen.”  As the blood vessels in his temples 
“throbbed,” the American delegation froze in fear that Yeltsin would “die right 
here in front of us.”291  After Igor Ivanov managed to find one of Yeltsin’s doctors, 
who provided a foul green drink for the president to consume, the meeting finally 
began.  In Talbott’s account, Yeltsin chided Clinton for not heeding his counsel 
over Kosovo and taking the U.S.-Russian relationship to the “brink of collapse.”  
 
Clinton had decided not to quibble with Yeltsin over Kosovo and moved on to 
other topics, but was interrupted midsentence by Yeltsin’s Chief of Protocol, 
Vladimir Shevchenko, who announced that the Russian delegation had to depart 
for the airport immediately, lest they “lose their departure slot” to return to 
Moscow.292  The oddity of the interruption gave it an ominous cast to the U.S. 
team.  The seriousness of the Russian military move to take Pristina Airport had 
left more than a trace of concern at the actual extent of Yeltsin’s control over the 
Russian military and General Staff.  The decision to cut short not only a top-level 
meeting but the remarks of the U.S. president as well, suggested either that 
Yeltsin’s presence was crucially required in Moscow, or that his health was at risk 
if departure was prolonged.  Neither scenario provided comfort.  Clinton gave his 
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impressions of this time in a taped history project, for which he suggested that, 
“Russia’s government was amorphous.  Rivals swarmed like hedge clippers to 
cut down the competent prime minister, Sergei Stepashin, and Yeltsin was a 
dying shadow.”293 
 
Despite the difficulties of the side meetings, the G-8 Summit restored a certain 
balance in U.S.-Russian relations.  President Clinton confirmed in an interview 
that Russia now was “a full member of the G-8.”294 After another month of 
negotiations and the cooperation of the Russian Duma in passing required 
economic legislation, the IMF agreed to restart its financial assistance to Russia.  
Stepashin was able to claim credit for the resumption of aid, but it was not a 
victory he was able to savor for long. 
 
In his memoir, Midnight Diaries, Yeltsin refers to his focus during this period of 
his administration as “Premier Poker.”  The removal of Primakov for Stepashin 
was an audacious move, perhaps even a feint to mask the greater task, which 
was to find a suitable successor and place him (there were no women in 
contention) in a position of substantial authority before the constitutional end of 
Yeltsin’s term in 2000.  It is an interesting side note that Yeltsin felt some need to 
play a bit of “mischief” with the Duma leadership when replacing Primakov with 
Stepashin in May.  Prior to the public announcement, he telephoned Duma 
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Speaker Seleznev to inform him that Primakov would be replaced with the 
Minister of Railways Nikolai Aksyonenko.  Aksyonenko was not popular with 
parliament, and Yeltsin knew his nomination would produce a strongly negative 
response.  As Yeltsin explains, “I could use him [Aksyonenko] to bait the Duma 
and throw the delegates into disarray.  I’d get them ready for confrontation and 
then toss them a completely different candidate.”295 
 
The point of this bait and switch seemed aimed at deflating the legislators resolve 
to oppose the real nominee.  With a bit of advance warning, the deputies would 
prepare for one fight, only to be presented with an entirely different scenario.  
Yeltsin appointed Aksyonenko First Deputy Prime Minister in Stepashin’s 
government – an indication that Yeltsin may have held him in reserve as a 
candidate to replace Stepashin at some point.296 
 
The issue of succession is particularly thorny in Russian history.  As Yeltsin 
noted, the only previous paths to power involved “natural death, conspiracy, or 
revolution.”297  In its transition from communist rule, Russia had no experience 
with a transparent mechanism for the transfer of legitimacy with the end of one 
presidential administration to the start of the next.298  The constitution stipulated 
elections, but Yeltsin clearly was uncomfortable leaving the decision to an open 
field.  His fear of a Communist revanche and his decision not to create a political 
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party to support presidential/governmental policies combined to cast great 
uncertainty on the outcome of an election.   
 
While Yeltsin took great pains to disavow the motive in his memoir, his decision 
to anoint a successor carried a trace of desperation over the post-presidential 
security of the Yeltsin family.  Some analysts posit that the economic crisis of 
August 1998 put the issue of security foremost in Yeltsin’s planning.299  Boris 
Nemtsov, Yeltsin’s one time heir apparent and former First Deputy Prime Minister 
ascribed Yeltsin’s many personnel shifts to his need to retain the aura of 
authority:  “Life was going in one direction and Yeltsin was staying in another 
hospital. … [H]e was so angry that he wanted to prove to the nation that he’s a 
Russian tsar.  How to prove it? Fire somebody.”300 
 
As the summer months progressed, Yeltsin claims that he began to focus on the 
choice of a successor and weighed the appropriate timing to spring a potential 
new heir on the electorate.  As he broached the topic with aides, there was 
resistance.  Stepashin had done nothing wrong.  His first priority, reviving 
financial assistance from the IMF, had been successful, and on July 28, a $4.5 
billion dollar loan for debt service had been approved.301   
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By early August, however, the North Caucasus began to flare up with raids inside 
Dagestan, allegedly by Chechen militants.302  If Chechnya was likely to be the 
focus of upcoming elections, Stepashin was damaged by earlier misjudgments.  
He had been forced from his post as Director of the Federal Counterintelligence 
Services (later the FSB) in 1995 following a disastrous attempt to dislodge 
Chechen militants from a hospital in Budyonnovsk, resulting in the deaths of 
many of the civilian hostages.303 
 
Yeltsin persisted in his decision to remove Stepashin, and his choice for the next 
prime minister candidate was Vladimir Putin.  Putin had been appointed as 
Director of the Federal Security Services in 1998, and then Secretary of the 
Security Council in April 1999. His move closer to Yeltsin’s inner circle had been 
facilitated, in part, by his discreet handling of details of the Skuratov case.  In his 
memoir, Yeltsin notes that repeated conversations, reports, and question and 
answer sessions with Putin revealed him to be a calm professional, who “would 
respond to any challenge with clarity and precision.”  Yeltsin also praised Putin 
for being “firm in the military manner.”304  Yeltsin mentions Putin’s support for him 
in a critical time: In 1998, when I realized the need for Primakov’s dismissal, I 
tortured myself with worries.  Who would support me?  Who was really backing 
me? At some point, I understood that it was Putin.”305  
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There was one incident that does clearly seem to have impressed Yeltsin.  Putin 
had served as Deputy Mayor to Anatoli Sobchak before moving to the Kremlin.  
When Sobchak lost his re-election bid in 1996 (with Putin heading up the 
campaign), he was pressed with corruption charges.  Before Sobchak could be 
arrested, Putin had him spirited out of the country through Finland to France.  
Sobchak only returned to Russia after Putin became acting president.306  Putin’s 
support of his former mentor produced in Yeltsin “a profound sense of respect for 
and gratitude toward him.” 307 
 
Yeltsin makes some vaguely contradictory claims in his memoir that leave room 
for speculation as to whether the dismissal of Stepashin was pre-planned in May.  
Certainly, there are indications that Yeltsin may have been considering the switch 
and considered the decision a heavy burden.  He described this foreknowledge 
of events as a “black shadow.”  “I felt heaviness.  I was again taking responsibility 
for the fate of others.  I would have to answer for the unpredictable 
consequences of my behavior.”308   Eventually, he evaluates Stepashin and Putin 
based on their strength of will and resolve, foreseeing a “fierce political battle” in 
the run up to parliamentary elections in December. 
 
Yeltsin informed Stepashin of his decision, and despite Stepashin’s strong 
displeasure with the decision, Putin was named acting Prime Minister in August 
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1999.  With the critical assistance of Emergencies Minister Sergei Shoigu, a pro-
government, centrist political party, “Unity” was created to compete in the 
elections and garnered a respectable second place showing, just behind the 
Communist Party, but with enough representation to make the parliament more 
manageable for a new president. 
 
Yeltsin kept the secret of his New Year’s Eve message from everyone but Putin 
until just a few days before the announcement.  His description of his rationale 
was familiar: “If the news were to leak, the whole effect would be lost.  The 
emotional, human, and political point of my gesture would be gone.  The energy 
of the decision would dissipate.”309  After taping the announcement, Yeltsin 
continued with the last of his presidential duties, including a meeting with the 
Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church, Aleksei: “A manly decision,” the 
patriarch proclaimed.310  It is likely this would stand as one of Yeltsin’s favorite 
commentaries on the decision. 
 
Yeltsin’s last moments as president were spent transferring the nuclear suitcase 
to Putin, meeting with the power ministers at a farewell lunch, and sipping 
champagne.  Clinton called as Yeltsin headed back to his dacha.  He put off 
taking the call.  Putin’s first decree, signed December 31, 1999 provided for 
guarantees to the president of the Russian Federation and his family.311 
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Kosovo 
 
Despite the success in signing an agreement on Russian military participation in 
KFOR, it would take another few weeks for the details to be resolved.  On July 7, 
1999, Russia and NATO agreed to the principles for Russian participation in the 
security force for Kosovo.  It is interesting to note that the purpose of the mission 
is described in the agreement as follows: “to establish a secure environment for 
the return of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons and to monitor, and if 
necessary enforce, compliance with the Military Agreement and the 
demilitarization of the KLA.”312 
 
Russian forces participated in the regular duties of peacekeepers in KFOR, and 
in addition maintained the airport at Pristina, as well as a hospital.  Russian 
participation ended on July 2, 2003, when the Russian government decided to 
withdraw from operations in both Bosnia and Kosovo “in light of the improving 
security situation in the region and … other commitments.”313 
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Russian Participation in KFOR314
 
A = Allied, Partner, or other non-Russian Contingent 
 
NOTES: * There will be Russian officers serving as the Representatives for Russian 
Forces in the FR/GE/US sectors respectively  
 * All troops in KFOR have full freedom of movement throughout the territory of 
Kosovo as ordered by COMKFOR 
 * KFOR Commander has full authority to order NATO forces to execute 
missions refused by a Russian Commander 
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The intervention in Kosovo has been widely debated in the years since Operation 
Allied Force.  Within the U.S., there was some concern that outrage over 
massacres in Kosovo, along with years of experience in negotiating with 
Milosevic predetermined a military outcome.  As previously noted, the National 
Security Council may have contributed unwillingly to the realization of an 
outcome it assumed would be the result of negotiations:  “The NSC’s preference 
for a military option became something of a self-fulfilling prophecy.  Each time 
Milosevic’s behavior - such as his refusal to personally attend the Rambouillet 
talks - signaled intransigence, he reinforced the NSC’s conviction in military 
force.  In response, the NSC would devote increasing amounts of time, funding, 
and political capital to its preparations for a military option.”315 
 
Both the mediation efforts and the NATO air campaign were closely identified 
with the U.S. Secretary of State, perhaps in part because Madeleine Albright was 
so clearly passionate about preventing another Bosnia on her watch: “When 
people thought that we'd made a mistake, they called it Madeleine's war, and not 
in a complimentary way. But I think that we would have been judged very, very 
harshly had we not stepped up to this. I believe in learning lessons, and I felt, at 
the time, that we were much too slow in responding to what Milosevic was doing 
in Bosnia. It is not often that you get a second chance.”316 
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In both short and longer term perspectives, NATO’s actions in Kosovo, as well as 
the process by which they were undertaken, have been seen as undermining the 
Westphalian value of sovereignty and setting a new precedent for international 
action.  As one veteran American diplomat noted, “The hitherto inviolable 
sovereignty of the nation state is now conditional, subject to the approval of the 
international community of its peers “in Security Council assembled.” … This 
evolving principle of international law coalesced in Kosovo, facilitated by a 
serendipitous combination of political developments in the Balkans, Europe, and 
the world. British Prime Minister Blair proclaimed Kosovo a victory for the 
progressive approach to foreign policy, replacing outmoded concepts which 
placed traditional concerns of national sovereignty ahead of the right of 
individuals to live free from persecution.”317 
 
Vladimir Putin has raised the reinterpretation of Kosovo as precedent to new 
levels.  Even before the Georgian-Russian War of 2008, after which Russian 
recognized the sovereignty of two of Georgia’s provinces, Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia, Putin warned that Kosovo had marked a new, universal norm: "Naturally 
if we resolve the problem in Kosovo in a certain way, the approach, the solution 
should become applicable to similar cases. … If we overlook the principle of 
territorial integrity and say: "Well it so happened and nothing can be done with it, 
the international community does not want to do anything for the restoration of 
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the territorial integrity of Serbia," then other nations also have the right to say: 
"We will also do so.""318 
 
At the time of NATO’s air campaign, Putin was Secretary of the Security Council, 
as well as Director of the FSB.  His role in the process of negotiating Russian 
participation in the Kosovo peacekeeping force was judged by American 
participants to be cool and calm.  He claimed to have been the individual who 
suggested to Yeltsin that Chernomyrdin be named envoy for the Kosovo 
mediation.  He also explained the Russian military rush to Pristina airport as a 
result of both internal Russian political dynamics and the damage done to 
President Yeltsin by NATO’s air campaign by noting at the time that Russia was 
in the middle of a “pre-election struggle” and that “Russian hawks” were to blame 
for the Pristina airport deployment.  He further implied that he disagreed with the 
decision to move the troops into Kosovo, but suggested that NATO’s actions had 
damaged Yeltsin.  The most important issue, according to Putin, was that “no 
one in Russia should be able to call President Yeltsin a puppet of NATO.”319 
 
It is clear that in the aftermath of Primakov’s dismissal as prime minister, there 
were efforts to subsume Russian foreign policy formulation into the realm of 
presidential decision-making, thus making Yeltsin personally more responsible 
for foreign policy outcomes.  Oleg Levitin, a former Russian Foreign Ministry 
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employee, who participated in the working group for the Contact Group on 
Kosovo, noted “Russian foreign policy became more presidential, but also more 
volatile, without clear lines of political authority, particularly with respect to the 
military.”320 
 
In Putin’s presidential administration, as in Yeltsin’s, there were periods both of 
greater Foreign Ministry control and moments of the reassertion of presidential 
prerogative.  The primary difference has been in the silencing of policy criticism.  
The lessons of Kosovo learned administratively almost certainly led to attempts 
at reining in the Russian military.  One of Putin’s earliest decrees attempted to 
reestablish a form of political commissar patrolling within military units. In 
February 2000, a presidential edict set out that the “FSB leadership, [would be] 
tasked with investigating terrorist activity, espionage, smuggling, sedition and a 
host of other criminal activity within the Russian military.”321 
 
For some analysts, the Kosovo campaign produced a psychological stigma for 
Russia.  In this interpretation of events, NATO’s bombing campaign and the fact 
that it was undertaken over Moscow’s strenuous objections pushed Russia, 
despite its participation in the negotiating process, its membership in the Contact 
group, its newly-established relationship with NATO, and its seat on the U.N. 
Security Council backward into the crowd of states whose voices were hushed by 
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western, by American, determination to act.  “Russia had already become 
concerned about the United States dominating international politics as the sole 
superpower….  So, too, it had already become concerned about NATO 
enlargement.  Russia saw the Kosovo War as amply demonstrating the validity of 
these concerns.”322  
 
The primary effect of the Kosovo campaign for relations with Russia, however, 
remains the interpretation, reinterpretation, and perhaps even willful 
misinterpretation of Kosovo as precedent for international behavior.  In recent 
months, Putin has returned to his claims of Kosovo as precedent for Russian 
actions within the territory of the former Soviet Union.  As relations between 
Russia and Ukraine have deteriorated, Putin chided critics for ignoring his 
version of the Kosovo precedent: "Our western partners created the Kosovo 
precedent with their own hands. In a situation absolutely the same as the one in 
Crimea they recognized Kosovo's secession from Serbia legitimate while arguing 
that no permission from a country's central authority for a unilateral declaration of 
independence is necessary. …  That's what they wrote, that’s what they 
trumpeted all over the world, coerced everyone into it - and now they are 
complaining. … It's beyond double standards. …  It's a kind of baffling, primitive 
and blatant cynicism. One can't just twist things to fit his interests, to call 
something white on one day and black on the next one. … We stand against 
having a military organization meddling in our backyard, next to our homeland or 
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in the territories that are historically ours. I just cannot imagine visiting NATO 
sailors in Sevastopol."323 
 
Putin’s argument and its exaggerated rhetoric of the danger posed by NATO 
mask an ambition for a unique Russian role in “territories that are historically 
ours.”  Ukraine’s independence and the sovereignty confirmed by previous 
Russian and Soviet governments are abandoned for a self-serving analysis of 
the Kosovo precedent.  Regardless of the intemperateness of Putin’s remarks, 
they are an unfortunate aftereffect of actions taken in Kosovo. 
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Yeltsin 
 
President Yeltsin’s leadership in crisis situations displays a strong and highly 
personalized approach that takes account of the intricacies of political intrigues, 
but nonetheless demonstrates a preference for bulldozing, or overturning the 
board, as a means of accomplishing his ends.  During the period under 
consideration in this study, from July 1998 through June 1999, Yeltsin balanced 
competing concerns in the domestic and foreign policy arenas, retreated behind 
an unlikely prime ministerial partner when necessitated by events, and undercut 
his prime ministers, parliaments, and even military when he deemed it 
necessary.  However, the frequency of his bursts of political action in crisis 
should not distract from his periods of inaction and retreat, whether as a rest to 
consider events as earlier in his presidency, or as his health necessitated in later 
periods. 
 
It is clear that Yeltsin preferred to choose action when the stakes of his decision-
making were particularly high.  As his biographer, Tim Colton, noted, “Yeltsin’s 
red-letter actions as leader were most often taken in spasms of effort and in 
crises he had a part in stimulating. … Yeltsin was likeliest to see a political 
challenge as in scale to his talents when its magnitude was great and the chips 
were down.  He took for granted that he could meet the challenge and others 
would not. … In suspenseful situations, Yeltsin’s habit was to ratchet up the 
  
198 
sense of crisis, and ergo the demand for decisive action to defuse it, by playing 
wait-and-see as long as he could.”324 
 
Yeltsin denied this charge, obviously raised throughout his presidency, in his 
memoir, A Struggle for Russia, “In emergency situations, I’m strong.  In ordinary 
situations, I’m sometimes too passive.  Sometimes I don’t look anything like the 
Yeltsin everyone has grown used to seeing.  I mean, I can fly off the handle in a 
stupid way, like a child. That is probably a weakness. Other people say my 
weakness is that I create obstacles so that I am forced to make a terrible effort to 
overcome them heroically later.  That’s not true.  The obstacles find me on their 
own.  Always.  I don’t go looking for them.”325 
 
Yeltsin’s method of evaluating his options and the likely consequences of a 
decision were heavily weighted with the importance both of the need for the 
decision and the make-or-break nature of the outcome.  Yeltsin seemed 
invigorated by the truly critical decisions, but spent little time in any consideration 
of altering a decision once made.  In one of the most notorious moments of his 
presidency, Yeltsin decided to dissolve the legislature, then the Congress of 
Peoples Deputies and Supreme Soviet, in the midst of an ongoing struggle for 
constitutional supremacy between the executive and legislative branches.  
Yeltsin made the decision to dissolve the parliament in early September 1993 
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and gradually let his aides and the relevant ministers (primarily military and 
security services) in on the decision.   
 
Yeltsin’s decree was set to be promulgated on September 19, 1993 and the 
planning for its implementation assumed an empty parliament building (then the 
Russian White House), which on a Sunday would be unlikely to have any 
deputies or workers present.  Unfortunately, in the days leading up to the release 
of the decree, word of the president’s intention leaked and the White House 
began to fill with deputies and “defenders.”  Yeltsin met again with his key 
advisers and reached a decision to delay the decree by two days, in order for his 
ministers to conceive a plan that would make the White House inhospitable to the 
legislators.  With concerns over the need to prevent casualties paramount, 
Yeltsin left planning to his Interior Minister, who eventually decided that unarmed 
police should guard the White House. 
 
Yeltsin’s former bodyguard and then head of the Main Administration for the 
Protection of the Russian Federation (GUO), Mikhail Barsukov, heatedly argued 
for military planning that might aim to counter possible scenarios, such as the 
White House remaining in the hands of the deputies or the possibility of an Army 
division taking the side of the White House against the president.  Yeltsin and his 
Minister of Defense, Pavel Grachev, responded angrily; Yeltsin suggested 
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Barsukov take a vacation and only relented when Barsukov asked to stay.  
Yeltsin called Barsukov’s voiced concerns a “mutiny” and a “display of 
weakness.”   
 
After the decree was issued and Yeltsin addressed the nation, the scenarios 
worked out by his team fell apart in the face of resistance by the leaders at the 
White House.  Yeltsin wondered briefly if he should have reconsidered his 
decision, but rejected the possibility:  “When I make some strategic decision, I 
don’t punish myself with ridiculous worries over whether I might have done it 
differently or whether I could have found another way.  Such fulminating is 
pointless.  When I make a choice there is only one thing left to do—implement it 
the best way possible, push it, and follow it through to the end.”326 
 
It did not matter that the circumstances surrounding the implementation of the 
decree had changed utterly, nor that his power ministers were woefully 
unprepared for any but the most banal of responses from the deputies in the 
White House.  Yeltsin had made a decision on a major issue of strategic import.  
Despite his own admonitions, Yeltsin did reflect on events later:  “I later 
exhausted myself trying to understand whether I’d done the right thing, believing 
that we shouldn’t let ourselves be provoked and that our restraint would force the 
outlaws to stop their armed resistance.  Now that the bloody events are over, it 
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can probably be said we were tragically mistaken. … All told, I don’t know, and to 
this day I cannot be sure.”327 
 
The opportunities open to Yeltsin to alter the chain of events in September-
October 1993 were significant, but his response to an alteration of his decisionxxvi 
or the inclusion of any negative scenarios in planning demonstrate his particular 
strain of stubbornness.  His decision had been made and reconsidering it was a 
weakness. 
 
In the course of the crises under consideration in this study, Yeltsin’s motives for 
unexpected behavior were myriad.  Equally plausible interpretations were 
suggested for his fear of losing authority or prominence, for his lack of stamina 
and inability to stay the course of governance that led him to grand strokes of 
interference, and for his political cunning and gamesmanship that delivered an 
outcome of his choosing, at a time of his choosing.  There were evident 
mistakes, but it is clear that when Yeltsin chose to act and worked out a game 
plan to achieve his objectives, he was determinedly focused on his goals.  
Unfortunately, by 1998, the health issues that finally were publicly acknowledged 
                                                        
xxvi Yeltsin did accede to requests to delay the promulgation of the decree based on the 
resonance of the date.  September 19, the original date for the decree struck too close a 
chord with the date of the coup in 1991—August 19. 
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in 1996 were still plaguing the Russian president and his ability to sustain his 
own initiatives was hostage to his infirmities. 
 
There is, of course, an instinct to gauge Yeltsin’s decisions based on their 
outcomes.  If the point of Yeltsin’s game of “Premier Poker” was to provide 
himself the right opportunity to select a successor and create favorable 
circumstances for that successor’s election to the presidency, Yeltsin succeeded 
in spades with Putin and the political party initially called “Unity.”  Yeltsin claimed 
that his real goal was to give Putin “the most important, the dearest thing I had: 
my political legacy.  And I wanted to do this through victory in the elections—the 
sort of public politics he disliked—to safeguard the democratic freedoms of the 
country and to maintain a normal market economy.”328 If that was the outcome 
Yeltsin most wanted, the evaluation of his results may be more mixed. 
 
For much of his career, Yeltsin identified himself as a reformer.  As part of the 
Soviet ruling elite, Yeltsin took up Gorbachev’s reformist policies in the era of 
glasnost’ and perestroika, and pushed for more widespread reform, more quickly.  
As president in the post-Soviet era, Yeltsin staked his presidency on reform, 
primarily economic, and fought political battles with the legislature to protect the 
reformers in his government.  Avenues of compromise and cooperation were 
rarely explored as battle lines between reformers and the Communist-dominated 
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legislature clashed frequently throughout Yeltsin’s presidential terms.  Yeltsin 
chose to stand apart from party politics, leaving it to subordinates or opposition 
leaders to attempt to fashion a multi-party system.  After leaving the presidency, 
Yeltsin reflected on the failure to establish broad-based pro-Government parties:  
“looking back, I think it wasn’t specific leaders or circumstances of the political 
battles of the moment that were to blame for these failures.  … It was also me 
and my attitude toward the Duma.  …[B]eginning with Gorbachev’s Congress of 
People’s Deputies of 1989, I saw a parliament full of Communists.  … I saw the 
obvious hatred, unconcealed even for the sake of decency, directed toward 
reform and change.  That initial impression of our parliament as unwaveringly 
Communist in orientation never left me.”329 
 
The executive branch of Yeltsin’s government operated for many years with a 
siege mentality that reflected Yeltsin’s concerns about the legislature, as well as 
his personal style of governance.  Yeltsin, perhaps in reaction to the Soviet 
Communist state apparat within which he had operated for years, chose to place 
himself as defender of economic transformation rather than construct the 
bureaucratic, organizational underpinning to support the reforms.330  When it was 
time for Yeltsin to leave the Kremlin, he still felt it was his personal responsibility 
to choose not only his successor, but to help construct a party to support Putin.  
“I thought that reforms could be moved forward with a push of political will.  But 
year after year I watched as the Duma…contrived to negatively influence the 
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situation in the country. … I had to correct this mistake, if only at the very end of 
my second presidential term.”331 
 
In the international arena, Yeltsin’s determination to rid Russia of the isolation of 
the Soviet state and work with the West was coupled with his preference for 
personalization in his relationships with state leaders.xxvii  His decisions, notable 
in regards to Kosovo, were often tinged with a visceral reaction to the “hardliners” 
in the Duma, and not infrequently Yeltsin used a foreign policy victory, 
particularly one that moved Russia closer to the West, as a rebuke to his 
opposition in the legislature.  Similarly, after being forced by the Duma to accept 
Primakov as prime minister, Yeltsin criticized him for not being able to work 
productively with the West in both economics and foreign policy.  His dismissal 
marked the resumption of a more personal presidential role in foreign policy.   
 
The leadership trait most difficult to reconcile with the type of leader Yeltsin tried 
to be is his inconsistency.  Throughout his presidency, Yeltsin was notorious for 
lightning fast or totally unexpected political victories followed by long periods of 
absence, during which time the Russian bureaucracy often churned out decisions 
that seemed to contradict the ideals for which Yeltsin had so exerted himself in 
                                                        
xxvii Yeltsin related particularly well with Germany’s Helmut Kohl and France’s Jacques 
Chirac, saying of them that he “had been blessed with two great allies” and that they all 
“feel a sincere sympathy for one another.” (Yeltsin, 2000, p. 147) 
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political battle.  Yeltsin makes clear, however, that the small decisions, the 
details, were never his strong suit.   
 
For Yeltsin, decisions are about risk and truly monumental decisions require 
great risk.  Yeltsin noted this tendency in himself: “I have a particular relationship 
with risk.  I don’t mean that I’m afraid of nothing or that I don’t react to danger as 
other people do. … But in each episode of danger there is one moment of self-
awareness.  It’s a moment when a thought begins to work itself out automatically, 
looking for an escape. … Risk, including political risk, goes hand in hand with 
calculation.  The most precise calculation is sometimes borne in the most 
extreme situation.”332 
 
The decisions truly worth making were the decisions with the most risk.  This 
may explain Yeltsin’s tendency earlier in his presidency to take an aggressive, 
occasionally brave, stand and fight off a particular challenge (the August 1991 
Coup, for example), following the “battle,” Yeltsin would retreat.  In the later years 
of his presidency, this tendency was underscored by Yeltsin’s need to rest and 
recuperate after a political crisis.  His instinct, nonetheless, was for the big risk, 
the unexpected decision, and for the win; everything was a test, and once he 
passed, he needed to rest.   
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Yeltsin described himself, and in many ways summed up his leadership style as 
well:  I am one of those fairly well-known types of Russian who needs to 
constantly prove his physical strength, his ability to overcome something, to 
breathe deeply (fresh air, of course), and load himself up to complete exhaustion. 
… Fortunately, I was born physically strong.  In addition to being strong, 
however, you must have the desire to win.”333  
 
Yeltsin as president, as leader, was more successful in rising to challenges than 
persisting through the details of organization, of building the blocks of a stable 
democratic state.  In moments of crisis, however, it was exactly Yeltsin’s 
approach to the crisis, as a contest—a game to be won—that brought out his 
strengths in leadership.   
 
 
Yeltsin’s Decision-Making in Context 
 
The focus of this study has been an examination of Russian President Boris 
Yeltsin’s decision-making process in the context of both foreign and domestic 
policy crises.  The timeframe selected encompasses July 1998, as the Russian 
economy faltered and headed to eventual currency devaluation through June 
1999, when NATO’s air campaign in Kosovo ended through mediation proposed 
  
207 
by Yeltsin and negotiated in part by his former prime minister, Viktor 
Chernomyrdin. 
 
The theoretical framework for this thesis builds on the model articulated by 
Robert Putnam of a “two-level game:”  “At the national level, domestic groups 
pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies, 
and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups.  At 
the international level, national governments seek to maximize the adverse 
consequences of foreign developments.  Neither of these two games can be 
ignored by central decision-makers….”334 
 
In the Russian context, the domestic groups included the president and his circle 
of advisers, political parties represented in the parliament, oligarchic power 
players (who controlled media outlets), the prime minister and members of his 
cabinet, as well as representatives of the security organs and leaders from within 
the military.  The foreign developments examined in this study include the 
relationship between the Russian government and foreign economic institutions 
as the Russian economy stumbled, Russia’s position in relation to international 
organizations, such as NATO and the Group of Eight, and the emerging crisis 
and negotiations over Kosovo and the Former Republic of Yugoslavia.   
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Constitutionally, the Russian government is a strong presidential regime, but this 
outcome and the constitution itself were created after a violent confrontation 
between the executive and legislative branches.  The domestic crises considered 
in this study are all tinged with the threat of a revision of power relations between 
the parliament and president.  Yeltsin’s decisions on both domestic and foreign 
policy options often reflected the pressure of, and backlash to, a revanchist 
opposition threatening to undo the president’s policy choices.   
 
The nature of the Russian system contributes to the focus on Yeltsin as the 
individual decision-maker throughout this work.  Yeltsin’s personality, as well as 
the particulars of his biography, specifically involving the status of his health, 
contribute to the atmosphere in which Yeltsin made decisions, and therefore are 
important elements of the study.   The Russian-U.S. relationship, which forms a 
foundational base to the crises and their resolution during this timeframe, also 
displays a high degree of personalization and figures prominently in the work.   
 
In describing the crisis situations in which Yeltsin’s decisions evolved, this study 
also provides insight into Yeltsin’s perceptions (or misperceptions) of the 
environment in which he operated.  This includes his focus on the revanchist 
element in the parliament and his evaluation of the importance of the 
interpersonal relationships he had developed over the years with other state 
leaders.  Yeltsin’s view of the Russian state, as well as his goals for Russia, both 
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domestically, in the form of the transition to a market economy, and in foreign 
policy, in the form of greater acceptance and cooperation with western states, 
also constitutes an integral part of this study.335   
 
This work was proposed as a study of a “chronological sequence of events and 
assessment of the competing demands of domestic and foreign policy on 
Russia’s leadership,” and drew upon a foundation of work in foreign policy 
analysis that examines decision-making and individual leadership as significant 
areas of research.  As noted by Margaret G. Hermann and Joe D. Hagan: “[I]t is 
essential to continue the study of how leaders work to balance what they see as 
the important international factors impinging on their countries with what they 
believe are their domestic imperatives.”336 
 
Throughout the evolving crises considered in this work, the motivations, 
concerns, and preferences of Boris Yeltsin have been factored into the analysis, 
including the possibility that his maneuvers were aimed at providing post-
presidential security for himself and his family,337 that his personal biography 
demonstrated a history of competitive and risk-taking behavior,338 and that 
politically, he was locked into an image of his opposition as Soviet communists 
prepared to strip away the accomplishments of his post-1991 presidency.339 
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At its core this work provides an examination of how Yeltsin “played the two-level 
game,” given his personal constraints, the domestic circumstances of economic 
crisis and resurgent parliamentary opposition, and a developing international 
crisis at a time when Russia’s status in the world was transitional.  As part of this 
analysis, Yeltsin’s Kremlin milieu, his policy advisers, staff, security personnel, 
and so-called “Family” insiders also factor into the decision-making environment.    
 
The Russian government of Yeltsin’s administration displayed greater openness 
than the previous Soviet regimes, as well as the successor Putin-Medvedev 
regimes, however, there remained an arena of “under the rug” Kremlin 
bureaucratic and military struggle that obscures the full range of inputs into 
Yeltsin’s decision-making.   
 
The scope of these behind-the-scenes Kremlin struggles and their impact on 
Yeltsin’s decision-making was examined throughout this work and came to the 
fore in the negotiations over Russian participation with NATO in the Kosovo 
peacekeeping force.  American negotiators noted a striking disconnect in 
information coming from disparate Russian counterparts, enough to raise 
concerns over the leadership of the Russian state and possible limits to Yeltsin’s 
control.  Nonetheless, this work also has made clear that “on the really important 
decisions, it is the president and his politics that matter most, not the 
bureaucracy.”340 
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This analysis of Yeltsin’s decision-making in context was structured on Putnam’s 
“two-level game” model, which “recognizes that central decision-makers strive to 
reconcile domestic and international imperatives simultaneously,”341 and the 
examination of Yeltsin’s response to NATO’s air campaign in Kosovo and the 
FRY, as well as his personnel shuffles in the face of a parliamentary 
impeachment threat have borne out this interpretation.   
 
The aim of this study has been to contribute to a central issue for International 
Relations research, “to improve our understanding of and our explanation for 
states’ foreign policy.”342  Russian mediation and Yeltsin’s decision-making in 
particular played a central role in the international events comprising this work, 
and an understanding of Russian foreign policy at this juncture is of critical 
interest.  The central foreign policy crisis at the heart of this work involves 
Kosovo and the attempt to balance interests of sovereignty with humanitarian 
concerns.  The echoes of the decisions reached during the timeframe of this 
study continue to reverberate in international affairs and current disputes, most 
notably today in Ukraine.   
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APPENDIX A 
Resolution 1160 (1998)  
Adopted by the Security Council at its 3868th meeting,  
on 31 March 1998 
 
The Security Council, 
Noting with appreciation the statements of the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, Italy, the 
Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United 
States of America (the Contact Group) of 9 and 25 March 1998 (S/1998/223 and S/1998/272), 
including the proposal on a comprehensive arms embargo on the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, including Kosovo, 
Welcoming the decision of the Special Session of the Permanent Council of the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) of 11 March 1998 (S/1998/246), 
Condemning the use of excessive force by Serbian police forces against civilians and peaceful 
demonstrators in Kosovo, as well as all acts of terrorism by the Kosovo Liberation Army or any 
other group or individual and all external support for terrorist activity in Kosovo, including 
finance, arms and training, 
Noting the declaration of 18 March 1998 by the President of the Republic of Serbia on the 
political process in Kosovo and Metohija (S/1998/250), 
Noting also the clear commitment of senior representatives of the Kosovar Albanian community 
to non-violence, 
Noting that there has been some progress in implementing the actions indicated in the Contact 
Group statement of 9 March 1998, but stressing that further progress is required, 
Affirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 
1.       Calls upon the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia immediately to take the further necessary 
steps to achieve a political solution to the issue of Kosovo through dialogue and to implement 
the actions indicated in the Contact Group statements of 9 and 25 March 1998; 
2.       Calls also upon the Kosovar Albanian leadership to condemn all terrorist action, and 
emphasizes that all elements in the Kosovar Albanian community should pursue their goals by 
peaceful means only; 
3.       Underlines that the way to defeat violence and terrorism in Kosovo is for the authorities in 
Belgrade to offer the Kosovar Albanian community a genuine political process; 
4.       Calls upon the authorities in Belgrade and the leadership of the Kosovar Albanian 
community urgently to enter without preconditions into a meaningful dialogue on political status 
issues, and notes the readiness of the Contact Group to facilitate such a dialogue; 
5.       Agrees, without prejudging the outcome of that dialogue, with the proposal in the Contact 
Group statements of 9 and 25 March 1998 that the principles for a solution of the Kosovo 
problem should be based on the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and 
should be in accordance with OSCE standards, including those set out in the Helsinki Final Act 
of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe of 1975, and the Charter of the United 
Nations, and that such a solution must also take into account the rights of the Kosovar Albanians 
and all who live in Kosovo, and expresses its support for an enhanced status for Kosovo which 
would include a substantially greater degree of autonomy and meaningful self-administration; 
6.       Welcomes the signature on 23 March 1998 of an agreement on measures to implement 
the 1996 Education Agreement, calls upon all parties to ensure that its implementation proceeds 
smoothly and without delay according to the agreed timetable and expresses its readiness to 
consider measures if either party blocks implementation; 
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7.       Expresses its support for the efforts of the OSCE for a peaceful resolution of the crisis in 
Kosovo, including through the Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office for the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, who is also the Special Representative of the European Union, and the 
return of the OSCE long-term missions; 
8.       Decides that all States shall, for the purposes of fostering peace and stability in Kosovo, 
prevent the sale or supply to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including Kosovo, by their 
nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels and aircraft, of arms and related 
matériel of all types, such as weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment and 
spare parts for the aforementioned, and shall prevent arming and training for terrorist activities 
there; 
9.       Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, a 
committee of the Security Council, consisting of all the members of the Council, to undertake the 
following tasks and to report on its work to the Council with its observations and 
recommendations: 
(a)  to seek from all States information regarding the action taken by them concerning the 
effective implementation of the prohibitions imposed by this resolution; 
(b)  to consider any information brought to its attention by any State concerning violations of the 
prohibitions imposed by this resolution and to recommend appropriate measures in response 
thereto; 
(c)  to make periodic reports to the Security Council on information submitted to it regarding 
alleged violations of the prohibitions imposed by this resolution; 
(d)  to promulgate such guidelines as may be necessary to facilitate the implementation of the 
prohibitions imposed by this resolution; 
(e)  to examine the reports submitted pursuant to paragraph 12 below; 
10.     Calls upon all States and all international and regional organizations to act strictly in 
conformity with this resolution, notwithstanding the existence of any rights granted or obligations 
conferred or imposed by any international agreement or of any contract entered into or any 
license or permit granted prior to the entry into force of the prohibitions imposed by this 
resolution, and stresses in this context the importance of continuing implementation of the 
Agreement on Subregional Arms Control signed in Florence on 14 June 1996; 
11.     Requests the Secretary-General to provide all necessary assistance to the committee 
established by paragraph 9 above and to make the necessary arrangements in the Secretariat 
for this purpose; 
12.     Requests States to report to the committee established by paragraph 9 above within 30 
days of adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken to give effect to the prohibitions 
imposed by this resolution; 
13.     Invites the OSCE to keep the Secretary-General informed on the situation in Kosovo and 
on measures taken by that organization in this regard; 
14.     Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council regularly informed and to report on 
the situation in Kosovo and the implementation of this resolution no later than 30 days following 
the adoption of this resolution and every 30 days thereafter; 
15.     Further requests that the Secretary-General, in consultation with appropriate regional 
organizations, include in his first report recommendations for the establishment of a 
comprehensive regime to monitor the implementation of the prohibitions imposed by this 
resolution, and calls upon all States, in particular neighbouring States, to extend full cooperation 
in this regard; 
16.     Decides to review the situation on the basis of the reports of the Secretary-General, which 
will take into account the assessments of, inter alia, the Contact Group, the OSCE and the 
European Union, and decides also to reconsider the prohibitions imposed by this resolution, 
including action to terminate them, following receipt of the assessment of the Secretary-General 
that the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, cooperating in a constructive 
manner with the Contact Group, have: 
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(a)  begun a substantive dialogue in accordance with paragraph 4 above, including the 
participation of an outside representative or representatives, unless any failure to do so is not 
because of the position of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or Serbian authorities; 
(b)  withdrawn the special police units and ceased action by the security forces affecting the 
civilian population; 
(c)  allowed access to Kosovo by humanitarian organizations as well as representatives of 
Contact Group and other embassies; 
(d)  accepted a mission by the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office for the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that would include a new and specific mandate for addressing 
the problems in Kosovo, as well as the return of the OSCE long-term missions; 
(e)  facilitated a mission to Kosovo by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights; 
17.     Urges the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal established pursuant to 
resolution 827 (1993) of 25 May 1993 to begin gathering information related to the violence in 
Kosovo that may fall within its jurisdiction, and notes that the authorities of the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia have an obligation to cooperate with the Tribunal and that the Contact Group 
countries will make available to the Tribunal substantiated relevant information in their 
possession; 
18.     Affirms that concrete progress to resolve the serious political and human rights issues in 
Kosovo will improve the international position of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and 
prospects for normalization of its international relationships and full participation in international 
institutions; 
19.     Emphasizes that failure to make constructive progress towards the peaceful resolution of 
the situation in Kosovo will lead to the consideration of additional measures; 
20.     Decides to remain seized of the matter. 
 
UN Security Council, Resolution 1160 (1998) Adopted by the Security Council at its 3868th 
meeting, on 31 March 1998, 31 March 1998, S/RES/1160 (1998), available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f1622c.html [accessed 27 March 2014]  
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APPENDIX B 
 
Resolution 1244 (1999) 
Adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th meeting, 
on 10 June 1999 
The Security Council, 
Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and the 
primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and 
security, 
Recalling its resolutions 1160 (1998) of 31 March 1998, 1199 (1998) of 23 September 1998, 
1203 (1998) of 24 October 1998 and 1239 (1999) of 14 May 1999, 
Regretting that there has not been full compliance with the requirements of these resolutions, 
Determined to resolve the grave humanitarian situation in Kosovo, Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, and to provide for the safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons to 
their homes, 
Condemning all acts of violence against the Kosovo population as well as all terrorist acts by any 
party, 
Recalling the statement made by the Secretary-General on 9 April 1999, expressing concern at 
the humanitarian tragedy taking place in Kosovo, 
Reaffirming the right of all refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes in safety, 
Recalling the jurisdiction and the mandate of the International Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, 
Welcoming the general principles on a political solution to the Kosovo crisis adopted on 6 May 
1999 (S/1999/516, annex 1 to this resolution) and welcoming also the acceptance by the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the principles set forth in points 1 to 9 of the paper presented 
in Belgrade on 2 June 1999 (S/1999/649, annex 2 to this resolution), and the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia's agreement to that paper, 
Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other States of the region, as set out in the Helsinki 
Final Act and annex 2, 
Reaffirming the call in previous resolutions for substantial autonomy and meaningful self-
administration for Kosovo, 
Determining that the situation in the region continues to constitute a threat to international peace 
and security, 
Determined to ensure the safety and security of international personnel and the implementation 
by all concerned of their responsibilities under the present resolution, and acting for these 
purposes under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 
1. Decides that a political solution to the Kosovo crisis shall be based on the general 
principles in annex 1 and as further elaborated in the principles and other required 
elements in annex 2; 
2. Welcomes the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the principles and 
other required elements referred to in paragraph 1 above, and demands the full 
cooperation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in their rapid implementation;  
3. Demands in particular that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia put an immediate and 
verifiable end to violence and repression in Kosovo, and begin and complete verifiable 
phased withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces according 
to a rapid timetable, with which the deployment of the international security presence in 
Kosovo will be synchronized;  
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4. Confirms that after the withdrawal an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serb military and 
police personnel will be permitted to return to Kosovo to perform the functions in 
accordance with annex 2;  
5. Decides on the deployment in Kosovo, under United Nations auspices, of international 
civil and security presences, with appropriate equipment and personnel as required, and 
welcomes the agreement of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to such presences;  
6. Requests the Secretary-General to appoint, in consultation with the Security Council, a 
Special Representative to control the implementation of the international civil presence, 
and further requests the Secretary-General to instruct his Special Representative to 
coordinate closely with the international security presence to ensure that both presences 
operate towards the same goals and in a mutually supportive manner;  
7. Authorizes Member States and relevant international organizations to establish the 
international security presence in Kosovo as set out in point 4 of annex 2 with all 
necessary means to fulfil its responsibilities under paragraph 9 below;  
8. Affirms the need for the rapid early deployment of effective international civil and 
security presences to Kosovo, and demands that the parties cooperate fully in their 
deployment;  
9. Decides that the responsibilities of the international security presence to be deployed 
and acting in Kosovo will include:  
a. Deterring renewed hostilities, maintaining and where necessary enforcing a 
ceasefire, and ensuring the withdrawal and preventing the return into Kosovo of 
Federal and Republic military, police and paramilitary forces, except as provided 
in point 6 of annex 2; 
b. Demilitarizing the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and other armed Kosovo 
Albanian groups as required in paragraph 15 below; 
c. Establishing a secure environment in which refugees and displaced persons can 
return home in safety, the international civil presence can operate, a transitional 
administration can be established, and humanitarian aid can be delivered; 
d. Ensuring public safety and order until the international civil presence can take 
responsibility for this task; 
e. Supervising demining until the international civil presence can, as appropriate, 
take over responsibility for this task; 
f. Supporting, as appropriate, and coordinating closely with the work of the 
international civil presence; 
g. Conducting border monitoring duties as required; 
h. Ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of itself, the international civil 
presence, and other international organizations; 
10. Authorizes the Secretary-General, with the assistance of relevant international 
organizations, to establish an international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide 
an interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy 
substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide 
transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of 
provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and 
normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo; 
11. Decides that the main responsibilities of the international civil presence will include:  
a. Promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial 
autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, taking full account of annex 2 and of 
the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648); 
b. Performing basic civilian administrative functions where and as long as required; 
c. Organizing and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for 
democratic and autonomous self-government pending a political settlement, 
including the holding of elections; 
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d. Transferring, as these institutions are established, its administrative 
responsibilities while overseeing and supporting the consolidation of Kosovo's 
local provisional institutions and other peace-building activities; 
e. Facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo's future status, 
taking into account the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648); 
f. In a final stage, overseeing the transfer of authority from Kosovo's provisional 
institutions to institutions established under a political settlement; 
g. Supporting the reconstruction of key infrastructure and other economic 
reconstruction; 
h. Supporting, in coordination with international humanitarian organizations, 
humanitarian and disaster relief aid; 
i. Maintaining civil law and order, including establishing local police forces and 
meanwhile through the deployment of international police personnel to serve in 
Kosovo; 
j. Protecting and promoting human rights; 
k. Assuring the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons 
to their homes in Kosovo; 
12. Emphasizes the need for coordinated humanitarian relief operations, and for the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia to allow unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid 
organizations and to cooperate with such organizations so as to ensure the fast and 
effective delivery of international aid;  
13. Encourages all Member States and international organizations to contribute to economic 
and social reconstruction as well as to the safe return of refugees and displaced 
persons, and emphasizes in this context the importance of convening an international 
donors' conference, particularly for the purposes set out in paragraph 11 (g) above, at 
the earliest possible date;  
14. Demands full cooperation by all concerned, including the international security 
presence, with the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia; 
15. Demands that the KLA and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups end immediately all 
offensive actions and comply with the requirements for demilitarization as laid down by 
the head of the international security presence in consultation with the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General; 
16. Decides that the prohibitions imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution 1160 (1998) shall not 
apply to arms and related matériel for the use of the international civil and security 
presences;  
17. Welcomes the work in hand in the European Union and other international organizations 
to develop a comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of 
the region affected by the Kosovo crisis, including the implementation of a Stability Pact 
for South Eastern Europe with broad international participation in order to further the 
promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability and regional cooperation;  
18. Demands that all States in the region cooperate fully in the implementation of all aspects 
of this resolution;  
19. Decides that the international civil and security presences are established for an initial 
period of 12 months, to continue thereafter unless the Security Council decides 
otherwise;  
20. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council at regular intervals on the 
implementation of this resolution, including reports from the leaderships of the 
international civil and security presences, the first reports to be submitted within 30 days 
of the adoption of this resolution;  
21. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.  
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Annex 1 
Statement by the Chairman  
on the conclusion of the meeting of the G-8 Foreign Ministers  
held at the Petersberg Centre on 6 May 1999 
The G-8 Foreign Ministers adopted the following general principles on the political solution to the 
Kosovo crisis: 
• Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo; 
• Withdrawal from Kosovo of military, police and paramilitary forces; 
• Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security presences, endorsed 
and adopted by the United Nations, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of the 
common objectives; 
• Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo to be decided by the Security 
Council of the United Nations to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all 
inhabitants in Kosovo; 
• The safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons and unimpeded access 
to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations; 
• A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework 
agreement providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of 
the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the 
demilitarization of the KLA; 
• Comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis 
region. 
Annex 2 
Agreement should be reached on the following principles to move towards a resolution of the 
Kosovo crisis: 
1. An immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo. 
2. Verifiable withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces according 
to a rapid timetable. 
3. Deployment in Kosovo under United Nations auspices of effective international civil and 
security presences, acting as may be decided under Chapter VII of the Charter, capable 
of guaranteeing the achievement of common objectives. 
4. The international security presence with substantial North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
participation must be deployed under unified command and control and authorized to 
establish a safe environment for all people in Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to 
their homes of all displaced persons and refugees. 
5. Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of the international civil 
presence under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to be decided by the Security Council of the United 
Nations. The interim administration to provide transitional administration while 
establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing 
institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in 
Kosovo. 
6. After withdrawal, an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel will be 
permitted to return to perform the following functions: 
o Liaison with the international civil mission and the international security 
presence; 
o Marking/clearing minefields; 
o Maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites; 
o Maintaining a presence at key border crossings. 
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7. Safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons under the supervision of the 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and unimpeded access to 
Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations. 
8. A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework 
agreement providing for substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of 
the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the 
demilitarization of UCK. Negotiations between the parties for a settlement should not 
delay or disrupt the establishment of democratic self-governing institutions. 
9. A comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis 
region. This will include the implementation of a stability pact for South-Eastern Europe 
with broad international participation in order to further promotion of democracy, 
economic prosperity, stability and regional cooperation. 
10. Suspension of military activity will require acceptance of the principles set forth above in 
addition to agreement to other, previously identified, required elements, which are 
specified in the footnote below.(1) A military-technical agreement will then be rapidly 
concluded that would, among other things, specify additional modalities, including the 
roles and functions of Yugoslav/Serb personnel in Kosovo: 
Withdrawal  
o Procedures for withdrawals, including the phased, detailed schedule and 
delineation of a buffer area in Serbia beyond which forces will be withdrawn; 
Returning personnel  
o Equipment associated with returning personnel; 
o Terms of reference for their functional responsibilities; 
o Timetable for their return; 
o Delineation of their geographical areas of operation; 
o Rules governing their relationship to the international security presence and the 
international civil mission. 
 
Notes 
1. Other required elements: 
o A rapid and precise timetable for withdrawals, meaning, e.g., seven days to complete withdrawal and air 
defence weapons withdrawn outside a 25 kilometre mutual safety zone within 48 hours; 
o Return of personnel for the four functions specified above will be under the supervision of the international 
security presence and will be limited to a small agreed number (hundreds, not thousands); 
o Suspension of military activity will occur after the beginning of verifiable withdrawals; 
o The discussion and achievement of a military-technical agreement shall not extend the previously 
determined time for completion of withdrawals. 
 
Accessed March 27, 2014, via http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/u990610a.htm 
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APPENDIX E 
 
ПРЕЗИДЕНТ РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ 
УКАЗ 
от 31 декабря 1999 г. N 1763 
О ГАРАНТИЯХ ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ, ПРЕКРАТИВШЕМУ 
ИСПОЛНЕНИЕ СВОИХ ПОЛНОМОЧИЙ, И ЧЛЕНАМ ЕГО СЕМЬИ 
     В целях обеспечения правовых, социальных и иных гарантий Президенту 
Российской Федераций, прекратившему исполнение своих полномочий, и членам 
его семьи до принятия соответствующего федерального закона постановляю: 
     1. Установить, что Президенту Российской Федерации, прекратившему 
исполнение своих полномочий в связи с истечением срока его пребывания в 
должности либо досрочно в случае его отставки или стойкой неспособности по 
состоянию здоровья осуществлять принадлежащие ему полномочия (далее 
именуется - Президент Российской Федерации, прекративший исполнение своих 
полномочий), и членам его семьи предоставляются следующие правовые, 
социальные и иные гарантии: 
     а) Президент Российской Федерации, прекративший исполнение своих 
полномочий, независимо от возраста имеет право на ежемесячное пожизненное 
денежное содержание в размере 75 процентов месячного денежного 
вознаграждения Президента Российской Федерации. В случае назначения или 
избрания Президента Российской Федерации, прекратившего исполнение своих 
полномочий, на государственную должность Российской Федерации, 
государственную должность субъекта Российской Федерации или на 
государственную должность государственной службы выплата указанного 
денежного содержания приостанавливается на период замещения им одной из 
указанных должностей; 
     б) Президенту Российской Федерации, прекратившему исполнение своих 
полномочий, пожизненно предоставляется государственная охрана в местах его 
постоянного или временного пребывания в полном объеме мер, предусмотренных 
Федеральным законом "О государственной охране", включая предоставление 
специальной связи и транспортное обслуживание. Государственная охрана 
предоставляется также членам семьи Президента Российской Федерации, 
прекратившего исполнение своих полномочий, проживающим совместно с ним 
или его сопровождающим; 
     в) Президенту Российской Федерации, прекратившему исполнение своих 
полномочий, и проживающим совместно с ним членам семьи сохраняется право 
на медицинское обслуживание, которое им предоставлялось на день 
прекращения Президентом Российской Федерации исполнения своих 
полномочий; 
     г) жизнь и здоровье Президента Российской Федерации, прекратившего 
исполнение своих полномочий, подлежат обязательному государственному 
страхованию за счет средств федерального бюджета на сумму, равную годовому 
денежному вознаграждению Президента Российской Федерации; 
     д) Президент Российской Федерации, прекративший исполнение своих 
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полномочий, обладает неприкосновенностью. Президент Российской Федерации, 
прекративший исполнение своих полномочий, не может быть привлечен к 
уголовной или к административной ответственности, задержан, арестован, 
подвергнут обыску, допросу либо личному досмотру. Неприкосновенность 
Президента Российской Федерации, прекратившего исполнение своих 
полномочий, распространяется на занимаемые им жилые и служебные 
помещения, используемые им транспортные средства, средства связи, 
принадлежащие ему документы и багаж, на его переписку; 
     е) Президенту Российской Федерации, прекратившему исполнение своих 
полномочий, предоставляется в пожизненное пользование одна из 
государственных дач; 
     ж) Президент Российской Федерации, прекративший исполнение своих 
полномочий, имеет право бесплатно пользоваться залами для официальных лиц 
и делегаций аэропортов и аэровокзалов, железнодорожных вокзалов и станций, 
морских вокзалов (портов) и речных вокзалов; 
     з) Президент Российской Федерации, прекративший исполнение своих 
полномочий, имеет право бесплатно пользоваться правительственной и другими 
видами связи, которыми располагают органы государственной власти, органы 
местного самоуправления и организации на территории Российской Федерации, и 
право на внеочередное получение услуг связи. Все виды почтовых и телеграфных 
отправлений Президента Российской Федерации, прекратившего исполнение 
своих полномочий, пересылаются (передаются), обрабатываются и доставляются 
в разряде правительственных; 
     и) Президент Российской Федерации, прекративший исполнение своих 
полномочий, имеет право содержать за счет средств федерального бюджета 
аппарат помощников. Помощники Президента Российской Федерации, 
прекратившего исполнение своих полномочий, несут ответственность за 
исполнение своих обязанностей только перед ним. Общий месячный фонд 
оплаты труда помощников Президента Российской Федерации, прекратившего 
исполнение своих полномочий, устанавливается в первые 30 месяцев после 
прекращения им исполнения своих полномочий в сумме, не превышающей 2-
кратного размера ежемесячного денежного вознаграждения Президента 
Российской Федерации, а в последующем - не превышающей 1,5-кратного 
размера ежемесячного денежного вознаграждения Президента Российской 
Федерации. В пределах указанного фонда оплаты труда Президент Российской 
Федерации, прекративший исполнение своих полномочий, самостоятельно 
определяет должностные оклады своих помощников, порядок и размер их 
премирования. Для размещения аппарата помощников Президенту Российской 
Федерации, прекратившему исполнение своих полномочий, предоставляется 
отдельное служебное помещение, оборудованное мебелью, оргтехникой (в том 
числе персональными компьютерами, подключенными как к общей сети, так и ко 
всем имеющимся правовым базам и государственным информационным 
системам, копировально-множительной техникой, аппаратом факсимильной 
связи), средствами связи, в том числе правительственной связью; 
     к) после смерти лица, замещавшего должность Президента Российской 
Федерации, каждому члену его семьи назначается ежемесячное пособие в сумме, 
равной 6-кратному минимальному размеру пенсии по старости, установленному 
федеральным законом на день его смерти. Круг членов семьи, имеющих право на 
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указанное пособие, и сроки его выплаты определяются применительно к статьям 
50 и 51 Закона Российской Федерации "О государственных пенсиях в Российской 
Федерации"; 
     л) лицам, указанным в подпункте "к" настоящего пункта, предоставляется 
право пользования служебным автотранспортом, а также сохраняется право на 
медицинское обслуживание, которое им предоставлялось, в течение пяти лет со 
дня смерти лица, замещавшего должность Президента Российской Федерации. 
     2. Установить, что наряду с гарантиями, предусмотренными настоящим 
Указом, Президенту Российской Федерации, прекратившему исполнение своих 
полномочий, и членам его семьи могут предоставляться иные гарантии, 
предусмотренные федеральным законодательством. 
     3. Установить, что финансирование расходов, предусмотренных настоящим 
Указом, осуществляется за счет средств федерального бюджета. Расходы 
органов государственной власти, органов местного самоуправления и 
организаций, связанные с обеспечением социальных гарантий Президенту 
Российской Федерации, прекратившему исполнение своих полномочий, 
возмещаются за счет средств федерального бюджета в порядке, установленном 
Правительством Российской Федерации. 
     4. Правительству Российской Федерации обеспечить финансирование 
расходов, связанных с реализацией настоящего Указа, в пределах средств, 
предусмотренных в федеральном бюджете на финансирование Администрации 
Президента Российской Федерации. 
     5. Настоящий Указ вступает в силу со дня его официального опубликования.  
Исполняющий обязанности 
Президента  
Российской Федерации 
В. ПУТИН 
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